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CHAPTER I 
INDIA'S POPULATION PREDICAMENT: THE NEED FOR 
A DUAL APPROACH 
Introduction 
Explosive population growth in India is generally con-
sidered the most serious obstacle to her social and economic 
development and a major contributor to the world's popula-
tion growth. Although India encompasses only 2.4% of the 
world's land area, it contains 15% of the world's popula-
tion. In mid-1978, India's population wai 638.3 million 
(Nortman and Hofstatter, 1980: 10). And it has been 
in~reasing at the rate of more than one million a month as 
suggested by the preliminary estimates from the 1981 census 
which placed India's population at 683.8 million (Visaria 
and Visaria,1981: 3). The major cause of this rapid popu-
lation growth is the gap in the timing of the decline of the 
mortality and fertility rates. Mortality has declined con-
siderably during the past few decades mainly due to signifi-
cant improvements in world medical knowledge and public 
health measures. This improved mortality control technology 
was quite readily importable since it is relatively indepen-
dent of a country's level and pace of socio-economic devel-
1 
opment. In contrast, fertility which is more heavily depen-
dent on the social and economic forces of development has 
not registered the same rates of decline, thus, creating 
2 
rapid population growth. Mortality rates have declined from 
48.6 per 1000 in the 1911-1921 decade to an estimated 15 per 
1000 in 1978. Birth rates, on the other hand, have just 
declined to 34-35 per 1000 (estimate) in 1978 from a high of 
45.5 per 1000 in the 1911-1921 decade. 1 The future direction 
of India's population change will, therefore, depend mainly 
on the trends in the birth rate. 
A welcome trend in the levelling off of the nation's 
population growth rates during the 1971-81 decade is evident 
in the preliminary results of the 1981 census (Population 
Council, 1981: 325-334). According to the Population Coun-
cil report, the average annual growth rate for the 1971-1981 
decade was 2.23%, slightly higher than the 2.2% of the 
1961-1971 decade. The states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and 
Orissa are the main contributors to this stabilization in 
2 the growth rate. Among these three states, Kerala's experi-
ence is particularly significant in that the decline in her 
growth rate between 1961 and 1981 has been the most pro-
nounced. Kerala's population grew at a high annual rate of 
1Data for the 1911-1921 decade were obtained from the 
United Nations (1965) publication while the Nortman-Hofstat-
ter (1980) compendium was the source for the 1978 data. 
2 The average annual growth rates for Kerala, Tamil Nadu, 
and Orissa during the 1971-1981 decade were 1.74%, 1.59%, 
and 1.8% respectively. 
2.34% in the 1961-1971 decade before dropping to a low of 
1.74% during 1971-1981. A detailed analysis of Kerala's 
population experience in the 1970s may provide useful infor-
mation and guidelines for an effective national population 
policy. 
Continuous reductions in mortality rates and lack of 
significant opportunities for migration requires concentra-
tion on fertility declines as the principal source of the 
decline. Modernization and an effective family planning 
program have been the two major components of the population 
control policy at the national and state levels. It is 
hypothesized that modernization and the family planning pro-
gram will influence fertility in two ways: at the normative 
level they may engender changes in individual's attitudes 
toward and desires for large families; at the behavioral 
level, they can lead to smaller family sizes. Unfortu-
nately, these two approaches have been central to competing 
rather than complementary propositions. 
Modernization And Fertility Behavior 
A major theme at the 1974 World Population Conference 
in Bucharest was "Development is the best contraceptive." 
Citing the fertility reductions attained during the indus-
trialization of the West, reductions that were achieved 
without family planning programs, the Third World argued for 
more aid in their economic development from the advanced 
nations (Tak, Haub, and Murphy, 1979: 31). The central 
thesis of the development or modernization argument is that 
unless a small family is economically beneficial and hence 
desired, provision of family planning services will not be 
effective in controlling fertility. Modernization would 
create the necessary conditions and motivations that are 
likely to lead to a decline in fertility. 
4 
Moore (1974) and Desai (1976) discuss these necessary 
conditions in terms of the core processes that modernization 
involves. The following are some of the processes that are 
considered important indicators of modernization: changes 
in socio-economic status through improvements in education, 
income, and occupation; shifts from rural to urban living 
and from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly indus-
trial economy; better accessibility to modern health care 
facilities, improvements in life expectancy and reductions 
in infant mortality; improved work opportunities and status 
for women, changes in the structures and role relations in 
the family; and changes in the value orientations from a 
traditional-fatalistic outlook to one in which the individ-
ual has more control (rational choice) over his actions. 
Finally, demographic changes in the form of declining birth 
and death rates are also considered integral parts of mod-
ernization (Moore, 1974: 100-102). 
Social demographers who view modernization as the 
prime mover of fertility decline use the theory of household 
choice as a frame of reference. One of its basic tenets is 
that economic factors ultimately influence fertility deci-
sion making (Carvajal and Geithman, 1976: 32-39). As Mur-
doch (1980: 26) stated it, "the great mass of poverty 
stricken peoples of the world have large families because 
5 
they are poor and because having a large family is the eco-
nomically rational decision for poor parents to make."3 In 
other words, couples generally attempt to maximize the util-
ity derived from children and other goods and services 
within the constraints of price, time, and income. The 
changes involved in modernization, like improvements in 
income, education, and work opportunities, especially for 
women, reductions in infant mortality, and egalitarian fam-
ily relationships, open up other functions, sources of 
income, and means of personal satisfaction which are effec-
tive alternatives to childbearing. For example, compulsory 
education for children, legislation against child labor, and 
mechanization of agriculture are a few of the modern ele-
ments that will reduce the economic productiveness of the 
offspring in their childhood. At the same time, when higher 
education becomes an effective means to higher status, 
parents would tend to invest more in a few children. Fur-
~The analysis of the failure of the Khanna study in a 
Punjab village by Mamdani (1972) provides a good example. 
According to Mamdani, the villagers refused to use contra-
ception that was offered to them because to do so "---would 
have meant to willfully court economic disaster." (Mamdani, 
1972: 21). Given the existing village economy, the only 
means to a higher status for these poor villagers was to 
have many sons. They could either contribute to the working 
of the land in lieu of hired labor and increase savings to 
be used in purchasing more land or they could find employ-
ment in the city in order to help the parents. 
6 
the~, the imp~ovements in educational, occupational, and 
income status of people, by pe~itting savings fo~ the 
futu~e, will ~educe dependence on child~en as a secu~ity fo~ 
old age. In sho~t, as the standa~d of living of couples 
imp~oves, the costs of child~en ~elative to the benefits 
de~ived f~om them inc~eases, influencing motivation in the 
di~ection of smalle~ families. 
Following this a~gument, it is often ~ecommended that 
planned economic and social, g~owth should fo~ the majo~ 
pa~t of the action p~og~am designed to cont~ol population 
(Glass, 1965: 23-24; Davis, 1975). In the absence of 
imp~ovements in living standa~ds, bi~th cont~ol p~og~ams 
will not be effective. Acco~ding to Davis, the population 
policies of many developing count~ies igno~e the motivation 
o~ desi~e to have la~ge families. Favo~able attitudes 
towa~d and acceptance of bi~th cont~ol methods, scientifi-
cally dete~ined th~ough the KAP su~veys, 4 a~e falsely con-
side~ed synonymous with desi~es fo~ smalle~ families. It is 
possible fo~ women to desi~e to use cont~aception afte~ they 
have had a ce~tain numbe~ of child~en, gene~ally a numbe~ 
highe~ than the ~eplacement level. Quite f~equently, con-
t~aception is desi~ed only fo~ the pu~poses of spacing, 
although that is likely to ~educe overall fe~tility to a 
4 Knowledge, Attitudes, and P~actice (KAP) su~veys we~e 
conducted in seve~al count~ies to dete~mine the extent of 
the people's knowledge of, attitudes towa~ds, and p~actice 
of cont~aception. 
limited extent. Basic changes in the social and economic 
structure will be necessary if parental motivation for hav-
ing large families is to be affected. 
7 
Davis (1975: 31-32) also cites the case of Taiwan 
where the birth rates declined dramatically from a high of 
50.0 in 1951 to 32.7 in 1965. Although several researchers 
have attributed this decline to the family planning campaign 
in Taiwan, the program was begun only in 1963. In contrast, 
argues Davis, "the decline represents a response to modern-
ization similar to that made by all countries that have 
become industrialized." (Davis, 1975: 32). Modernization 
in Taiwan represented a combination of rapid economic growth 
and population increase in a limited territory which made 
large families disadvantageous. These factors created a 
high demand for abortions and other contraceptives at a time 
when the family planning program was started. Thus, even 
the post 1963 decline in fertility is not completely due to 
the program. 
Much research has also been done to document the role 
of socio-economic development in reducing birth rates. 
Kasarda (1971), Heer (1968), and Ekanem (1972) are among 
those who have used cross-sectional and time series data 
from different nations to analyze the relationship between 
economic development and fertility. These studies assume 
that people in the developed and rapidly developing socie-
ties would adopt family planning irrespective of whether a 
family planning program exists. They also postulate the 
8 
success of a p~og~am to depend on a high deg~ee of u~baniza­
tion and indust~ialization~ with thei~ concommitant shifts 
in desires toward small families. Hence, they concent~ate 
on studying the relationship of economic development and 
fe~tility using different indices of development. Fo~ exam-
ple, Kasa~da uses levels of u~banization, indust~ialization, 
and education as exogenous va~iables whose effect on fe~til­
ity is mediated mainly through the p~opo~tion of women 
employed in the non-agricultural occupations, p~opo~tion of 
women who a~e unpaid family wo~ke~s, and extent of child 
labo~. 
Using data f~om Latin Ame~ican count~ies, Oechsli and 
Ki~k (1975) discuss how fe~tility declines a~e an integral 
aspect of mode~nization. Majo~ declines in fe~tility were 
found to occu~ in those count~ies which had achieved suffi-
cient social and economic p~og~ess to achieve substantially 
low levels of mo~tality. What is even mo~e significant is 
that within a count~y such as B~azil fertility diffe~ences 
between ~egions co~~esponded with thei~ levels of mode~niza­
tion. Fo~ example, the highest birth ~ates of 40 to 46 pe~ 
1000 we~e found in the No~theaste~n states of B~azil which 
we~e the least developed a~eas. On the othe~ hand, the low-
est bi~th ~ates (20-30) we~e associated with the most devel-
oped states while the ~egions with some development had 
bi~th ~ates between 30 and 40. This type of evidence is the 
basis fo~ the a~gument made by the advocates of the develop-
ment app~oach that unless a society unde~goes mode~nization, 
9 
thereby changing the structural influences on the motivation 
for a large family, fertility reductions will not be 
achieved. 
Family Planning And Fertility 
At the other extreme is the family planning perspec-
tive, best exemplified by the work of Tsui and Bogue (1978, 
1979). They utilized socioeconomic and family planning data 
from 113 third world countries for the time period of 
1968-1975 in evaluating th~ role of family planning pro-
grams. Although modernization was not substantial in these 
countries between 1968 and 1975, they had succeeded in 
reducing their fertility. Further, it was the countries with 
higher 1968 birth rates that had achieved pronounced 
declines in fertility. This success, according to Tsui and 
Bogue, was largely due to the organized family planning 
efforts initiated in these countries in the early 1960s. 
Hence, "instead of clinging to the doctrine that general 
economic and social development is the dominant cause of 
fertility decline, demographers should be willing to con-
sider the possibility that a major factor in recent fertil-
ity declines in LDCs has been the massive intervention of 
organized family planning programs" (Tsui and Bogue, 1979: 
103) • 
One of the classic examples of the role of family 
planning program in fertility declines is that of Java and 
10 
Bali in Indonesia.5 According to researchers, it was the 
family planning campaign vigorously initiated in 1971 in 
Java and Bali that was responsible for seventy-five percent 
of the fertility reduction between 1967-71 and 1976. In 
Bali the birth rate in 1976 was 28 per 1000, a sharp decline 
from a high of 44 around 1968. By the end of 1976, nearly 
50% of the eligible couples were also using birth control 
compared to practically no users in 1971. At the same time, 
there was relatively little change in fertility in other 
parts of the country where the program was not as strong 
during this period. 
Tsui and Bogue propose a new theory of fertility to 
take account of this new evidence (1979: 104-105). If 
through family planning programs individuals are informed 
that limiting their family size will help in improving their 
living standards, they will tend to do so under certain con-
ditions: if they believe the message; if they have the 
required knowledge about contraception; if they believe that 
the methods are effective, socially acceptable, relatively 
harmless, and easy to use; and if the methods are available 
readily and economically. Thus, even if standards of liv-
ing, education, and other status characteristics are low, 
family planning programs which create the required 'cogni-
tive preparation' and which provide the necessary services 
5The following discussion on Indonesia is taken from Mur-
doch, 1980: 54-55 and Tak, Haub, and Murphy, 1979: 33-34. 
11 
will achieve the desired reductions in family size. 
Although this theory is very appealing and promising, 6 
no conclusive evidence exists that a family planning pro-
gram, in itself, can lead to substantial declines. An imme-
diate example is that of India which has had an official 
program since 1952 and whose family planning budget has been 
increasing every year so that in 1975 it was almost one and 
one-half times its health budget (146%, Tsui and Bogue, 
1978: 28). Yet, the decline in its total fertility rates 
has been only 8% between 1968 and 1975, one of the lowest 
among the 113 countries studied by Tsui and Bogue (1978: 
13). At the same time, substantial declines in fertility 
have been achieved in countries even before family planning 
programs were begun, as in the case of Taiwan discussed ear-
lier. In Indonesia (Murdoch, 1980: 55), fertility declines 
had begun before 1971, the year the family planning program 
was begun. These declines are attributed partly to the ris-
ing age at marriage of the 1960s, a trend that continued 
into the 1970s. 
Moreover, the advocates of the family planning per-
spective do not make clear whether the fertility declines 
were attained by the programs in the absence of the changes 
in motivation generally occasioned by modernization. In 
Indonesia for example, between 1965 and 1974, when fertility 
6 The source for the ideas concerning the pitfalls of the 
family planning perspective in the following two paragraphs 
is Murdoch, 1980: 55-56. 
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declines were spectacular, per capita gross national product 
also increased by an average of 4.1% per year, chiefly due 
to the sale of oil. Further, in Bali, where the fertility 
decline has been greatest, a large proportion of women were 
employed outside the home and demand for child labor was 
reduced because of collective farming which was introduced 
on a large scale during the same period. Thus, the evidence 
does not warrant the unequivocal conclusion of the primary 
role of family planning drawn by the supporters of the fam-
ily planning perspective. 
This is especially true of Tsui and Bogue's analysis 
(1978) of socio-economic and family planning data. In a 
regression analysis of the 1975 total fertility rates on the 
level of socioeconomic development in 1968, status of family 
planning in 1972, and the 1968 total fertility rate esti-
mates, the model was found to explain 86% of the total vari-
ance. 76% of the variance was due to the 1968 total fertil-
ity rate, the strongest predictor. The family planning 
effort index accounted for 4.7% of the variance after the 
effect of the 1968 total fertility rates and the socioeco-
nomic variables had been considered. The rest of the vari-
ance (5.5%) was attributed to the independent effect of the 
five socioeconomic variables. Therefore, Tsui and Bogue 
contended that family planning has an independent and sig-
nificant impact on fertility. This conclusion, however, is 
only one side of the picture. An equally strong and inde-
pendent influence is seen in the case of the socioeconomic 
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indices, eventhough they have to be considered collectively. 
Moreover, there is no difference in the total variation 
(5.5%) explained by the socioeconomic measures before and 
after the family planning index was introduced. 7 Changes in 
the regression coefficients of the socio-economic variables 
after the introduction of the family planning index also 
suggests an 'association between the extent of modernization 
in 1968 and family planning status in 1972. For example, 
the standardized regression coefficients for the per capita 
Gross National Product in 1968 was reduced in half from .125 
to .067, after the family planning effort score was entered 
into the equation. Similar patterns are evident in the case 
of infant mortality rates and percentage of females employed 
in agriculture in 1968. The regression coefficients became 
much smaller after the family planning index was introduced. 
It is, therefore, a strong possibility that the effect of 
modernization on fertility is mainly indirect through its 
influence on family planning. A path analytic model, in 
lieu of the multiple regression model used by Tsui and 
Bogue, would have clarified the nature of the indirect role 
of modernization on fertility through family planning. Such 
an analysis would have also minimized the possibility of 
rash conclusions as to the predominant significance of fam-
ily planning on fertility declines. 
7unfortunately, the differences in variance explained by 
the family planning index before and after the socioeconomic 
measures were introduced are not available. 
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Another caution in accepting Tsui and Bogue's 
conclusion about the role of socio-economic development is 
voiced by Murdoch (1980: 57). Most research has indicated 
that socio-economic development is one of the major influ-
ences on fertility levels around 1968. 8 Fertility levels in 
1968 were the best predictors of the 1975 fertility levels 
in Tsui and Bogue's analysis. Therefore, the same processes 
of modernization which influenced the 1968 fertility rates 
should be relevant to the fertility levels in 1975 too. 
Murdoch also criticizes Tsui and Bogue for omitting crucial 
determinants of fertility, such as distribution of income, 
literacy, and life expectancy, from their analysis. When 
critical factors are not included in the measurement of 
. 
socio-economic development, the proportion of variance 
explained is bound to be smaller. 
The major reason for these conflicting conclusions is 
the differences in perspectives adopted in interpreting the 
data. Taiwan is a good case in point. On the one hand, 
researchers such as Davis (1975) and Li (1973) concluded 
that the declines in Taiwan's fertility rates since 1956 
were not induced by the family planning program initiated in 
1963, but by the reduced infant mortality and improved edu-
cational status. A revealing example is found in the exam-
8 Even though some countries initiated family planning 
programs in the early sixties or even earlier, vigorous 
implementation of the programs did not start until the late 
sixties and early seventies when international attention 
began to be focussed on population and modernization. 
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ple of Taichung city, where fertility rates did not change 
much inspite of the concentration of action programs. In 
fact, the decline in the fertility of women in the major 
cities and rural towns of Taiwan was higher than that in 
Taichung (Li, 1973: 101). On the other hand, Srikantan 
(1977: 227) and Schultz (1973), among others, contend that 
the family planning program in Taiwan speeded up the fertil-
ity declines that had already begun much earlier under the 
influence of modernization. 
Complementarity Of Family Planning And Modernization 
From the conflicting and complementary research on the 
correlates of fertility declines in developing countries 
discussed thus far, one definitive conclusion can be drawn. 
Both modernization and family planning programs seem neces-
sary if future declines in fertility are to be achieved 
quickly and efficiently. Modernization induces shifts in 
motivation toward smaller families. The family planning 
programs not only legitimize these small family norms but 
also provide couples the necessary means to actualize these 
norms. 
Historically, fertility declines, through voluntary 
family limitation, started in Europe under a wide range of 
levels in socioeconomic development (Walle and Knodel, 1980: 
29-40). For example, reductions in fertility began in Hun-
gary, France, and Bulgaria, when these societies were predo-
minantly agrarian and had low literacy rates. On the other 
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hand, fertility declines through family limitation did not 
begin in England and Wales until it was highly urbanized and 
industrialized. 
A mixed picture is also obtained in the case of 
today's developing countries. One of the best sources from 
this point of view is the cross-country study done by Maul-
din and Berelson (1978). They analyzed the relation of sev-
eral indices of socioeconomic development around 1970 and an 
index of the government's effort in family planning to 
changes in fertility between 1965 and 1975 in 94 developing 
countries.9 Singapore, Korea, and Costa Rica, for example, 
which had a high level of modernization and a strong family 
planning program experienced around 29-40% declines in fer-
tility (clearly the largest) between 1965 and 1975. 
Declines were modest in the case of countries with advanced 
development but weak family planning programs (Brazil, 10% 
and Turkey, 16%) as well as in nations with moderately 
strong family planni~~ programs, but low levels of modern-
9The index of socio-economic development comprised of 
adult literacy levels, proportion of 5-19 year olds enrolled 
in school, per capita GNP, proportion of adult males engaged 
in non-agricultural occupations, percentage of population 
living in cities with 100,000 or more, infant mortality 
rate, and life expectancy at birth. 15 items were included 
in the index of family planning effort reflecting the role 
of government in the family planning effort, availability of 
different methods of contraception, efforts to provide edu-
cation, information, and methods and the sources used, and 
the extent of program evaluation. The composite score 
ranged from a low of 0 to a high of 30 since the responses 
were given a value of 2 for yes, 1 for a qualified yes, and 
0 for no. 
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ization (India, 16% and Indonesia, 13%). Mauldin and 
Berelson's research indicates that "social and economic con-
ditions in which family planning programs can be effective 
may not be so stringent as once believed" (Birdsall, 1980: 
37). 
Yet, while well organized programs that provide infor-
mation and methods of family limitation have contributed to 
the fertility decline in many countries, its efficacy would 
be improved if there were concommittant modernization. 
Research has shown that lower status individuals, i.e., 
those with lower education, income, and other socio-economic 
statuses, generally have the least access to the modern fam-
ily limitation services. Birdsall (1980: 38-39) presents 
data from the World Fertility Surveys for developing coun-
tries. Those with less education and rural women were the 
most likely not to use contraception, inspite of not wanting 
any more children. Rural-urban and educational differences 
in contraceptive use were also examined by Birdsall after 
controlling for the strength of the family planning program. 
In countries with strong programs and relatively advanced 
modernization, such as South Korea and Costa Rica, very few 
residential and educational differences were noted compared 
to the countries with weaker programs. Stronger demand for 
contraception and easier access to the modern birth control 
measures on the part of the educated and urban women are 
major reasons for the differences. These discrepancies are 
greater in countries where family planning is either not 
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subsidized or administered by the government and development 
is low. 
The complementarity of modernization and family plan-
ning programs at the aggregate level has also been docu-
mented by Srikantan (1977) using data around 1970. From his 
analysis of the family planning programs of several develop-
ing countries, he concluded that well developed programs 
speed up fertility declines initiated by socio-economic 
development (as operationalized by declining infant mortal-
ity and increasing education of women). 
Modernization and a family planning program are, thus, 
clearly interdependent and complementary approaches to the 
population problem. Improvements in the social and economic 
statuses of individuals influence motivation in favor of 
smaller families and create a demand for family limitation 
services. It is also suggested (although not much 
researched) that the influence of social and economic char-
acteristics on motivation is mediated through social and 
cultural factors such as the secularization of attitudes, 
improvements in the status of women (van den Walle and Kno-
del, 1980), and openness to outside influences (Beaver, 
1975). In this context, a well organized family planning 
program involving not only the provision of information and 
services, but also education regarding the benefits for both 
the individual and society to be derived from smaller fami-
lies and aimed at all segments of society will help in actu-
alizing these desires for small families. Herein lies the 
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need for integrating the family planning program with a 
nation's program for modernization. However, it is not nec-
essary to achieve a threshold level of modernization (which 
in itself will vary among countries) before implementing the 
family planning program. As Tak, Raub, and Murphy (1979: 
36) suggest on the basis of their analysis of data from the 
World Fertility Survey, modernization through its influence 
on education, age at marriage, and infant mortality on the 
one hand, and family size desires and contraceptive use on 
the other, is a long run and indirect tool in controlling 
fertility. In the short run, it is the universal provision 
of contraceptive information and effective service that will 
speed up the fertility declines that have already begun in 
most countries. 
Many of the third world countries, recognizing the 
importance of population problems, have begun to incorporate 
population policies into their national development plans 
(Stamper, 1977). For example, 63% (38) of the governments 
of the 60 countries that Stamper studied do recognize that 
rapid population growth adversely affects their socio-eco-
nomic development. Among these 38 countries, only 68%, how-
ever, have designed some specific policy to check the rate 
of population growth. Further, many of these policies do 
not get implemented during the plan periods. Thus, although 
population growth is recognized as a problem, there are 
severe discrepancies between policy and action. 
Modernization And Family Planning In India 
Applying this framework to India, we find that some 
20 
modernization has indeed been accomplished, especially since 
10 
she gained Independence in 1947. There has been increasing 
urbanization induced by both industrial and non-industrial 
forces (such as commercial and administrative). The scale 
of industrial production for various items has increased 
considerably. For example, production of coal tripled in 
the period between 1950-51 (32.8 million tons) and 1974-75 
(95.3 million tons). Similarly, within this time period the 
installed capacity of electricity increased 10 times (from 
1.8 million kilowatts to 18.5 million) and there was also a 
12 fold increase in the amount of electricity generated (5.9 
thousand million kilowatts to 69.4 thousand million). At 
this stage, the nation possesses the capacity to produce all 
types of goods and machinery, although not in the quantities 
required by a modern nation (Johnson, 1979: 133). Further, 
village and small scale industries, which are more common in 
India, create jobs and improve the level of economic activ-
ity in the smaller towns and villages while working closely 
with the agricultural economy. Thus, they are a significant 
element in India's transition to industrial modernization. 
In the field of agriculture too, the Green Revolution has 
1 0 ~ The data on the modernization and the family planning 
status of India were obtained from the following sources: 
Nortman and Hofstatter, 1980; Johnson, 1979; Tsui and 
Bogue, 1978; Government of India, 1979; Gueruviere, 1973; 
Stamper, 1977). 
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played a significant role through the introduction of high 
yielding varieties of grain and provision of irrigation 
facilities, fertilizers, and other chemicals, and credit, 
among other things. For example, the total area under cul-
tivation of crops, such as cereals, pulses, oilseeds, cot-
ton, and jute has increased nearly 45% from 1947-48 to 
1974-75. 
Aside from the agricultural and industrial sectors, 
improvements have also been documented in the spheres of 
education, land reform, health, and general standards of 
living. There has also been increasing political socializa-
tion leading to the development of political consciousness. 
The caste system, the joint family, and the traditional 
value system have lost some of their overriding influence on 
the social structure. These changes, however, have been 
achieved through a continuous blending of selected tradi-
tional values with the ideology of modernization. This 
integration has been possible partly through the reinterpre-
tation of Hinduism and its religious and philosophical foun-
dations to fit the needs of modernization. India's modern-
ization so far presents a unique pattern that challenges the 
view of a complete replacement of traditional culture as a 
basic prerequisite of modernization. 
Nevertheless, India has a long way to go before she 
can be fully modernized. Despite her efforts to industrial-
ize, about 70% of her labor force is still engaged in agri-
culture and cottage/small scale industries. The primary 
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sector (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and mining) is still 
the major contributor to her domestic product. There has, 
however, been a 6% increase in the contribution of the sec-
ondary sector and nearly 8% in that of the tertiary sector 
between 1950-51 and 1973-74. 
A major setback in India's attempt at economic modern-
ization is the rapid growth in population. Total food pro-
duction doubled from a low of 55 million tons in 1950-51 to 
110 million tons in 1976-77. Trends in national income, 
despite the lack of improvement, have been maintained at 
nearly the same level of increase (an average of 16%) over 
the various plan periods. Yet, the doubling of population 
between 1950 and 1977 has lowered the rate of increase in 
the per capita income to 2.5% during the fourth plan period 
(1969-1974) from 11% during the second five year plan. 
A per capita income of Rs.850 at current prices or 
Rs.340 at the 1960-61 prices also conceals considerable ine-
qualities in the distribution of income. For example, at 
the 1964-65 levels, the richest 10% of the population made 
an average income of Rs.2498 in 1973-74 in contrast to the 
Rs.227 earned by the poorest tenth percent. This top 10% 
also owns nearly 56% of the land and property. Similarly, 
although educational facilities at all levels have been 
expanded, 70% of the population is still illiterate and 55% 
of the students in professional colleges come from 5% of the 
families where the fathers are professionals. Inspite of 
the social and fiscal policies of the government, glaring 
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inequalities exist in the standards of living and in the 
access to the means to improve living conditions. Recent 
research (Murdoch, 1980; van den Walle and Knodel, 1980) 
suggests that reducing inequalities in welfare is a crucial 
component of the attempt to achieve fertility declines. 
Other indices of the extent of modernization in India 
indicate only very moderate successes. In terms of produc-
tion, the per capita consumption of energy (coal) in 1976 
was only 218 kilograms, a mere 2% of the consumption in the 
United States (11,554 kilograms). Further, by 1975-76, only 
29% of the villages were electrified, an essential precondi-
tion to the modernization of agriculture. Even the small 
farmers and peasants, the group most in need of participat-
ing in the development process, has not benefitted much from 
the Green Revolution. 
Parallel to these developments, there have only been 
marginal improvements in health and other social aspects of 
modernization. Infant mortality has decreased from 130 per 
1000 in 1968 to 122 in 1975. Conversely, people were 
expected to live two years longer in 1975 (life expectancy = 
49.5) than in 1968 (47.2). Literacy rates have also 
increased 4% between 1968 and 1975, along with a 2% increase 
in the proportion of females enrolled in shool (26.2% in 
1975). 
Another problem in India's modernization lies in the 
nature of her urbanization. While the urban population as a 
proportion of the total population has not increased much 
24 
(only 19.7% of the population in 1968 and 21.5% in 1975 
lived in urban areas), in absolute terms the urban popula-
tion increased by almost 26 million in the 7 years between 
1968 and 1975. This urban growth has occurred with a rela-
tively small level of industrialization, making available 
fewer opportunities for employment in manufacturing and 
related occupations to the city immigrants. Moreover, it is 
the excess of agricultural labor on land, and not the mod-
ernization of agriculture, that pushes the Indian villagers 
to the city (Mookerjee and Morril, 1973: 17). 
These peculiarities in the urbanization, industriali-
zation, and economic growth in India also have important 
sociocultural implications. The cities in India provide a 
picture of a small, highly urban sector with very new and 
modern values coexisting with a mass of urbanites who are 
not very distant from the rural culture and its social 
structure. Urban residence, higher socio-economic status, 
and higher education of women were found to be related to 
egalitarian relationship between the husband and the wife by 
Conklin (1973). But, since these characteristics are lim-
ited to a small proportion of the population, traditional 
family relationships still prevail. While attempts have 
been made to improve the legal and social status of women in 
India, changes in the former have been more significant than 
those in the latter (Mehta, 1970). That only 26.2% of the 
females are enrolled in school in 1975 compared to 43.5% of 
the males is one indication of the sex disparities in the 
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access to education. 
In gene~al, India since Independence has achieved some 
success in he~ t~ansition to a mode~nized society. But, the 
pace of mode~nization has not kept up with the expectations 
of the gove~nment planne~s and the p~og~ess that has been 
achieved has not been unifo~ly dist~ibuted. 
Along with the planned policies to achieve mode~niza-
tion, the Indian gove~nment has ~ecognized the impo~tance of 
cont~olling population g~owth, if the f~uits of mode~niza­
tion a~e to be mo~e fully ~ealized. 11 India is the fi~st 
count~y to have initiated an official family planning p~o-
g~am as a pa~t of its national five yea~ development plans 
as ea~ly as 1952. It was in the second plan pe~iod (1956 to 
1961), howeve~, that clea~ cut action and ~esea~ch p~og~ams 
we~e unde~taken. Du~ing the fou~th five yea~ plan 
(1969-1974) the family planning budget was Rs.3,300 million 
and was Rs.5,842 million du~ing 1974-1979, giving it a high 
p~io~ity. 12 Among the developing count~ies fo~ which simila~ 
data is available, India is second only to Bangladesh in the 
p~opo~tion allocated to family planning. 
A mo~e detailed look at the components of the Family 
Planning p~og~am indicates a disp~opo~tionate amount (78%) 
being expended on p~ovision of cont~aceptive se~vices while 
11 The family planning data is de~ived f~om No~tman and 
Hofstatte~, 1980 and Stampe~, 1977. 
12The total gove~nment budget fo~ 1969-74 was Rs.l57,825 
million while fo~ 1974-79 it was Rs.393,032 million. 
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only 7% is geared to information, education, and personnel 
training. This unfortunate emphasis on the contraceptive 
methods is based on the assumption that there exists a 
demand for contraception, an assumption which cannot be jus-
tified, especially in terms of the modest modernization that 
has been achieved thus far. One mitigating factor is that 
as of 1978, IUD insertions and sterilizations are not only 
provided free of cost, but the government provides some com-
pensation to acceptors 13 of these methods for costs of 
transportation and drugs, and for loss of wages incurred. 
These and other contraceptives are provided by a system of 
urban and rural welfare centers (N=7,240 in 1978), rural 
subcenters (42,875), and postpartum centers (492). There 
were also 7 central training institutes and 46 health and 
family welfare training centers in 1978. 
How effective have these programs been in influencing 
the extent of contraceptive use? The total number of accep-
tors trippled in 1976 (12.8 million) from a low of 4.4 mil-
lion in 1974 and then declined to 5.6 million in 1978. A 
promising feature is that more women are accepting contra-
ception at a younger age and at an earlier period in their 
pregnancy history. For example, during 1965-69, the wife's 
13Even the term family planning 'acceptors' suggests that 
the initiative for contraceptive use comes not from the cou-
Ples but from the program. In other words, individuals 
accept the contraceptive methods offered to them by the fam-
ily planning program, but generally do not request or 
actively seek out the available services on their own. 
median age and the number of living children were 30.1 and 
4.0 respectively for IUD acceptors which declined to 27.7 
(age) and 2.4 children during 1977-78. Similarly, the 
median age and number of surviving children for the accep-
tors of female sterilization declined to 29.9 and 3.4 
respectively in 1977-78 from a high of 34 years and 4.4 
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children. Another indication of the success of the program 
is seen in that the percentage of married women in the 
reproductive age using contraception doubled between 1969 
(8%) and 1976 (17%) and increased even more sharply by 6% in 
the three years between 1976 and 1979. 14 
While these figures appear very impressive, especially 
in the context. of the slow pace of modernization, the actual 
test of the success of the program lies in its effect on the 
birth rates. Inspite of these achievements, there was only 
an 8% decline in the total fertility rates between 1968 
(TFR=5671) and 1975 (TFR=5241) (Tsui and Bogue, 1978: 13). 
The estimated birth rate in 1978 was 34-35 per 1000, still 
higher than the 30 per 1000 target set for the end of the 
fifth five year plan in 1979. 
Many studies, nonetheless, indicate that there has 
been a shift away from the large family norms, with 3-4 
children generally being considered the ideal (University of 
Kerala, 1965; Anker, 1973). The two children family 
14The actual figures would be higher because this data 
includes only acceptors from the public sector units. 
28 
(replacement level fertility), the motto of the Indian 
family planning program, and families with five or more 
children seem to be much less popular. The average ideal of 
3-4 children held by a major section of the population is 
still too large from the point of view of the nation's over-
all population. Even if these women succeeded in limiting 
their births to 3 or 4 children, it would still result in a 
high rate of multiplication of the population and will post-
pone further the time when the national goal of replacement 
level fertility will be reached. 
Therefore, the first problem this study is concerned 
with is the analysis of some of the factors associated with 
differences in family size ideals in order to identify the 
factors that have contributed to the lowering of family size 
ideals. The clue to some of the important variables is evi-
dent in Kingsley Davis' (1975: 30) argument that the moti-
vation to have children is socially sanctioned and, there-
fore, cannot be changed merely through family planning 
propaganda and mass communication aimed at educating the 
woman as to the problems of numerous births. In addition to 
the program, basic changes in the social structure and econ-
omy are also necessary to achieve a reduction in the number 
of children wanted. 
Equally important from the perspective of national 
population growth is how much couples have been able to 
achieve their ideals, because sizeable differences exist 
between family size that is considered ideal and the family 
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size that is actually achieved. This problem becomes even 
more important in the context of the intensive programs that 
have been launched in India, especially since 1970, in order 
to popularize family planning. The numerous KAP (Knowledge, 
Attitude, and Practice) studies of family planning methods 
show that knowledge of and favorable attitudes toward family 
planning are quite widespread (Lahiri, 1974: 324). The 
next logical question, then, is why the knowledge and favo-
rable attitudes are effectively utilized by only 23% of the 
married women of reproductive age (1979 levels). Ultimately 
what is significant is the actual number of surviving chil-
dren each family has. 
Therefore, the second problem that this study deals 
with refers to the identification of some of the factors 
that distinguish the couples who have actualized their ideal 
family size from those who have not. The same factors--so-
cial structural, economic, and family planning--that may 
help differentiate among the family size ideals can also be 
effective in explaining the differences in actual family 
sizes of couples and in distinguishing between couples who 
have been able to achieve their ideals from those who have 
not. In other words, the two problems under consideration 
in this study are related. Modernization and an effective 
family planning program which may bring about a lowering of 
the ideal family size can also be expected to create a 
stronger dedication to realizing the ideal, ultimately lead-
ing to success in obtaining the low ideal. The broad policy 
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implication of this study would be as follows: if the char-
acteristics which help distinguish the small ideal-actualiz-
ers from the larger ideal-non-actualizers could be made as 
universal as possible, considerable reductions in family 
sizes and closing of the gap between mortality and fertility 
rates could be achieved in India. 
Kerala: A Case In Transition 
Kerala provides a striking example of the transitional 
nature of Indian society. It is unlike any other state in 
that it is fairly well advanced in some aspects while lag-
ging behind in others. 15 Per capita income in Kerala in 
1972-73 was a third lower (Rs. 579) than the all India aver-
age (Rs. 850). Corresponding to this, Kerala is one of the 
few states in India that had 50% or more of its population 
below the poverty level around 1970-71 with the rural compo-
nent having an average of Rs.28 per month and the urban poor 
an average of Rs.43 per month for consumption expenditure. 
Hence, it is not surprising that the estimated average 
caloric intake per day around 1973 was 2,200, nearly 200 
calories lower than the average per capita calories required 
for India in general. A diet survey of a region in Trivand-
rum district suggests the possible socio-economic biases in 
the high extent of undernutrition. Lower income, lower edu-
l5The following sources were used for data regarding Ker-
ala: U.N., 1975; Johnson, 1979; Nortman and Hofstatter, 
1980. 
cation, and lower occupational statuses interact in 
determining the large proportion of undernourished and the 
severity of undernourishment. 
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The industrial backwardness of Kerala is a primary 
cause of the poor living standards in the state. Analysis 
of the labor mobility, however, reveals a paradoxical situa-
tion. On the one hand, given the low levels of per capita 
income, there has been some decline in the proportion of the 
population engaged in the primary sector from 64.2% in 1901 
to 59.3% in 1971. Yet, the labor force movement during this 
period has been into the tertiary sector and not the secon-
dary sector. Some factors responsible for the growth of the 
tertiary sector are the high density of population limiting 
the capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb more peo-
ple, and the increase in contractual employment. At the 
same time, industrialization in Kerala still involves pro-
cessing of agricultural and other goods using labor-inten-
sive methods. Further, nearly a half of the manufacturing 
is of the household type. These trends have over the years 
resulted in large scale and increasing unemployment, espe-
cially among agricultural laborers and the educated sec-
tions. For example, in 1965 there was an 8.3% unemployment 
rate among individuals over 15 years of age in the total 
labor force. Kerala also has the highest levels of literacy 
and educational attainment in India, But, the inadequate 
growth of employment opportunities has resulted in higher 
rates of unemployment among the educated in Kerala than 
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elsewhere. 
Another paradox in Kerala's economic situation is seen 
in the growth of real wage rates by 238%, despite the grow-
ing unemployment, the largest increase among all the states 
between 1956-57 and 1971-72. Unionization of agriculture 
and the rise of collective bargaining and land reforms are a 
few factors responsible for the rise in wages. This posi-
tive trend, in turn, has saved the consumption standards and 
inequality rates from further deterioration which would oth-
erwise have occurred given the inadequate growth in wage 
employment. 
Other policy measures adopted during the 1960s to 
reduce inequalities in the living standards in Kerala 
. 
include a system of public distribution of food grains 
through a network of fair price shops in both the rural and 
urban areas, provision of free noon meals to low income 
children in elementary schools, and land reforms designed to 
eliminate the tenancy system and to set ceilings on land 
ownership. These programs, however, have not been effec-
tively implemented. Inadequate supplies of food has been 
the major weakness of the distribution program. Loopholes 
in the land reform legislation and the reluctance on the 
part of both landlords and tenants to participate in the 
reforms have slowed down the process of transferring the 
rights of ownership to the tenants. Even public works pro-
grams, such as the crash program for rural employment and 
the one lakh housing scheme designed to create more employ-
~3 
ment, while having short run remedial effects, have not been 
self sustaining. 16 
In the context of these mixed achievements in the 
field of socio-economic modernization, it is necessary to 
assess the demographic trends in the state. Around 
mid-1973, Kerala had the lowest crude death rates in India, 
in both its rural (7.9) and urban areas (6.3). Rural-urban 
differences in the crude death rates are also the smallest 
for Kerala. Further, not only does Kerala have the lowest 
infant mortality rate (50 per 1000 live births in 1971), but 
also has the longest expectation of life at birth (61 years 
in 1971). 17 A combination of low crude death rates and low 
infant mortality rates suggest that the low death rate can-
not be attributed solely to the younger age structure of the 
population. These successes, on the contrary, are primarily 
due to the comparatively lesser inequalities in the access 
to health care in both urban and rural areas achieved 
through spreading out the health care facilities and health 
expenditures to all areas. 
Shifts in birth rates, on the other hand, have not 
16 The one lakh (100,000) housing scheme was a public 
works program undertaken by the Government of Kerala in 
early 1972. It was designed to provide permanent housing to 
landless and homeless agricultural laborers throughout the 
state. 
17The corresponding rates for India are a crude death 
rate of 16.9 per 1000 in 1972, an infant mortality rate in 
1971 of 122 per 1000 live births, and life expectancy in 
1971 of 47 years. 
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been so dramatic. As the data in Table 1 suggests, the 
declines in birth rate between 1931 and 1960, although con-
sistent, were slightly lower in Kerala compared to the all 
India average. But, since 1960 Kerala has achieved more 
substantial declines in birth rates than the nation as a 
whole. In fact, birth rates in Kerala in 1974 were lower 
than the national target of 32 per 1000 that was set to be 
achieved by 1974 by the family planning program. Further, 
unlike the rest of India, rural fertility in Kerala has 
declined as significantly as urban fertility. It is these 
patterns that may provide a primary explanation for the low 
average annual growth rate in Kerala's population during the 
1971-81 decade as discussed at the beginning of this chap-
ter. Improvements in education and health conditions played 
a major role in the decline, especially during the 1960-1968 
period since the family planning programs did not become 
widespread until the late sixties. 
It is generally hypothesized that both family planning 
and socio-economic factors have contributed to the declines 
in fertility and population growth since 1970. Very little 
research has been done, especially at the individual level, 
to determine the factors responsible for the declines in 
birth rates and for the variations in fertility. This 
study, which analyzes cross-sectional data from Kerala, is 
an attempt in that direction. Analysis of Kerala's fertil-
ity patterns may provide guidelines for policies applicable 
TABLE 1 
BIRTH &\TE TRENDS Ii.'i KERALA A1m INDIA: 
1931-1978 
(Per 1000) 1 
Period Kerala 
1931-1940 40.0 
1941-1950 39.8 
1951-1960 38.9 
1968 (aural) 33.2 
1970 (Rural) 31.9 
1972 (est.) 31.8 
1974 (est.) 27.0 
1978 (est.) NA 
India 
45.2 
39.9 
41.7 
39.0 
38.8 
36.6 
dA 
34-35 
lsource: United Nations, Poverty, Unemployment and 
Develo ment Polic : A Case Stud of Selected 
Issues with Reference to Kerala ~ew Yor : 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
ST/ESA/29, 1975). 
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to the rest of India. Most of the progress in Kerala has 
been achieved through progressive fiscal and social programs 
of the government designed to reduce inequalities and 
improve the standards in the living conditions of the peo-
ple. 
CHAPTER II 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION THEORY 
AND ITS RELEVANCE TO KERALA 
A useful framework for the analysis of the two central 
concerns of this study --identifying the factors involved 
in the lowering of family size ideals and achieving the 
smaller ideals--is provided by the Demographic Transition 
model, especially as applied to the present stage in the 
population history of India. The transition theory is 
intrinsically connected with the concept of modernization in 
2 
that "it seeks to characterize three 'stages' of fertility 
and mortality levels, viewed as derivative from the funda-
mental economic and social changes of 'development or mod-
ernization"' (Teitelbaum, 1975: 174). It is, however, nee-
essary to evaluate the extent to which the transition theory 
is applicable to a developing society such as India. A 
brief discussion of the theory in the context of moderniza-
tion and of the existing research with the transition theory 
as an organizing principle will aid in this evaluation. 
17 
The Demographic Transition Theory And Its Applicability 
To Developing Countries 
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Among the theories that have been put forward to 
explain changes in demographic behavior, the transition 
theory is perhaps the most explicit and simple, and conse-
quently has evoked the most analysis and criticism. Unlike 
many other theories, the transition theory has its basis in 
actual historical experience. It was originally developed 
in order to explain the declining trends in mortality and 
fertility in the Western world. Later, its applicability 
was extended to the developing countries, still in the early 
stages of their transitions. The theory, thus, became the 
basis for the prediction of future population trends in 
these countries. In recent decades, however, the theory has 
been subject to severe criticism, both in its applicability 
to the Western world and to the developing countries. 
Some of the pricipal proponents of this theory are W.S 
Thompson, Blacker, Notestein, Cowgill, and Stolnitz. As 
these theorists postulate it, Stage I was characteristic of 
primitive societies and is marked by a population equilib-
rium achieved through high birth and death rates because the 
technology needed to control births and deaths is absent. 
Mortality remains high because of the very precarious nature 
of existence and the lack of modern means of transportation, 
medical technology, sanitation, and other amenities. The 
continued survival of the population, therefore, necessi-
tated the maintenance of high fertility rates commensurate 
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with the high death rates. Strong, institutionalized, pro-
natalist norms, backed by societal sanctions maintained the 
fertility rates at a high level. 
Once industrialization and urbanization set in and the 
technology for death and birth control is developed, death 
rates tend to be controlled first, since health and long 
life are universal goals. Stage II, the stage of population 
explosion, is created by declining mortality rates and fer-
tility desires or actual fertility rates that remain 
unchanged. It is only later that birth rates are reduced 
leading to a third stage in which equilibrium is achieved 
through low death and low birth rates. Fertility declines 
cannot occur until the pronatalist social and economic 
institutions are replaced by new institutions which will 
support the adoption of the small family not~. For example, 
the shifts away from the extended agrarian family reduce the 
importance of the family in the spheres of production, rec-
reation, education, and other functions that weaken the pro-
natalist pressure. With improvements in the educational 
opportunities and the removal of children from the labor 
force, the economic value of children is reduced. Further, 
once infant and general mortality levels decline, fewer 
births will be necessary to maintain the desired family 
size. 
Within these general trends, differentials exist in 
the rates of declines in different subgroups of the popula-
tion. By utilizing the appropriate control technology, 
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deaths and then births will be controlled, first in the 
upper social and economic classes and only later in the 
lower classes. Another differential exists in the tendency 
for urban birth rates to decline faster than the rural 
rates. Similarly, birth rates decline faster in the nuclear 
families than in the extended agrarian families. To quote 
Stolnitz (1964: 30), "All nations in the Modern Era which 
have moved from a traditional, agrarian based economic sys-
tem to a largely industrial, urbanized base have also moved 
from a condition of high mortality and fertility to low mor-
tality and fertility." 
Research using both historical and current data, none-
theless, lends support to the theory only in general terms. 
Transition theorists support the broad thesis that tradi-
tional societies are characterized by high mortality and 
fertility levels in contrast to the low vital rates in the 
industrialized societies. It is in their transition to mod-
ernization, that societies experience the demographic trans-
ition. Apart from this broad pattern, there is no uniform-
ity in the actual process of transition of the modern 
societies. According to Ansley Coale, a leading transition 
theorist (1974: 64-65), "the weakness of the concept is 
associated with the difficulty of defining a precise thresh-
old (a checklist of essential characteristics, or a combined 
score on some socioeconomic scale) of modernization that 
will reliably identify a population in which fertility is 
ready to fall." 
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Ansley Coale (1974: 56-63) and Teitelbaum (1975: 
176-177) have summarized some of the major differences, not 
only among Western societies in their premodern states, but 
also among the developing countries of the present day and 
the premodern societies before the Industrial Revolution. 
These differences highlight the discrepancies in the specif-
ics of the demographic transition. For example, wide varia-
tions existed in the fertility levels of premodern socie-
ties. During the early nineteenth century, family size was 
as low as 5.0 in Sweden while it was estimated to be well 
over 8.0 in many African groups. Similarly, a fertility 
rate of over 45 per 1000 in countries such as Tanzania and 
Iran is much higher than the rate of 35 pet• 1000 that 
existed in early nineteenth century Britain. These differ-
ences between pretransition Europe and the developing coun-
tries is primarily due to the prevalence of late marriage 
and smaller proportion married in nineteenth century Western 
Europe. The practice of early and universal marriage in 
most of today's developing societies is in direct contrast 
to the Western pattern. As Coale suggests (1974: 56), "the 
difference between the highest and lowest pre-transition 
fertility levels is a magnitude comparable to the change in 
fertility during the transition itself." 
Another exception to the general model lies in the 
process of transition. According to the theory, the rapid 
population growth in the transition stage is due to the lag 
in the decline of mortality and fertility rates. Reductions 
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in mo~tality we~e achieved ea~lie~ because of the imp~ove­
ments in public health and medical knowledge and also 
because health and life a~e valued in eve~y society. These 
same ~easons (emphasis on health and life) maintained fe~­
tility at constant high levels. Besides, it was the ~educ­
tion in infant mo~tality, by ensu~ing the su~vival of the 
desi~ed numbe~ of child~en, that p~ovided the initial moti-
vation fo~ cont~olling the family size at late~ stages of 
development. Histo~ical evidence, howeve~, indicates dis-
c~epancies in this patte~n. Dov F~iedlande~ (1969) points 
out that fe~tility and mo~tality ~ates declined almost 
simultaneously in nineteenth centu~y F~ance, without the lag 
and the accele~ated population g~owth. In fact, acco~ding 
to Habakkuk (1953), when ~apid population g~owth did occu~, 
as in England du~ing the eighteenth centu~y, it was the 
~esult of ~ising bi~th ~ates and not declining mo~tality 
levels. This phenomenon of ~ising bi~th ~ates, in cont~ast 
to the fai~ly constant fe~tility ~ates p~oposed by the 
t~ansition theo~y, in the ea~ly stages of the t~ansition, 
was also found in many developing count~ies of Latin America 
between 1940 and 1959 (Davis, 1975: 31). The reduction in 
mo~tality and imp~oved health conditions that accompany mod-
e~nization cont~ibute to a ~ise in bi~th ~ates by ensu~ing 
the successful completion of p~egnancies, the su~viva1 to 
adulthood, and the ~eduction in the chances of widowhood. 
To quote Davis (1975: 31), "some of the upwa~d p~essu~e on 
bi~th ~ates-----a~ises f~om the fact that, with lowe~ed mo~-
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tality there are simply more couples." 
Advocates of the transition theory (for example~ Kam-
meyer, 1970: 502) hold that the notion of some increase in 
fertility as a result of improved living conditions is not 
incompatible with the transition theory. Increases in birth 
rates due to the improvements in the official recording of 
births has also been noted in countries, such as Japan 
(Taeuber, 1960). There is, however, a serious difficulty 
with this critique of the transition theory. The critics, 
in their argument for the role of the increase in fertility, 
generally tend to ignore the relevance of declining mortal-
ity, even if largely indirect, in the accelerated population 
growth in the early stages of modernization. For example, 
Tabbarah (1971: 267-268) speaks about the beneficial 
impacts of health measures on improving fecundity by reduc-
ing the incidence of mortality and morbidity associated with 
childbearing and consequently raising fertility. Thus, both 
declining mortality and rising fertility were common in the 
initial stages of the transition and together led to the 
population growth. 
There is, however, no doubt that fertility rates 
declined after the transitional stage and even after a 
slight increase in the modernized nations. The transition 
theory generally holds that these reductions were achieved 
by these societies in the process of their industrial devel-
opment and modernization. Nevertheless, considerable varia-
tions exist in terms of the economic stage at which fertil-
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ity began to decline in the West. According to Goldscheider 
(1971: 135-181), the birth rates began to decline in France 
in the late 1700s, almost sixty years before industrializa-
tion took place. On the other hand, declines in the English 
fertility rates did not begin until nearly fifty years after 
the Industrial Revolution. Goldscheider suggests that the 
nature of England's industrialization was compatible with 
her delayed response. Industrialization provided opportuni-
ties for rural to urban migration, reducing the pressure on 
land and the pressure to limit family. Alternately, the 
possibility of utilizing family labor in the early factory 
system increased the economic benefits of large families. 
In France, in contrast, the small rural land holdings, the 
result of the redistribution of land under the Napoleanic 
code, increased the agricultural density. This, coupled 
with the dearth of rural to urban migration opportunities 
(due to the late industrialization), created sufficient eco-
nomic pressure on families, especially in the rural areas. 
Faced with a choice between maintaining a large family and 
reducing living standards or vice versa, they chose the lat-
ter. 
These patterns also explain why, unlike the projec-
tions of the transition theory, urban fertility was higher 
than rural fertility towards the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury in countries such as France, Spain, Bulgaria, and Swe-
den. Economic pressures to reduce fertility were not as 
strong in the urban as in the rural areas. It also suggests 
an explanation for the absence of prolonged lags between 
declines in the death and birth rates in these countries. 
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Some of these factors pr~vail in today's developing 
countries too (Teitelbaum, 1975: 176-177). For example, 
there are very few possibilities for substantial interna-
tional migration and for occupational and rural to urban 
mobility in developing countries. These factors pressured 
European populations, such as France and Sweden, to control 
their fertility during their demographic transitions because 
smaller families were one of the most effective means to 
achieving higher living standards. Yet, they have not led 
to any large reductions in fertility in a majority of the 
third world nations, suggesting that the relationship 
between economic development and demographic transition is 
not automatic. A major difficulty in providing opportuni-
ties for spatial and occupational, especially agricultural 
to non-agricultural movement, is the rapid rate of natural 
increase in these countries. This natural increase, at a 
rate which is much higher than the rates that prevailed dur-
ing the European transitions, is caused by the high fertil-
ity and the momentum for further population growth inherent 
in the huge population base. Opportunities for women to 
enter the labor force, an important variable in fertility 
reduction, is also restricted by the rapidly expanding labor 
force. Growing populations also hinder the provision of 
universal education, consequently limiting the impact of 
education on family size. 
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A significant lead as to why the socio-economic trends 
just discussed have not exercised the same influence in the 
developing societies as they did in some of the European 
societies is available in the recent research on the Euro-
pean transitions. Coale (1974: 62-63) cites historical 
research in Spain which indicates not socioeconomic, but 
regional or linguistic bases for marital fertility differ-
ences in the early 1900s. In other words, adjacent prov-
inces with similar languages and history had similar levels 
of marital fertility, inspite of having different propor-
tions of literacy and agricultural labor force. 
Similar research using Latin American data by Beaver 
(1975) reveals a fairly close correlation between the open-
ness of a culture to outside influences and the declines in 
fertility achieved. For example, Argentina and Uruguay with 
strong European backgrounds and openness to outside influ-
ences had the lowest fertility levels. The least amount of 
decline was evident in countries that were most resistant to 
external influences, such as, the Indian cultures of Bolivia 
and Paraguay. Beaver proposes that even if the necessary 
economic circumstances conducive to reductions in birth 
rates prevail in a society, cultural factors may still 
determine the timing and extent of the declines achieved. 
At the same time, as Murdoch (1980: 52) indicates, economic 
development, irrespective of the cultural setting, has 
played a significant role in the low fertility rates of 
groups such as the Chinese in Asia, the Indians, Goans, and 
Pakistanis in Uganda, and the Indians and Malays in Malay-
sia. 
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These developments dispute the automatic adjustment of 
fertility to decreased mortality, industrialization, and 
improved standards of living suggested by the Transition 
theory. They also provide the possibility of identifying 
the precise circumstances in which fertility control will 
begin. Hence, Coale (1974: 65) delimits three broad condi-
tions necessary for a significant decrease in marital fer-
tility to occur: (1) fertility decisions, made consciously 
by weighing, either implicitly or explicitly, the benefits 
and demerits of having children, should be an acceptable and 
viable behavior pattern in a culture; (2) it should be 
socially and economically advantageous (even if only per-
ceived) for couples to have small families; (3) birth con-
trol information and methods must be easily and widely 
available to the husband and wife who are sufficiently moti-
vated and who jointly decide to utilize fertility regulation 
methods. 
Coale's propositions shed further light on the differ-
ences between the third world countries and the transitions 
of countries, such as France and Sweden. In most of the 
developing countries, small families are perceived as disas-
trous, both economically and religiously. Further, deliber-
ate fertility decisions are not an acceptable form of behav-
ior among large sections of the populations, especially in 
the early stages of their childbearing history. The subor-
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dinate role of women and the informal taboos surrounding 
discussions of sex, procreation, and family planning also 
hinder efficient and sustained use of fertility control 
methods. 
Coale's statement of the three prerequisites is an 
important first step toward restating the demographic trans-
ition theory at the micro level. Demographic transition 
theory, in its traditional form and even after accounting 
for the variations in the details of the transition, 
-
focusses on fertility and mortality and their relationship 
with modernization at the aggregate level. To quote Schut-
zer (1978: 269), "the aggregate focus of the transition 
framework --- does not permit the easy incorporation of the 
results of microlevel demographic research with a motiva-
tional focus." Emphasis on the motivation or desire for 
children will be a useful corrective to the notion of the 
automatic movement of societies through the stages postu-
lated by the transition theory. 
Schutzer (1978: 276-279) provides a restatement of 
the demographic transition theory using a microlevel fertil-
1 ity variable --completed fa~ily size. He concentrates on 
completed family size as the focus of his revision for two 
reasons. It is in the context of the family that most fer-
tility decisions are arrived at in conjunction with the eco-
1 A similar revision was provided by Tabarrah in 1971, 
although it was mainly a classification device. Schutzer, 
however, does not seem to be aware of the work. 
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nomic and social status of the family, and tastes, prefer-
ences, and other personal attitudes of the couple. Further, 
the completed family size provides the final picture of the 
aggregate decisions, choices, implementation of the deci-
sions, and changes in the decisions, if any, regarding the 
number of children and the spacing that have been made over 
the entire childbearing history. 
Three indices of completed family size are used in the 
revision. The first index is natural fertility which is 
"the size of completed family that would occur in the 
absence of any voluntary control of fertility" (Schutzer, 
1978: 277). Desired fertility, the second index, is 
defined as "the completed family size that those making fer-
tility decisions view as optimum at the time the decisions 
are being made" (1978: 277). The size of the desired fam-
ily will be intluenced by socioeconomic considerations, 
availability of time, and other extra-familial opportuni-
ties. Actual fertility is the third index and is the result 
of "a series of discrete decisions or non-decisions, as well 
as an adjustment for the actual and anticipated loss of 
children through premature mortality" (1978: 277). Natural 
and actual fertility are similar in that they are both 
responsive to variations in nutritional and health condi-
tions; yet, actual fertility, unlike natural fertility 
involves the couples' attempt at adjusting to the environ-
ment. 
The demographic transition of a nation involves a 
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movement from a stage in which the size of the actual family 
is determined by fecundity to a state of demographic devel-
opment where the former is influenced by the size of the 
desired family. A nation could be demographically developed 
at either a high or low desired family size. Due to the 
high infant and child mortality rates and cultural 
restrictions (such as taboos regarding intei"coui"se dui"ing 
bi"eastfeeding) on childbearing, the natural family size is 
small in the eai"ly phases of demogi"aphic development. Popu-
lations in the early stages of development lack definitive 
notions of desii"ed family size and genei"ally the noi"m is to 
have as many as one can. Hence, the actual number of chil-
di"en couples have depends on the level of natui"al fei"tility. 
Fei"tility at this stage, accoi"ding to Tabai"rah (1971: 269) 
is a biological phenomenon. 
In the process of improvements in the socioeconomic 
contexts of nations and the modernization of their tradi-
tional cultui"al patterns (such as, equality between the man 
and the woman), couples become aware of a family size that 
is desirable. With the development of this awareness, 
nations enter the second stage of development. At this 
stage, desired family size theoretically can eithei" I"ise, 
remain stable, or decline. In reality, howevei", with mod-
ei"nization and its I"elated developments, desired family size 
has in the long run tended to decline, even if there is an 
initial short term increase. In the unlikely event that 
desired family size either remained constant at a high level 
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(continuing the predevelopment notion of the more the bet-
ter) or even rose consistently, the second stage would be 
characterized by an increase in the actual family size in an 
attempt to meet the high desires. The increase in actual 
fertility is made possible by the improvements in living 
conditions. Better nutrition and higher health standards 
improve fecundity by reducing the incidence of morbidity and 
mortality associated with childbearing. Populations enter 
the third stage when the high family size desires are actu-
alized. 
Although, according to Schutzer's theory, such a cul-
mination of the transition where both desired and actual 
fertility remain high is a theoretical possibility, it is 
. 
unlikely that high fertility will persist in the context of 
advanced modernization. Nor is high fertility desirable 
from the perspective of a nation's overall population growth 
and economic development. These developments, therefore, 
cannot accurately be viewed as the third or final stage in 
the transition. It would be more appropriate to state that 
societies characterized by such fertility patterns remain 
'stuck' in the second stage. 
If, on the other hand, desired family size declines in 
the second stage, it will fall below the increasing biologi-
cal fertility levels at some point in this stage. At that 
phase, actual family size will be higher than the desired 
family size. Again, demographic development will be reached 
in the third stage when couples adopt various measures to 
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bring their actual family size in conformity with their low-
ered desired family size. 
According to Schutzer (1978: 278), family planning 
programs providing birth control information and methods 
will be most successful in reducing actual family size only 
at the point where the actual family size of a group or a 
population is in excess of what is desired. Prior to this 
stage, no sizeable reductions in actual family size can be 
achieved. Nevertheless, he argues that family planning pro-
grams could be used earlier to influence family size desires 
by legitimizing the small family norm and to encourage the 
practice of family planning even if only for spacing and 
health reasons. Since desired family size is determined 
within the constraints of social, economic, and other psy-
chological factors, fertility in the third stage is a socio-
economic phenomenon. In the second stage it is partly soci-
o-economic and partly biological (Tabarrah, 1971: 269). 
Schutzer cautions that this model does not apply to 
individual couples in the sense that they do not move 
through the various stages delineated above. Rather, dif-
ferent populations, as a result of shifts in its members' 
fertility aspirations and behavior undergo changes in the 
patterns of their fertility. Thus, it is possible to iden-
tify the stage of demographic development that a population 
or a subgroup has reached, by analyzing their family size 
desires, actual family size, and the level of their modern-
ization. 
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Most developing nations of today are in the second 
stage of their demographic development, with a declining 
desired family size pattern. Several trends that prevail in 
these developing countries have the potential of speeding up 
their demographic development so that their actual family 
size is brought in conformity with their declining desired 
family size. Teitelbaum (1975: 177) suggests some examples 
of these positive trends such as the moderately rapid pace 
of development, international aid in development, and the 
role of governments in the national family planning programs 
which can not only provide the methods of family limitation 
but can also legitimize the small family as an economically 
viable norm. 
Role Of Modernization In the Demographic Transition Theory 
Schutzer, in his attempt at modifying the transition 
theory, was mainly concerned with using micro fertility 
variables to postulate the process of demographic develop-
ment. He does not analyze in any depth the factors--for 
example, modernization, development, and family planning--
-that bring about the changes in fertility. Both macro and 
micro fertility studies, conducted with the transition 
theory as either an explicit or implicit organizing frame-
work, incorporate indicators of modernization as explanatory 
factors. Conceptualization of the indices of modernization 
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has closely followed the developments in modernization 
theory. Studies in the classical structural-functional 
model of modernization use a macro-sociological approach to 
explain how modernization involves changes in societal 
institutions, in the interrelationships among institutions, 
and in the cultural values of the society, and the struc-
tural consequences of these changes. The transition theory, 
in its original formulation used macro social and structural 
changes--industrialization, urbanization, changes in the 
occupational and income structure, changes in the cultural 
norms, changes in the structure of the family--in accounting 
for fertility and mortality declines. 
While the structural models refer to modernization at 
the societal level, the theorists in the social psychologi-
cal model of modernization deal with those sets of atti-
tudes, values, and behavior of individuals that are prere-
quisites for their participation in modern society or are 
even acquired by such participation. When applied to trans-
ition theory social psychological modernity was used as an 
intervening variable (Miller and Inkeles, 1974) to spell out 
the mechanisms through which societal modernization influ-
enced fertility behavior. Miller and Inkeles (1974: 171) 
define social psychological modernity to include elements 
such as openness to new experience, belief in one's ability 
to control one's fate to some extent, emphasis on planning 
and punctuality, independence from traditional parental 
authority, and the acceptance of such ideas as those of mod-
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ern science, equality of women, and family size limitation. 
These characteristics developed by individuals in the pro-
cess of modernization motivate them to adopt birth control 
and to limit their family size. 
These models of modernization and the transition 
theory have been criticized on several grounds (Tipps, 
1973). One major criticism is that classical theories are 
ethnocentric. They assumed that all societies would follow 
a unilinear path and converge toward the model of the modern 
capitalist (Western) society. As discussed earl~er, critics 
of both the modernization and transition theory point out 
the considerable diversity in the timing and pattern of 
changes in the development of the developed societies them-
selves. In the case of modernization, for example, Goode 
(1966) has discounted the obvious link between modernization 
and the nuclear family system. Industrial societies them-
selves reveal a wide variety of family systems and in some 
societies the nuclear family system existed even before 
industrialization. Examples also exist of non-Western soci-
eities that have modernized and completed their demographic 
transitions through paths different from those of the clas-
sical transitions. In Japan, it was the committment to the 
Emperor and to the family, a collectivistic orientation, and 
lack of social mobility--factors that hampered economic 
change in the West--that encouraged the modernization of the 
Meiji period (Hagen, 1958). 
Criticisms have also been brought against the classi-
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cal theorists' conception of the relation between tradition 
and modernity. The classical theorists viewed tradition and 
modernity as mutually exclusive. Therefore, when moderniza-
tion took place old traditions were weakened and replaced by 
the modern. Critics, on the other hand, point to the conti-
nuity between the traditional and modern eras. Gusfield 
(1967) discusses how the caste and joint family, considered 
impediments to economic growth, have in fact proved to be 
mobilizing elements in both traditional and modern India. 
Similarly, Freedman (1979: 63-79) cites the case of Taiwan 
where large scale adoption of contraceptives and the rapid 
decline in fertility were achieved even when the family 
maintained many of its traditional features and attitudes. 
The extended family structure where older parents live with 
their married sons, where children provide financial support 
to their parents in old age, and where intergenerational 
kinship ties predominate are some examples of these tradi-
tional elements. 
A third difficulty with the classical model centers on 
the inclusiveness of the concept of modernization rendering 
it 'vague and confused' (Nettle and Robertson, 1966: 281). 
The breadth of the concept precludes specifying the limits 
of its application; consequently, it eludes a precise defi-
nition. Goldberg (1975: 91) addresses the same issue in 
discussing modernization in relation to fertility. He 
argues for selecting only those variables that have a direct 
impact on fertility instead of using the large set of val-
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ues, attitudes, and behaviors that are attributed to modern 
men. 
These criticisms necessitated and have resulted in a 
reformulation of the classical model of modernization and 
its relation to the demographic transitions. In the revised 
model, there is a greater emphasis on the role that premo-
dern conditions play in the future developments of these 
societies and in their adaptations to borrowed elements. 
The revisionist school does not subscribe to the automatic 
spread of the modernization process, and consequently the 
automatic completion of the demographic transition. They 
recognize the variations, the stresses and the strains, and 
even reversals that may occur in the process of moderniza-
tion. The differences in starting points and the different 
paths each society takes results in a constant interplay 
between the traditional and modern forces, creating unique 
features in the modernized and modernizing societies. It, 
therefore, becomes necessary to examine the divergences in 
the modernization and the demographic transitions in differ-
ent countries. Distinctions have to be made between the 
developed and developing countries. Even among the devel-
oped countries, there is the need to differentiate between 
the capitalist and socialist countries (Desai, 1976: 
99-100) and to work out the specifics of each national mod-
ernization and demographic transition. No single model--
-capitalist or socialist--can be replicated because of the 
different nature of individual societies. 
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Despite these variations, modern societies do possess 
some common features. O'Connel (1976: 17-24) succinctly 
summarizes them in three categories: (1) an analytical-cau-
sal and inventive outlook which refers to the development of 
an inquiring mind and inventive attitude, both at the indi-
vidual and societal level; this outlook results in (2) the 
rapid accumulation of tools and techniques; (3) and the 
flexibility of will and the capacity of both the society and 
the individual to accept and adopt to new changes without 
breaking down. In demographic terms, these modernized soci-
eties are characterized by low mortality and fertility. 
With regard to fertility, the three broad elements (speci-
fied by Coale and discussed earlier) concerning the small 
family norm, the nature of fertility decisions, and the 
availability of birth control technology prevail in the mod-
ernized context. 
Nevertheless, an overarching model, either in the 
theory of modernization or demographic transition, does not 
seem empirically feasible. It appears feasible to develop 
regional models, applicable to areas with similar cultural 
histories or backgrounds. The present study is to be viewed 
as an attempt to specify a system of factors that will be 
most relevant to the achievement of fertility declines in 
Kerala and ultimately in India and may consequently lead to 
the completion of the Indian demographic transition. 
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Model Of The Modernization-Demographic Transition Tradition 
In attempting to provide a causal explanation of the 
demographic trends, transition theory, being a theory of 
social change, attemp~s to link micro level changes implic-
itly or explicitly with macro level changes. Using a frame-
work provided by r.Uller and Inkeles (1974), an inclusive 
model could be stated as follows: societal modernization as 
indicated by changes in social institutions from the tradi-
tional to modern forms --> individual participation in these 
modern institutions --> emergence of modern attitudes and 
aspirations which include small family size norms --> favo-
rable attitudes toward limiting families --> individuals' 
use of birth limitation --> ability to actualize small fam-
ily norms --> societal modernization. This model, thus, 
links different levels of variables--macro social, social 
psychological, and psychological--in explaining how fertil-
ity declines could be achieved. 
Many studies, particularly those undertaken in the 
tradition of the classical Demographic Transition theory, 
remain purely at the macro level of analysis. They use 
macro structural indicators of the social, cultural, eco-
nomic, ecological, and demographic situation to explain dif-
ferences and changes in fertility rates. However, these 
variables, such as urbanization, industrialization, changes 
in value orientations, and educational improvements, are not 
viewed as influencing fertility per se; they are used as 
indicators which implicitly reflect changes occurring in the 
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life patterns of individuals or their households and which 
collectively influence fertility in a given direction. Most 
of these studies merely indicate the extent of the relation-
ship between social and economic modernization and fertility 
rates. They do not specify the causal nature of the rela-
tionship. In order to specify how social and economic 
development influences fertility rates, it is necessary to 
incorporate micro level variables in the modernization-fer-
tility relationship. Development does not operate in a vac-
uum; it induces changes in fertility through its effect on 
individuals. 
At the other extreme are found studies that operate 
only at the individual level in the case of both the causal 
and fertility variables. The micro economic theory of fer-
tility uses principles of consumer behavior to explain vari-
ations in individual fertility and behavior. The micro-eco-
nomic independent variables, such as changes in income, 
prices, and tastes, are viewed as manifestations of macro 
level social and economic development. 
In between the above two extremes are those studies 
that attempt to link macrostructural indicators of urbaniza-
tion, industrialization, and modernization with micro-fer-
tility indices through intervening micro variables. The 
model presented at the beginning of this section specifies 
several kinds of intervening variables. Rosen and Simmons 
(1971: 49-51) discuss the rationale underlying this model. 
Urbanization and industrialization, and their objective man-
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ifestations--the cost of raising a family in circumstances 
where almost everything has to be bought in the market, the 
declining economic utility of children, the cost of their 
education, rising material aspirations--impose strains on 
the economic resources at the disposal of the family and 
make large families expensive. But, these influences on 
family size operate through values, attitudes, and capabili-
ties that individuals acquire in these modern circumstances, 
enabling them to respond more effectively to the challenges 
and strains of urban industrial life. As Rosen and Simmons 
argue (1971: 50), "an analysis of fertility decline, there-
fore, should link social structural factors which influence 
fertility with data about personal orientations and modes of 
decision making which help men and women respond to social 
circumstances." 
Much research has been done in establishing many of 
the relationships that can be delineated among the variables 
considered above. But, a majority of the research studies 
is restricted in the range of variables considered simulta-
neously and as a coherent system. Studies emphasizing the 
psychological and social psychological aspects of moderniza-
tion are limited in the range of variations in the macro 
social contexts in which the relationships are examined. 
Many studies examining the influence of social psychological 
factors on family size ar-e restricted to the urban ar-eas. 
Some examples are the Indianapolis study by Kiser and Whelp-
ton (1958); Groat and Neal's study in Toledo, Ohio (1967); 
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the study of fertility and family planning in Taiwan by 
Freedman, Takeshita, and Sun (1964); Rainwater's study of a 
sample in Chicago, Cincinnati, and Oklahoma city (1965); 
Stoke's study on family structure and socioeconomic varia-
tions as related to fertility in Lexington, Kentucky (1973); 
Michel's study of the French urban family (1967); Mitchell's 
study of the family in urban Hong Kong (1972); and Khalifa's 
study (1973) in Cairo, Egypt. At the same time, studies are 
also limited to rural areas alone (Crader and Belcher, 1975; 
George, 1973). 
Unlike most of the aforementioned studies which 
include a sufficient range in the variations in social and 
economic status, others (Miller and Inkeles, 1974) concen-
trate on certain educational and occupational strata. There 
is also another set of research in which social and psycho-
logical factors are omitted. Such studies use only demo-
graphic and socioeconomic variables to explain differential 
fertility (Loebner nad Driver, 1973; Kim, Rider, Harper, and 
Yang, 1974). These lacunae have rendered difficult the task 
of specifying the mediating mechanisms between the social 
structural and social psychological levels of analysis. 
Two additional patterns can also be delineated in fer-
tility studies (Mitchell, 1972). One group consists of 
research on the causes and correlates of differentials in 
family size desires and actual fertility. The second trend 
pertains to studies attempting to identify the social and 
psychological factors that influence the knowledge and atti-
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tudes regarding family planning technology and the motiva-
tion to adopt it. Many of the studies in the latter tradi-
tion, especially those pertaining to India, are limited to 
the adoption of specific methods of contraception, mainly 
IUD and sterilization. The KAP surveys, dealing with birth 
control knowledge, attitudes, and practices, conducted in 
many countries are another example of the primary emphasis 
on family planning. Even research dealing with both kinds 
of variables--family size norms/actual family size and atti-
tude to/practice of family planning--tend to conceptualize 
them separately as two ways of operationalizing the same 
variable, fertility. Consequently, they examine the rela-
tionships of independent variables first to family size 
norms and behavior and then to the family planning variable 
or vice versa. 
It is important to examine the interrelationships 
between these two aspects of fertility behavior. Research 
has documented that when a larger number of children are 
desired, the need to accept family planning and to practice 
it diligently is less imperative (Sagi, Potter, and Westoff, 
1962). In accordance with Schutzer's (1978) modification of 
the transition theory (see also Davis, 1975: 33), the 
emphasis on the provision of family planning itself, without 
the necessary changes in family size norms, is not suffi-
cient to achieve substantial declines in actual fertility. 
At the same time, the role of favorable attitudes to and 
practice of family planning in reducing actual fertility 
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also needs to be analyzed. Such an analysis would provide a 
test of the efficacy of family planning programs in realiz-
ing its ultimate goal of reducing the number of children 
each couple has. Unfortunately, much of the research on 
this relationship between family planning and fertility has 
been limited to the aggregate leve1. 2 
Most of the other fertility research deals with lim-
ited subsets of relationships within the broad model set 
forth at the beginning of this section. Some examples are 
studies dealing with the impact of education on family size 
(Janowitz, 1976), female labor force participation and fer-
tility (Havens and Gibbs, 1975), the role of husband-wife 
communication and conjugal role relationships in acceptance 
of family planning in the rural-urban context (Mukherjee, 
1975; Olson-Prather, 1976), the age at marriage-fertility 
relationship in the context of socioeconomic differentials 
(Bumpass, 1969), and the influence of infant mortality on 
the size of the family (Balakrishnan, 1978; Devi, 1978). 
There are a few studies that in different ways incor-
porate macro structural factors, data on personal orienta-
tions, and decision makiP~ patterns in order to explain fer-
tility differentials (including all the relevant fertility 
variables). One such early study was the Puerto Rican study 
by Hill, Stycos, and Bach (1959). They began with a wide 
2 The most important examples are Mauldin and Berelson's 
research (1978) and Tsui and Bogue's study (1978) discussed 
in Chapter I. 
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range of variables representing different levels of analy-
sis--macro structural or background variables, value orien-
tations, specific family size attitudes, family a~tion pos-
sibilities, and knowledge, and attitudes toward means of 
family limitation--and related them to different measures of 
fertility. But in the course of the analysis, several of 
the independent variables which were empirically established 
at the beginning as being related to fertility were omitted 
through the use of the factor analytic model. Further use 
of the factoring technique brought out just husband-wife 
communication as a significant variable, while the social 
status factors were related to fertility only indirectly 
through communication. A further disappointment was that 
the range of variations in social status was limited to the 
lower classes. Thus, as Goldberg (1975: 87) remarked, "The 
empirical potential of the study was destroyed. And proba-
bly more important, some of the better hypothesis were 
pushed to the sidelines." 
Goldberg's study of Ankara (Turkey) and Mexico City 
(1975) is another attempt to use background variables and a 
set of intervening variables as they relate to expected num-
ber of children and practice of family planning considered 
separately. The background variables he used were wife's 
place of birth, wife's education, and husband's income; the 
intervening mechanisms were focussed on women's activities, 
her perceptions, and attitudes (which together he calls the 
Truncated Modernism Index, TMI), and other exposure to mod-
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ernization variables. He found that TMI and wife's educa-
tion, which has only an indirect effect through TMI, domi-
nate the relation to expected number of children, while TMI 
and possession of modern objects dominate the relationship 
to use of family planning. While Goldberg is obviously 
interested in providing a broad pattern of the relationships 
between variables that are causally related to fertility 
declines in two developing countries, he does not pay too 
much attention to the relationship between factors closer to 
the ultimate outcome desired--reduced family size. More 
specifically, he treats expected family size3 and use of 
family planning data separately as two dependent variables. 
The significance of analyzing the relationship between these 
two variables, especially in the context of the effective-
ness of the family planning programs undertaken by most 
developing countries, can hardly be overemphasized. 
Finally, Rosen and Simmons' study (1971) on Brazil 
also sets forth a model including structural, social psycho-
logical, and psychological variables as they relate to fam-
ily size. They acknowledge that their framework specifies 
only some of the intervening links between industrialization 
and fertility. Most notably missing are data related to the 
means of family limitation. Brazil still firmly believes in 
larger populations as economic and political assets and did 
3Expected family size is used as a proxy for actual fam-
ily size. 
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not launch a fo~al family planning program until 1974 (Tak, 
Haub, and Murphy, 1979: 37) while the study was conducted 
during 1963-1965. 
Theoretical Significance Of The Study 
On the basis of the preceding discussion and the 
review of the available literature, the theoretical signifi-
cance of this study can be identified clearly. There have 
been only a few studies that simultaneously incorporate both 
macro social and micro level variables in explaining fertil-
ity. Although these studies have been done in developing 
countries, no attempt has been made to set forth and study a 
coherent system of interrelated factors that may influence 
family size in India, the largest of such countries. The 
relevance of this approach for India lies in the problems 
that the rapid population growth poses for her social and 
economic development, which necessitates analyzing the prob-
lem from as many different angles as possible. 
Secondly, India is in the state of transition from a 
traditional to a modern society. This transition period 
provides an advantageous set-up for studying the extent to 
which the structural changes in India correspond to changes 
in attitudes, beliefs, and cultural values, and how these 
changes affect related fertility behavior. Given the uneve-
ness of modernization across the Indian society, wide varia-
tions are available to study the effects of India's trans-
ition to a modern society on fertility changes at the 
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normative and behavioral levels. Besides, some of the 
unique features of the Indian social structure--such as the 
caste system, the joint family, and religious diversity--
-have survived the modernizing trends and continue to oper-
ate in modified forms in modern India. These institutions 
play an important role in the life of an Indian and need to 
be incorporated in the study of Indian fertility. The uni-
queness of both the traditional and modern social structures 
in India warrant the special consideration of the Indian 
demographic transition and the identification of the factors 
that will help bring about reductions in fertility. 
Further, the studies that simultaneously incorporate 
variables operating on different levels of analysis have 
been done among predominantly Catholic populations, such as 
in Puerto Rico, Brazil, and Mexico city, with Goldberg's 
Ankara, which has a majority Muslim population, as the major 
exception. Religion exerts an overriding influence on val-
ues, attitudes, and behavior, in general and particularly 
with regard to procreation and its control. This is partic-
ularly true of traditional and modernizing societies. This 
study with its concentration on Hindus and non-Catholic 
Christians of Kerala, India, would provide a cross-religious 
reference. 
Finally, as was discussed in the previous chapter, 
Kerala, the state in which the study is conducted presents 
an anomalous situation with regard to the problem that is 
being investigated here. Apart from the social and economic 
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characteristics detailed in Chapter I, Kerala, also has the 
highest proportion of female literates and mean age at 
effective marriage among all the states in India. It was 
also the first state to push for intensive family planning 
programs through the organization of camps and other servi-
ces. Its people possess a high level of political con-
sciousness and it was the first state to vote a communist 
government into power democratically. Kerala is, therefore, 
modernized in certain respects although it remains tradi-
tional (for example, the poor living standards) in others. 
Despite the relative economic poverty, Kerala has succeeded 
in reducing its rate of population growth and birth rates to 
some extent. It, thus, provides an opportunity for identif-
ying the factors that have contributed to the initiation of 
the downward trend in fertility. At the same time, Kerala's 
experience also demonstrates that concommittant improvements 
in at least most of the relevant societal aspects (such as 
living standards) are necessary to speed up further the fer-
tility decline that has already begun. 
CHAPTER III 
A MODEL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS 
A brief review of the Demographic Transition theory 
and the existing literature in that tradition presented in 
Chapter II suggests the need for conceptualizing both macro 
and micro variables as a relevant system in the analysis of 
the determinants of fertility. In accordance with this 
argument, several sets of variables will be used in this 
study as causes and correlates of fertility decline. They 
represent the two phenomena--modernization and family plan-
. 
ning--which have been the focus of competing schools of 
thought regarding variations in fertility. Figure 1 pres-
ents the model and the causal relationships among the vari-
ables to be investigated in this study. 
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Background Or Structural Variables 
The background variables are essentially group vari-
ables reflecting the influence of group norms on individual 
behavior. Anker (1973: 64) for example, argues that social 
groups, such as caste, village, and tribes, are highly cohe-
sive in developing countries. These groups regulate the 
attitudes and behavior patterns of their members, including 
fertility. Hence, it can be hypothesized that membership in 
a societal group will influence family size norms and behav-
ior of couples over and above their individual characteris-
tics. 
Rural/Urban Area Of Residence 
Rural or urban area of residence is the first struc-
tural variable. Rural and urban areas represent different 
levels of modernization and industrialization. At the same 
time, they also provide different economic, social, cul-
tural, and demographic opportunities to their members. 
Early research in the classical demographic transition 
framework conceived of urbanization and industrialization as 
direct influences on fertility • In the rural areas, where 
children were productive at an early age, they constituted 
an important source of income to the family. Urban chil-
dren, in contrast, represented higher costs than benefits to 
their parents. It was, therefore, assumed that urban cou-
ples would have fewer children than rural couples. 
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The evidence on the effects of rural and urban 
residence on fertility is mixed. Birdsall (1980: 31-32) 
presents data from the recent World Fertility Survey for 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka which indicate very little differ-
ence in rural and urban family sizes. Couples with higher 
levels of education (more than primary school in Bangladesh 
and grades 10-11 in Sri Lanka) are the only exception. On 
the other hand, in many Latin American countries (Murdoch, 
1980: 46-48) and Thailand (Birdsall, 1980: 31) urban fer-
tility has been and is still lower than rur.al fertility. 
These differences are due mainly to the higher standards of 
living in the cities. Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Indonesia, 
where differences in rural and urban fertility are minimal 
are contrasting examples of countries in which economic wel-
fare has been extended to the rural areas also. Residence 
in the city or village in itself may, therefore, not be an 
important differentiating factor in fertility. It is the 
differences between the rural and urban areas in the access 
to modern institutions (manifested in higher education, 
higher income, lower infant mortality, higher status of 
women, and openness to new ideas among urban respondents) 
and the participation in these institutions that seem rele-
vant. 
Kerala, the focus of this study, has succeeded in 
reducing the inequalities, specifically in the access to 
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health care and education, among its cities and villages. 
While Kerala has achieved significant reductions in its 
aggregate rural fertility, it is not clear whether differ-
ences in urban and rural fertility, especially at the indi-
vidual level, have been eliminated. Further, urban resi-
dence is still a precondition for easier access to higher 
education and other modern amenities and values. Hence, 
this study will consider rural and urban area of residence 
as a structural variable. 
Religion 
Religion, the second background variable, is a pervad-
ing traditional influence in the life of every Indian. Hin-
duism, in particular, attaches social and religious signifi-
cance to children. For example, a barren woman, and even a 
woman without sons, is socially ostracized, although secu-
larization processes are gradually eroding these traditional 
patterns. 
Research on the effect of religion on fertility (as 
presented in Murdoch, 1980: 49-50) reveal only a slight 
impact of religious background, such as Catholicism, Chris-
tianity, and Islam, on fertility. When differences exist, 
as in the case of non-Catholic Christians in Lebanon, whose 
family size is lower than that of Muslims, they are limited 
to the poorer classes. 
This study concentrates on the Hindus in comparison to 
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the Protestants in Kerala. The Protestant ethic of these 
non-Catholic Christians is in direct contrast to .the sense 
of resignation central to traditional Hinduism. These dif-
ferences and their effects on fertility may be reduced 
within the secular atmosphere of the cities. In the rural 
areas, the attitude of resignation to one's destiny may be 
reflected in higher fertility among the Hindu women in com-
parison to the Christians. 
Caste Status 
Closely allied with religion is the caste status of 
individuals, which has both religious and social signifi-
cance. In traditional India, the caste system exercizes a 
very conservative influence. Membership in a caste was. (and 
still is) determined solely by birth; consequently, access 
to the educational, occupational, and other social opportu-
nities provided by a caste group was limited to its members. 
There were, thus, no opportunities for individual mobility. 
Given the low economic and social status of the lower 
castes, their higher fertility (Loebner and Driver, 1973 
using 1958 data and Anker's study in eleven villages of 
Gujerat state, 1973) was predictable. However, moderniza-
tion and the preferential policies in the field of education 
and jobs, aimed at helping the lower castes may have had 
some modernizing consequences for the fertility behavior of 
the lower castes, especially in the cities. Hence, the 
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caste status of respondents is the third structural variable 
in the model. 
Age Of The Respondent 
The last background variable, age of the respondent, 
represents a demographic grouping, with important fertility 
relevant implications. Age of the respondent, which aids in 
evaluating cohort differences in fertility is important for 
two reasons. The older cohorts tend to be more conservative 
than the younger cohorts who have had a better chance of 
participating in the modernizing processes that began in the 
early 1950s, after India gained Independence. They also 
differ in their exposure to the organized family planning 
program, the vigorous implementation of which began in the 
late sixties and early seventies. The older respondents 
would have been exposed to the program later in their child-
bearing than the younger women, necessitating control for 
the differential exposure. It also provides a time dimen-
sion to the problem of the impact of modernization and fam-
ily planning on fertility. In other words, smaller families 
of the younger women will suggest shifts towards lower fer-
tility over time. 
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Intervening Social And Economic Characteristics 
Each set of intervening variables in the model deals 
with specific opportunities provided by the rural and urban 
areas which may have an impact on fertility. Social and 
economic characteristics of the respondent's family and of 
the respondent herself comprise the first set of intervening 
variables. 
Family's Socio-Economic Status 
The family is one of the most cohesive social groups 
in a developing country, such as India. It is the source of 
identity, social, economic, and personal, for the individ-
ual, and particularly for the woman. Hence, the status of 
the family needs to be incorporated in the analysis of fer-
tility. 
How does the status of the family affect fertility? 
Theoretically, it can be argued that the influence of indus-
trialization, urbanization, secularization, and increased 
social mobility will be mediated partly through the shifts 
toward opportunities for the kind of education, occupation, 
and income that are typical of modernizing societies. More 
specifically, improvements in the educational and occupa-
tional status of the family reduce the parents' dependence 
on children as additional sources of income or even as 
security in old age (Tak, Haub, and Murphy, 1979: 31-32; 
Birdsall, 1980: 32-33; Murdoch, 1980: 39-41). Higher 
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socio-economic status of the family, by alleviating poverty 
and insecurity, also renders future planning and a sense of 
control over one's life (including family size) a realistic 
possibility. For individual couples, improvements in socio-
economic status open up opportunities for other lifestyles 
and material goods and services that may compete with chil-
dren. Families with higher status are also aware of the 
advantages of higher education and occupation for their own 
children, creating incentives to spend more time and money 
on a few children. Thus, improvements in the social and 
economic status of the families affect changes in the 
tastes, outlook, preferences, consumption styles, and recep-
tivity to new ideas. These changes, in turn, will create 
the motivation for small families. They will also aid in 
the realization of these changed desires because information 
on methods of family limitation is generally more accessible 
to the educated and the literate. 
Three indices of socioeconomic status are used in the 
preliminary analysis of this study: husband's education, 
his occupation, and extent of modern items owned. Husband's 
education, the social status variable, is measured in com-
pleted years of education. Occupational status is opera-
tionalized as a continuum ranging from the unemployed to the 
professionals (see Table 12 in Chapter 5). The modern item 
index, the economic component of socio-economic status, is 
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defined as the number of modern items owned by each 
household. These items range from airconditioners, washing 
machines, telephones, and cars to refrigerators, radios, 
clocks, and steel utensils, among others. The assumption 
underlying the operationalization of this variable is that 
those who own the more expensive and modern items, such as 
airconditioning and telephone, would also own the less 
expensive items. 
Previous research on the influence of the family's 
socio-economic status on fertility suggests a largely indi-
rect relationship between the two, irrespective of whether 
husband's education, his occupation or modern items is used 
as an index of status (Rosen and Simmons, 1971; Loebner and 
Driver, 1973; Goldberg, 1975; Graff, 1979). Some of the 
intervening factors in the socio-economic status-fertility 
relationship have been age at marriage, conjugal role rela-
tionships, and preferred family size. 
Respondent's Socio-Economic Status 
The social and economic characteristics of the respon-
dent form the second set of intervening variables. Women 
are more directly responsible for bearing and rearing chil-
dren; consequently, the costs of children, in terms of time 
and lost opportunities are greater for women. Hence, the 
woman's status can be expected to have a separate effect on 
fertility. Three indices are used to measure the respon-
Ro 
dent's status. The respondent's education, measured as the 
number of completed years of education, is the first index 
of her status. Her labor force participation status, i.e., 
whether she works (coded as 1) or not (coded as zero) is 
used as a second measure. Further, it can be argued that 
not just her employment, but the nature, and therefore, the 
status of her employment will also be significant in study-
ing fertility variations. Respondents' occupational status 
is, thus, the third index of her socio-economic status. 
Women's education is generally accepted as one of the 
strongest and most persistent modernizing influences on fer-
tility. Murdoch (1980: 42) presents data around the early 
1960s for Puerto Rico, Chile, India, Thailand, Taiwan, and 
Ghana to demonstrate the negative relationship between 
female education and family size. Invariably, the family 
size of higher educated women is closer to replacement fer-
tility while that of lower educated women is more than dou-
ble the replacement level. This inverse relationship has 
persisted into the 1970s as the World Fertility survey data 
indicate (Birdsall, 1980: 31). Similar to men, higher edu-
cation induces changes in the values and norms of women, as 
women critically evaluate the traditional customs and behav-
ior of their parents. Even more important for the women is 
the relatively independent social status and the opportuni-
ties for advancement outside the home that higher education 
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confers on them. Given that women have a more direct 
involvement in childcare, the educated woman stands to lose 
more opportunities than her less educated counterpart and 
even men with the same qualifications. For these reasons, 
as Birdsall (1980: 29) concludes, women's education has a 
stronger modernizing influence on family size than men's 
education. 
Another major source of higher social status for the 
woman, and which consequently would have a suppressive 
effect on fertility, is her labor force participation. Giv-
ing up her job or taking time off to raise children is an 
indirect cost that the working woman incurs and this indi-
rect cost will adversely affect her family size decisions. 
Her employment outside her home also opens up other non-fa~­
ily oriented means of personal satisfaction, such as finan-
cial gains, companionship, recreation, and other activities 
outside the family. 
There is, however, a limitation on the women's employ-
ment-fertility relationship. For example, data from Turkey 
(Stycos and Weller, 1967) suggest that female employment 
reduces family size only when the working role of the woman 
is incompatible with her role as wife and mother. In other 
words, women's employment in agricultural or cottage indus-
tries, particularly in the rural areas of developing coun-
tries, will not have a strong effect in lowering fertility 
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because he~ wo~k would pe~it he~ to take ca~e of her 
child~en simultaneously. Thus, it is not me~ely her labor 
force participation, but her employment status too, that is 
the major determinant of family size (see also Havens and 
Gibbs, 1975). 
Generally, women in higher status occupations--white 
collar and professional jobs--also tend to have higher edu-
cation. It is, therefore, possible that part of the modern-
izing effect of female employment on fertility is due to the 
influence of education. Murdoch (1980: 42-43), however, 
cites Puerto Rican data to demonstrate that women's employ-
ment has a negative influence on family size, even after the 
effect of their education has been accounted for. Thus, as 
Rosen and Simmons (1971: 51) suggest, the nature of the 
work a woman is engaged in will have a suppressing impact on 
fertility by altering her perception of he~ role in the 
society and in her family. 
Intervening Demographic Variables: ~At Marriage and 
Infant Mo~tality 
Age At Marriage 
Age at which women marry is another inte~vening mecha-
nism through which education and employment of women influ-
ence fe~tility. Higher education leads to postponement of 
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marriage, because marriages are generally delayed until 
women complete their education. Women with higher education 
also tend to seek employment, which again delays their mar-
riage. Age at marriage, in turn, can influence fertility in 
two ways. The socio-economic effect of age at marriage is 
mediated by the antecedent factors of wife's education and 
her occupation. Women who marry later tend to have higher 
education and tend to be employed in higher status occupa-
tions.1 This higher status provides her with non-familial 
oriented opportunities and interests, which exercise a nega-
tive influence on fertility. 
Age at marriage also has a quantitative influence on 
fertility, particularly when a society experiences very lit-
tle extramarital fertility, as is the case in India. 
Delayed marriage shortens the reproductive life of women 
within marriage and reduces their exposure to the risk of 
pregnancies, thereby leading to fewer births. At the socie-
tal level, rising age at marriage slows down the rate of 
1The variable occupational status refers to the occupa-
tion at the time of the interview. Yet, it can be hypoth-
esized to affect causally age at marriage in Kerala. Gener-
ally, women tend to get employed, if they ever do, before 
they get married for two reasons. Employment enhances their 
chances of finding a good husband, particularly in terms of 
his socioeconomic status. Second, given the extremely tight 
employment situation, if a woman does not seek and get a job 
immediately after her education, her chances of finding 
employment later would be almost nonexistent. Hence, it can 
be assumed that the vast majority of these women who have 
jobs had them before they got married. 
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population growth by increasing the number of single women 
and lengthening the interval between generations (Birdsall, 
1980: 33). 
Evidence on the age at marriage-fertility relationship 
is mixed. Pathak (1980: 412-414), after reviewing several 
studies undertaken in different regions of India between 
1961 and 1974, found women who married between the ages of 
15 and 19 to have had on the average one child more than 
those marrying after 19 years of age. Yet, Birdsall (1980: 
33) presents data indicating that age at marriage did not 
explain any significant additional variation in the fertil-
ity rates of countries, once life expectancy and adult lit-
eracy were introduced. Hence, according to Birdsall, 
delayed marriage in itself cannot cause lower fertility, 
which in effect upholds the socio-economic influence of age 
at marriage. 
Studies, such as the one done by Kim, Rider, Harper, 
and Young (1974) in Korea, in contrast, consider age at mar-
riage to be a strong predictor of family size, even after 
the effects of socio-economic variables, such as education, 
rural-urban residence, economic status, and exposure to mass 
media, have been controlled. Such research lends support 
for the quantitative effect of age at marriage on fertility. 
At the same time, another study conducted in India in 
1958 (Loebner and Driver, 1973) demonstrated a weak positive 
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relationship between age at marriage and family size, when 
the duration of marriage, number of years husband and wife 
lived together, and women's age were controlled. According 
to Loebner and Driver (1973: 340), the positive relation-
ship was an indication of the prevalence of adolescent ste-
rility in women who married early. They also suggested that 
women who married late probably tend to "catch up" for lost 
years by having frequent births. 
It is possible to make some sense of these contradic-
tory results. As the authors of the Mysore Population study 
(U.N., 1961) indicated, a threshold level of age at marriage 
exists which can aid in separating the positive and negative 
effects of age at marriage. In the case of women who marry 
very early, fertility in the early years of their marriage 
will be low because of the lag between the marriage and its 
consummation and subfecundity following menarche. In such a 
society (which probably was the situation at the time Loeb-
ner and Driver's sample was entering marriage), reducing the 
number of very early marriages is likely to result in an 
increase in fertility. Moreover, since delaying marriage 
tends to affect the health of the woman favorably, it may 
again increase fertility in later years. In contrast, it is 
when marriages are delayed beyond a threshold level that the 
negative effect of a briefer reproductive span on fertility 
will become evident. Research attempting to calculate the 
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family size reductions achieved by raising the age at 
marriage in India generally use 18-20 years as an average 
threshold in drawing comparisons (Pathak, 1980). 2 In the 
Korean sample (Kim, et. al, 1974), in which the quantitative 
influence was established, the mean age at marriage for 
women around 1970 was 25 to 26 years. The mean age at 
effective marriage for women in Kerala was 20.9 around 1971, 
the highest among all the states in India. Hence, both the 
socio-economic and quantitative effects of age at marriage 
on family size can be expected to prevail in this study. 
Infant Mortality 
Each of the aspects of modernization described thus 
far contribute to the promotion of responsible parenthood 
and to the protection of the health of the mother and the 
child. The extent of infant mortality, an important indica-
tor of the health of children, is therefore an index of mod-
ernization. It also is a correlate of fertility because in 
the long run, declines in infant mortality are consistently 
associated with reduced fertility (Mauldin and Berelson, 
1978; Oeschli and Kirk, 1975; Balakrishnan, 1978; Devi, 
1978). For example, Mauldin and Berelson found a strong 
correlation between the level of child mortality in 1970 and 
2 The minimum legal age at marriage for women in India was 
15 since 1955 and it was raised to 18 in 1976. 
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the declines in birth rates between 1965 and 1975. In other 
words, countries that had lower levels of infant mortality 
had experienced greater fertility declines. 
High rates of infant mortality is generally hypoth-
esized to have two types of effects--replacement and insur-
ance effects--on fertility (Balakrishnan, 1978). Families 
which suffer child mortality may attempt to replace their 
losses. At the same time, personal experiences or even per-
ception of the extent of infant mortality in their community 
may lead couples to have larger numbers of children as an 
insurance against future losses. 
On the other hand, a reduction in infant mortality can 
lead to a decline in fertility in two ways (Murqoch, 1980: 
44-45)·. Breast-feeding the surviving infants is a common 
practice in developing countries. The cultural and biologi-
cal constraints against conception associated with breast-
feeding reduces the chances of further pregnancies (Taylor, 
Newman, and Kelley, 1976). Lower infant mortality can also 
have motivational effects on fertility. When the chances of 
infant mortality are reduced, the motivation to have 'insur-
ance births' will also be reduced. 
The impact of modernization and the reductions in 
infant mortality in reducing the number of births becomes 
evident only in the long run, although the time lag is not 
too long. Beaver (1975) used data over a twenty year period 
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for selected Latin American and Carribean countries to 
demonstrate how infant mortality was strongly associated 
with fertility a decade later. Other studies (Murdoch, 
1980: 44-45) have also found the lag between the decline of 
childhood mortality and the initiation of fertility decline 
to be an average of ten years. 
In the meantime, the short run effects of reductions 
in infant mortality, by increasing the number of surviving 
children, would be to increase the size of the family (Bird-
sall, 1980; Murdoch, 1980). Conversely, since couples gen-
erally do not replace all the child deaths, higher infant 
mortality could result in smaller families. This short run 
effect, however, soon becomes supplanted by the modernizing 
effects of reduced infant mortality. Modernization and its 
concommittants--higher education and higher social and eco-
nomic status of women--will not only enable couples to have 
the number of children they desire, but will also reduce the 
size of the family desired. 
Intervening Social Psychological Characteristics: Conjugal 
Role Relationships 
Having analyzed the role of social, economic, and 
demographic modernization on fertility, the next important 
relationship to be specified is the effect of these vari-
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ables on the relationship between the husband and the wife, 
the two individuals directly connected with childbearing. 
several studies have used conjugal role relationships in 
explaining fertility differentials (Hill, Stycos, and Bach, 
1959; Rosen and Simmons, 1971; Mukherjee, 1975). Earlier, 
the argument was made that the woman who participates in the 
opportunities (education, occupation) provided in urban-in-
dustrial areas has a strong interest in limiting her family 
size. Under these conditions, it is the woman who bears the 
major responsibility for childcare and who may feel the 
financial strain more keenly. Hence, a large family will 
conflict with her role obligations outside the home, leading 
her to desire a smaller family. The lower family size 
desires of the wife can be actualized only in a family con-
text in which she has a voice in decision making and where 
possibilities for communication and discussion exist between 
the couple. Further, the wife's role in decision making, 
and particularly joint decision making, reflects a moderniz-
ing shift from an attitude of resignation by the wife to her 
sense of control over events in her life, which also 
includes the number of children born to a couple. 
Another aspect of the husband-wife role relationships 
that has a bearing on family size is the flexibility or fix-
ity of the husband and wife's roles in the family. The tra-
ditional pattern of strict division of labor, where the hus-
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band perfo~s the male jobs of bread earning and decision 
making while the wife performs the household tasks fit well 
in the traditional society. But, in a modernizing context, 
with the women taking up additional responsibilities and 
activities outside the home, the trend would be toward joint 
participation in interchangeable functions and roles.3 Such 
a modern set-up would provide additional incentives to the 
couple to limit their family size. 
Conjugal role relationships is operationalized as the 
extent of jointness in relationship so that a higher score 
indicates greater jointness in relationships. Seven indi-
vidual aspects are included in the role relationship index--
-decision making, extent of sharing in household activities, 
oarticipation in dealing with outsiders, participation in 
religious activities, extent of disagreement on various 
issues, outcome of disagreements, and pattern of solving 
(See Appendix A for a detailed description of the seven 
items.) These seven items are aggregated to form the com-
posite role relationship index. 
~ The concept of conjugal role relationships was first 
developed by Bott (1971). 
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Intervening Family Size and Family Planning Variables 
Modernization and its indirect effect on fertility has 
been the focus of the model described thus far. In specify-
ing further the nature of the effect of modernization on 
family size, indicators of family size and family planning 
which directly impinge on actual fertility need to be con-
sidered. Two attitudinal variables pertaining to (a) family 
size norms (large or small norm), and (b) disposition to the 
use of family planning constitute the first set of the indi-
cators of family size and family planning. 
Family Size Norms 
Family size norms is the focus of the first problem of 
identifying the factors associated with differences in fam-
ily size ideals to be investigated in this study. It will 
be used as an intervening attitudinal variable in the second 
problem concerning fertility performance. The significance 
of shifts in family size values was evident in the discus-
sion of the theoretical framework presented in the preceding 
chapter. Couples have large families either because they 
actively desire large families or because they do not con-
ceptualize a specific family size. Hence, as Schutzer 
(1978), Davis (1975), and others have concluded, unless cou-
ples can visualize a family size that is ideal for them and 
unless this ideal is small, actual family size will not be 
reduced. Changes in motivation toward smaller families is 
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an important prerequisite to changes in fertility behavior. 
several studies (Katiyar, 1976; Rele and Kanitkar, 1976; 
Bhatia, 1978) have attempted to specify the socio-economic 
correlates of small family norms in India. Some of the sig-
nificant factors have been higher education, higher income, 
higher occupational status of the respondent, and younger 
age. 
Empirically, several alternate measures of family size 
norms exist, such as preferred family size, expected family 
size, and ideal family size. In this study, the concept of 
ideal family size (or desired family size) is used to opera-
tionalize norms about family size. The following question 
was asked regarding the family size that respondents consid-
ered ideal: "If your married life were to start all over 
again, you had as much money as you possibly need and you 
could have just the number of children you want, how many 
children would you want to have?" This definition involves 
two elements which renders it suitable for this study. A 
major criticism of the concept of ideal family size has been 
that respondents tend to rationalize their existing family 
size as ideal. Specifying hypothetical conditions concern-
ing their married life, economic circumstances and biologi-
cal conditions will minimize, although not totally elimi-
nate, the influence of actual fertility on the norm. 
Preferred family size and expected family size, in contrast, 
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are based on the actual family size. Preferred family size 
refers to the number of children wanted in addition to the 
children the respondent already has. Similarly, expected 
family size includes the number of children the respondent 
expects to bear by the end of her childbearing history. 
Preferred and expected family size not only include the fam-
ily size achieved at the time of the interview, but the 
expectations and desires for the future are stated in the 
context of the past and present experiences of the respon-
dents. 
Ideal family size is a stronger measure of motivation 
and shifts in these motivations. Couples who idealize two 
children or fewer, even in ideal conditions, could be 
expected to be more strongly committed to a smaller family 
size. This is especially true in comparison to those cou-
ples who idealize small families only due to economic 
restrictions and impaired fecundity. Since the nature of 
the family size norms is an important aspect of the popula-
tion problem investigated in this study, the ideal family 
size concept is the most suitable and reliable measure of 
shifts in the family size values. 
The hypothetical nature of the ideal family size ques-
tion also provides a solution to another criticism concern-
ing the validity of the family size norm. For example, Hau-
ser (1967) questions the meaningfulness of ideal family size 
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in a society where children and life in general are 
determined by nature and God. This criticism, however, will 
not be valid, if it can be shown that the majority of the 
respondents can conceptualize a specific family size and can 
do so even under hypothetical conditions. 
Another criticism of the ideal family size concept 
refers to the possibility of mechanical answers by individu-
als who have been influenced by the family planning slogan 
of two or three children (Bhatia, 1978). Earlier research 
(Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973; University of Kerala, 1965) 
provides some tests that were included in the design of this 
study to evaluate the meaningfulness of the data on ideal 
family size. Questions regarding family planning and addi-
tional children wanted constitute two such tests. If the 
concept of ideal family size possessed intrinsic meaning for 
the respondents those whose actual family sizes exceed or 
are equal to their ideals generally will not want any more 
additional children and will be using some form of birth 
control to avoid additional births. Previous studies (Rele 
and Kanitkar, 1976; Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973; University 
of Kerala, 1965) have proved the relevance of this index. A 
discussion of the validity of the concept of ideal family 
size in this study will be provided in the next chapter. 
Related to the quesion of mechanical responses is 
another criticism by Ryder and Westoff (Rele and Kanitkar, 
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1976) concerning the limited utility of the ideal family 
size due to its small variance. Rele and Kanitkar (1976: 
313), however, argue that fecundity indirectly restricts the 
size, the range, and consequently the variance of the ideal 
family. Further, most research on ideal family size in 
India until 1973, reviewed by Rele and Kanitkar indicate a 
family of 3 to 4 children to be the average ideal. Ideal 
family size of the respondents of this study undertaken in 
1977, the end of a period of intense family planning pro-
gram, will provide an interesting comparison with the appar-
ent earlier norms. 
One final issue requiring clarification concerns the 
nature of the relationship between ideal and actual family 
size. Earlier, it was noted that ideal family size will be 
used as an intervening variable in analyzing fertility 
behavior. However, since ideal family size was ascertained 
at the time of the interview, the problem of delineatig the 
time ordering in a causal model remains. In other words, it 
is necessary to determine, theoretically, that the ideal 
family size is antecedent to actual family size. 
An important distinction between actual and ideal fam-
ily size may provide some aid in delineating the time order-
ing. Actual family size is a cumulative index of a series 
of childbearing events spread out over a period of time. In 
contrast, the ideal family size concept refers to the most 
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desirable final product, at the end of the childbearing 
process. There is no means of deciding whether the respon-
dent entered her childbearing period with this ideal. But 
the evidence available (and presented in the next chapter) 
suggests that the respondents had some notion of their ideal 
at least before their last birth or even earlier. For exam-
ple, in the case of women whose actual family size corre-
sponded with their ideal, future pregnancies were deliber-
ately avoided because they were satisfied with the sex 
combination or number of children, or because of economic 
and health reasons, among others. Similarly, the majority 
of women whose actual fertility exceeded their ideal family 
size desired to stop bearing children at an earlier stage in 
their pregnancy history, especially once their ideal was 
attained. Finally, the reasons stated by respondents for 
their inability to achieve their ideal (such as biological 
and economic difficulties) also suggest some prior conceptu-
alization of an ideal. These respondents, thus, did concep-
tualize an ideal size, before the process of childbearing 
was ultimately completed. Ideal family size can, therefore, 
be used as an intervening variable in the modernization-fer-
tility relationship. 
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Family Planning Attitudes 
The second normative variable--attitude to the use of 
family planning--represents an important precondition to the 
acceptance or rejection of methods enabling deliberate con-
trol of family size, viz .• family planning. 
A favorable disposition to deliberate control over 
reproduction, in turn, presupposes a change in the values 
concerning family size. Hence, it is theoretically possible 
that family size norms may influence attitudes to family 
planning. The indicators of modernization used in this 
study--group variables, socio-economic status of the family 
and the wife, her age at marriage, extent of infant mortal-
ity, and role relationships--may similarly be expected to 
influence family planning attitudes, both directly and indi-
rectly through their effects on norms regarding family size. 
For example, Mukherjee (1975) found husband-wife communica-
tion about family planning to have a significant influence 
on awareness and favorable disposition to family planning. 
At the same time, Miller and Inkeles' (1974) data allow only 
indirect effects to education, occupation, urban residence, 
living standards, and mass media exposure. The effects of 
these modern experience variables are mediated through psy-
chological modernity (a system of modern values) which has a 
strong direct effect on favorable attitudes to family plan-
ning. 
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While considerable research has been undertaken to 
identify the correlates of attitudes to family planning, the 
latter's relationship to fertility behavior has been neg-
lected. In this model, ther•efore, attitude to family plan-
ning is studied from two perspectives. It is conceived, 
first as a dependent variable, whereby the role of modern-
ization and family size norms in creating favorable disposi-
tions to family planning are analyzed. Secondly, it is also 
necessary to assess the role of favorable attitudes towards 
family planning, both as a direct and an intervening mecha-
nism, in the modernization-fertility relationship. 
Respondent's attitude towards family planning is an 
ordinal variable with responses ranked as follows: 
(!)indispensable; (2)favorable; (3) favorable to some meth-
ods only, while definitely not to all; (4) favorable, if 
used to space children only; (5) indifferent; (6) unfavora-
ble only because of after-effects; (7) unfavorable; (8) 
totally opposed. 4 
4Items #3 and #4 in the attitude to family planning index 
represent conditional approval and from a policy perspective 
are more advantageous than indifference. Hence, they were 
ranked before indifference. Further, item #4 does not 
involve the notion of limiting the size of the family, an 
important goal of the family planning program and was placed 
after #3. Item #6 was placed before item #7 because the 
former implies a favorable disposition to a method, if there 
are no after-effects. In contrast, item #7 indicates that 
the respondent does not favor using any method irrespective 
of whether it has after-effects or not. 
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The Practice of Family Planning 
A final set of factors with the most direct effect on 
fertility behavior deals with the practice of family plan-
ning. Once again, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the impact of the practice of family planning on actual fer-
tility, involving conscious control of childbearing, has 
been neglected in previous research. Numerous attempts have 
been made to explain why couples adopt various methods of 
family limitation and the effectiveness with which they use 
these methods (Mitchell, 1972; Anker, 1973; Mukherjee, 1975: 
Goldberg, 1975; Olson-Prather, 1976; Jolly, 1976). Unfortu-
nately, such studies, either explicitly or implicitly treat 
the practice of family planning as a proxy for actual fer-
tility. In the process, they ignore the basic goal of 
adopting family planning, namely, the reduction of family 
size. They also do not consider the effect of family size 
norms on family planning practice. For, as noted earlier, 
unless the ideal size of the family is reduced, adoption of 
birth control will not lead to smaller family sizes in prac-
tice. In this study, therefore, family planning adoption is 
conceptualized as a direct correlate of fertility behavior. 
Concommittantly, it is another intervening mechanism through 
which modernization, both structural and individual, and 
family size and family planning norms affect fertility. 
Three indices of family planning practice are included 
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in the model. Parity at which birth control was initiated 
is the first variable and is operationalized as the birth 
after which the method was adopted. It takes a value of 
zero if the method was used before the first pregnancy. If 
a respondent has never used a method, she was given a value 
of the total number of pregnancies plus one.5 
Starting deliberate control of fertility early in the 
childbearing process presupposes modern experiences and 
exposure to modern values, a notion of a family size that 
would be ideal, and a desire to conform to that ideal. 
Hence, it is hypothesized that respondents who enjoy a more 
modern status and those with smaller ideals, less intense 
preference for sons, and more favorable attitudes to family 
planning will tend to initiate family planning use earlier 
in their pregnancy history. These respondents, in turn, 
would have smaller actual families compared to those who 
postpone initiation of family planning. It is when couples 
desire small families that planning and controlling their 
childbearing as early as possible becomes essential to make 
fertility behavior congruent with their norms. 
5one drawback of this measure is that it does not distin-
guish between women who began using birth control after sev-
eral pregnancies and those who had relatively few children 
despite not using any method. It is, however, very unlikely 
that women with small families would not have used birth 
control at all. 
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Family Planning Effectiveness 
If close conformity between behavior and norms is to 
be achieved, early use of family planning alone is not suf-
ficient. The overall effectiveness with which the methods 
are used and the pregnancies planned are also essential to 
achieve the desired outcome--a smaller family size. Modern 
experiences, favorable values concerning family size and 
family planning, and early use of family planning are con-
ceptualized as pre-requisites for high effectiveness. 
Family planning effectiveness is conceptualized as the 
success in the couple's efforts to prevent unplanned and 
unwanted conceptions (Stokes, 1973: 300). Following 
Stokes, family planning effectiveness can be measured by 
classifying each pregnancy as planned or unplanned. The 
pregnancy is planned if use of family planning devices is 
consciously not initiated so as to have a child or is delib-
erately stopped to have a child. The rest of the pregnancy 
categories denote lack of planning in various degrees. A 
pregnancy is unplanned if the pregnancy occurred even though 
some method(s) was being used regularly, in which case it is 
termed an accidental pregnancy. It is defined as unintended 
if it occurred while use of a method had to be stopped for 
reasons such as health, side effects, and running out of 
supplies. If the pregnancy occurred before a method was 
used, but the child was not wanted immediately, it is also 
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called an unintended pregnancy. Such a pregnancy, however, 
would be ranked below the previous unintended pregnancy in 
its effectiveness because the former had not initiated use 
of any methods when the pregnancy occurred. Finally, the 
'never-thought-of-it' pregnancies are those which just hap-
pened in the course of the marriage without any of the above 
considerations. 
Sterilization Status 
The third and final index of family planning use deals 
with whether or not the respondent or her husband have 
adopted sterilization, a permanent method. Sterilization 
status is a different measure of family planning behavior 
from family planning effectiveness. Although sterilization 
is the most effective contraceptive in terms of avoiding 
future births, it does not provide a picture of the status 
of planning effectiveness throughout the pregnancy history. 
Moreover, since it involves a one time decision at the time 
of acceptance of the method, it is not as dependent on mod-
ernization as family planning effectiveness and parity of 
birth control initiation are. This may be particularly true 
of the present sample, a large proportion of which were 
exposed to the intensive family planning campaigns and pro-
grams of the seventies. As a result, predictions about the 
fertility behavior of sterilized as opposed to non-steri-
lized respondents are difficult to derive. Yet, some indi-
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cation of the diffe~ential may be found in a study by Ram 
and Datta (1976) in which ste~ilized ~espondents had expe~i­
enced highe~ fe~tility than the non-ste~ilized, even afte~ 
adjusting fo~ ma~~iage du~ation. 
The model culminates with fe~tility behavio~, the cen-
t~al focus of the study, ope~ationalized as actual family 
size and the co~~espondence between the ~espondent's ideal 
and actual family size. Actual family size ~efe~s to the 
numbe~ of child~en su~viving at the time of the inte~view. 
This data is obtained f~om the p~egnancy histo~y. The gap 
between the ~espondent's ideal and he~ actual family size 
constitutes the second measu~e of fe~tility behavio~. 
Sample And Method 
The study was conducted among the eligible couples of 
~ep~oductive age in T~ivand~um and E~nakulam dist~icts of 
Ke~ala, India. Both ste~ilized and non-ste~ilized women on 
the eligible couples list fo~ the unive~se of the study. 
The eligible couples list includes all cu~~ently ma~~ied 
couples with wives in the ~ep~oductive age g~oup. To make 
the sample mo~e homogeneous in te~ms of thei~ views on fam-
ily planning in gene~al, Hindus and non-Catholic women f~om 
the Ch~istian community we~e selected. While the~e a~e no 
age ~est~ictions on the ste~ilized ~espondents, the non-
ste~ilized sample is ~est~icted to the 30-45 age g~oup. 
Since the study compa~es achieved family size with ideal 
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family size, it is necessary to use respondents who have 
completed their family size. Given the low age at marriage 
in India, it is assumed that by the time the respondents 
reach the 30-45 age group, they will have completed their 
childbearing or will at least have made final decisions 
about family size. The couples who have resorted to steri-
lization form a group which has definitely completed their 
childbearing. 
The area of research is the city corporation areas of 
Trivandrum and Ernakulam districts and one typical rural 
block in each the two districts situated not very near the 
two cities. The third city in Kerala--Calicut--was omitted 
because it is mainly a commercial area and is less developed 
in comparison to the other two cities as a result of which 
the necessary variations in the relevant variables (such as 
education, occupation) under consideration will not be 
available. Moreover, the majority of the city's population 
is Muslim and the district in which this city is located is 
on the whole less modernized compared to the Ernakulam and 
Trivandrum districts. Thus, this study includes the whole 
range of variations with regard to the rural/agricultural-
urban/industrial continuum and socio-economic characteris-
tics such as education, occupation, and income. The inter-
view schedule was the tool for data collection with 
questions covering the relevant variables included in the 
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study. A copy of the schedule in presented in Appendix c. 
Family planning workers associated with the primary 
health centers of the two rural areas and the family plan-
ning centers of the two cities maintain lists of couples 
residing in their jurisdiction who are eligible to use birth 
control. From these eligible couple lists, sampling frames 
consisting of couples satisfying the following criteria were 
prepared in each of the four areas. The first group in an 
area consisted of couples who had not accepted steriliza-
tion, who were either Hindus or Christians, and where the 
wife was thirty years of age or older. Those who had 
adopted sterilization formed the second group in each of the 
areas. Again, both Hindu and Christian couples were 
included in the list of sterilized couples. Since these 
couples had completed their childbearing, there were no age 
restrictions in the case of the wives in the sterilized sam-
ple. 
Once the sampling frames were prepared, two samples of 
~00 couples from each of the two cities and 200 couples from 
each of the rural groups were selected using the systematic 
sampling technique with a random start. The desired sample 
size was 500 so that 150 couples from each of the cities and 
100 couples from each of the rural areas were to be 
selected. The wives were the subjects of the interview in 
this study. They were visited in their homes by the 
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~esea~che~. Ir a ~espondent was not available, she was 
~eplaced with the next woman on the list until the desi~ed 
sample size had been achieved. 
Both the medical orrice~s and the ramily planning 
wo~ke~s in the rour a~eas we~e helprul in locating the 
~espondents in the sample lists. The ~esearcher asked to 
speak with the respondent privately and was generally well 
received. A rew or the older women rerused to talk about 
their ramily planning histories because the researcher was 
younger and unmarried. Another woman could not respond on 
her own because her husband insisted on being present at the 
interview and took the initiative in answering the ques-
tions. The session was, thererore, terminated midway 
through the inte~view and the respondent was dropped rrom 
the sample. 
Aside rrom these rew problems, the women were gener-
ally interested in talking about the issues ~aised in the 
auestionnaire. The rinal sample includes 168 women rrom the 
city and 105 women rrom the rural area or Trivandrum dis-
trict. The urban sample rrom Ernakulam district consists or 
158 respondents and its rural sample has 109 women. In 
accordance with the study design discussed above, the total 
sample or 540 respondents was also stratified to include 275 
sterilized and 265 non-sterilized women. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THE STUDY 
OF FAMILY SIZE 
India, as documented in the earlier chapters, is cur-
rently experiencing a low mortality rate and a high fertil-
ity rate. In terms of the demographic transition theory, 
India is in the growth stage of the transition and if she 
were to follow the stages postulated by the transition 
theory should move into the last phase and develop a lower 
rate of fertility. Reductions in fertility translated into 
smaller family sizes at the individual level, is not only 
the historical experience of most developed societies, but 
is the most viable means to checking rapid growth in popula-
tion. Opportunities for extensive outmigration which pre-
vailed in developed countries during their transitions and 
which tempered their population growths are not available to 
today's developing countries. Further, unlike the gradual 
declines in mortality rates experienced by developed coun-
tries during their transitions, mortality reductions have 
been much faster in the developing countries, thereby esca-
lating their population growth rates. Yet, raising the mor-
tality rates to curb population growth is not merely ethi-
cally unacceptable, but is socially destructive. 
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India's high fertility results in part from people's 
desires for large families which are supported by the struc-
ture of social institutions. Thus, voluntary reductions in 
fertility will come about only as a result of significant 
social and cultural changes. Hence, any comprehensive popu-
lation control policy should address itself to both fertil-
ity desires and behavior and to the social structures sus-
taining them. In assessing the fertility differentials that 
exist in this sample population, both family size orienta-
tions and achieved family size will be considered. The two 
concepts are complex and difficult to operationalize in such 
a fashion that they are uncontaminated by other factors. 
Before investigating fertility in the context of moderniza-
tion and family planning, it is necessary to discuss some of 
the methodological and substantive issues surrounding the 
concepts of ideal family size, actual family size, and the 
gap between them. 
For the Indian woman, having at least two to four 
children is a crucial aspect of her marriage. For example, 
only 1% of the respondents felt it was right for married 
couples who are physically able to produce children to 
choose to have none at all. 69% of the women considered 
children a source of meaning and happiness in life and 
viewed a family without children incomplete. In a society 
with no formal social security system, it is not surprising 
that 29% of the women consider children a source of security 
in old age. Children are, moreover, perceived as being nee-
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essary for the perpetuation of the family line and the fam-
ilY property (11%). A small proportion of these respondents 
(4%) even consider having children the duty of women. 
Finally, some women (3%) attach extremely negative implica-
tions ('it is a sin, ' 'it is abnormal, I 'it is selfish') to 
the notion of couples deliberately choosing not to have any 
children. 1 
The attribution of both economic and non-economic ben-
efits to children is consistent with other studies on the 
value and costs of children (presented in Espenshade, 1977). 
One study in particular, the Value of Children (VOC) project 
of the East-West Center in Hawaii dealing with the perceived 
costs and benefits of children, has direct relevance to the 
present research. The VOC study (conducted in 1975) sug-
gested that in the more developed countries, such as Taiwan, 
Japan, the U.S., and Korea, the emotional value of children 
was more important than the economic. In the Philippines 
and Thailand, which in contrast are less developed, the eco-
nomic benefits were more significant. Kerala, despite being 
a developing society, falls in between. As in other poorer 
societies, women in Kerala do perceive children as a source 
of economic security. Yet, they place greater emphasis on 
the emotional satisfaction that children provide their 
parents. The non-economic value attached to children in 
1 The percentages add up to more than 100 because 17% of 
the women gave multiple responses. 
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Kerala has its basis in the collectivistic orientation of 
the society. Unlike most developed societies, Indian soci-
ety is very group oriented with the individual finding ful-
fillment and happiness through institutions that will 
directly benefit the group. Marriage is one such institu-
tion because marriages in India are contracted primarily for 
the sake of the perpetuation of the family through procrea-
tion. Satisfaction of the individual's needs are only sec-
ondary in marriages. Hence, it is not surprising that for 
many of these. women children provide meaning to and happi-
ness in life along with a sense of completion of their mar-
riages. This is particularly true for traditional women who 
find personal fulfillment mainly vicariously through their 
progeny. Changes in the economic structure alone, there-
fore, will be insufficient to induce shifts in fertility 
norms and behavior. 
Ideal Family Size 
While children are very important to women in Kerala, 
the next logical questions are how many children do these 
women ideally desire to have and how many do they actually 
have. The ideal family size of each respondent is opera-
tionalized as the number of children (surviving) that she 
would want to have if she could begin her married life all 
over again from the start, she could have as much money as 
she could possibly need, and she could have just the number 
of children she wants. It is probable that responses to a 
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question on ideal family size will be influenced by the 
respondent's actual fertility. The danger of rationalizing 
the family size already achieved would be greater if the 
question was phrased "what is your ideal family size?" 
Deter-mining family size ideals in hypothetical and optimal 
conditions would encourage the respondent to disassociate 
her response to some extent from her experience, although 
its influence cannot be totally avoided. 
To aid the respondent in distinguishing between the 
family size norm for her family and a general nor-m, two more 
questions concerning family size were asked. The first 
referred to the ideal for an average family in Kerala and 
the second to the ideal for a family like the respondent's. 
These questions should help the respondent in conceptualiz-
ing a situation other than her experience when responding to 
the question on ideal family size under ideal conditions. 
It will also, to some extent, prevent her from voicing the 
general nor-m of two children advocated by the family plan-
ning propaganda and think of a personal ideal. 
Ideal family size under ideal conditions is used as 
the index of family size norms in later analysis. For rea-
sons discussed above, it is the least contaminated by the 
respondent's fertility performance and by the general norm. 
Ideal family size determined under optimal conditions is 
also a better measure of the intensity of the desires than 
the other two norms applicable to the average family and to 
a family like the respondent's. If women idealize smaller 
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families (one, two or three children) even in optimal cir-
cumstances, it can be expected to represent a genuine break 
from the desire for large families. The ideal under ideal 
conditions is also the only personal norm among the three 
indices referring to the respondent's own family. When com-
parisons are to be made between the woman's fertility norms 
and behavior, it is, therefore, logical to use her personal 
ideal. The two other measures of family size norms will, 
however, be used for further comparison and analysis (in 
relation to the ideal under ideal conditions) in order to 
delineate the meaning of the ideal family size concept for 
these women. 
Analysis of the family size desires presented in Table 
. 
2 suggests that most of the respondents have a clear idea of 
the family size that would be ideal for them under ideal 
conditions and the two other ideals. In all three 
instances, less than 1% of the women refused to speculate, 
stating that they would want as many children as God gives 
or that such matters were not in their hands. A larger pro-
portion (albeit still a small overall percentage) of women 
refused to talk about a definite family size when the ques-
tion referred to the ideal family size under ideal condi-
tions than under the other two frames of reference. It 
reflects their inability or unwillingness to visualize hypo-
thetical situations as opposed to the rest of the two ques-
tions which involve more real assumptions. More specifi-
cally, for this small group of women, family limitation is 
TABLE 2 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF IDEAL &~D ACTUAL FAt.ULY SIZE 
Ideal Family Ideal Family Ideal Family Actual Family 
Size in Ideal Size for Size for a Size 
Conditions Average Family like 
the Respondents' 
0 - 2 40.0% 41.7% 61.5% 27.1% 
3 - 4 54.6 55.5 36.2 50.0 
5+ 4.5 2.4 2.3 22.9 
As Hany as God 
Gives 0.9 0.4 0.2 
N 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(540) (540) (540) (540) 
1-' 
1-' 
w 
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not legitimate unless it is the result of other conditions, 
such as economic hardship. Alternately, it would suggest 
(similar to Heer, 1968) that if the economic conditions 
improved, family size would increase at least in the short 
run. But, unlike earlier predictions of critics (Mauldin, 
1965 and Hauser, 1967), the number of respondents who were 
unwilling to give a numerical answer, even in a developing 
society, was small. 
How many children do the respondents think constitute 
an ideal size? Table 2 indicates very few women (less than 
~%) have an ideal of more than four children even under 
ideal conditions. Yet, the fact that 55% idealize three or 
four children, double the replacement level, does not augur 
well for Kerala's population future. But compared to the 
67% who had an ideal of three or four children in a study 
conducted in 1965 in three villages in Trivandrum district 
of Kerala (University of Kerala, 1965: 24), the proportion 
idealizing a similar family size is lower in this study. 2 
Further, while only 28% of the women in the 1965 project had 
an ideal of two or fewer, the corresponding proportion is 
40% in this study. A definite shift toward smaller family 
size during the last decade is, thus, evident. 
There is also a close similarity in the various family 
2 These three villages were also the target population of 
the Family Planning Communication Research Project of the 
University of Kerala and hence were subject to an intense 
Family Planning Education Program. 
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sizes idealized under the three frames of reference (Table 
2). About 95% of the respondents have an ideal of four or 
fewer in all the three instances. However, differences 
exist in the proportions with replacement level or smaller 
ideals. Ideal family size under optimal conditions involves 
the most hypothetical assumptions and under these ideal eco-
nomic and biological (fecundity) conditions, more women 
desire to have three or four children than two. The ideal 
for an average family, although not as hypothetical as the 
ideal under ideal conditions, refers to a more general unit 
than the reference point involved in a family like that of 
the respondent's. This generality may explain why more 
respondents also tend to idealize larger families in this 
situation than in the case of a family like the respon-
dents'. In contrast to these two ideals, nearly 20% more of 
the women idealize a family size of two children or fewer 
for a family similar to theirs. Of the three norms, the 
ideal for a family like the respondent's is the closest 
approximation to reality. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that economic considerations are a major part of the estab-
lishment of this particular type of family size ideal as is 
evident in Table 3 which describes the reasons for the dif-
ferent ideals. In the case of the ideal for a family like 
the respondent's, economic difficulties are the most common 
reasons cited, irrespective of the size of the ideal family. 
Why do these respondents consider these family sizes 
to be ideal? Economic problems seem to be a major reason 
TABLE 3 
FREQUEi~CY OF DISTRIBUTION OF REASONS FOR IDEAL FA!1ILY SIZEl 
Reasons for 
Ideal 
Economic 
Family 
Size 
Better Care; 
Better Education 
Accepted !.~orm 
Health of Parents 
(Mother) 
Care of Parents; 
I11heritance of 
Property 
Infant Mortality 
Company for leids 
Custom; Gift of God; 
Ideal Under 
Ideal Conditions 
0-2 
91.9% 
0.9 
3.2 
0.5 
3.2 
3-7 
76.6% 
1.9 
2.5 
1.1 
3.5 
10.1 
Completion of Household . . . 4. 9 
N 100% 100% 
(224) (368) 
Ideal For 
Average Family 
0-2 
88.1% 
3.3 
6.2 
1.2 
1.2 
100% 
(243) 
3-7 
79.3% 
0.9 
2.0 
1.2 
7.2 
6.9 
2.6 
100% 
(348) 
Ideal for Family 
Like Respondents' 
0-2 
93.2% 
6.8 
100% 
(336) 
2-7 
82.3% 
11.6 
1.9 
3.3 
0.9 
100% 
(215) 
1Total number is higher than 540 because few people gave multiple reasons. ~ 0\ 
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for limiting the size of the family to two children or less 
in all the three questions (refer Table 3). Under ideal 
conditions too, economic considerations tend to predominate, 
presumably because the respondents realize the economic 
implications (benefits and disadvantages) of large families 
even under the best circumstances. Apart from economic rea-
sons, the next major concern of women who idealize three to 
four children (under ideal conditions) is the necessity for 
a child to have the company of another child. Respondents 
do not favor single children because these children would be 
deprived of the psychological and social advantages of grow-
ing up with siblings. 
One additional item in the case of the reasons for the 
ideal in a family like the respondent's needs to be speci- • 
fied. As mentioned earlier, economic considerations predo-
minate in this instance too. It is also the only situation 
in which better care and education of the children are cited 
more often as reasons for limiting the size to a certain 
level. In other words, when the frame of reference is clos-
est to the respondent's own experience, economic concerns 
and factors that indirectly lead to higher economic status 
(education) become important. Thus, the data lend support 
to one of the conclusions of the VOC study (Espenshade, 
1977: 17) that economic factors underlie individuals' deci-
sions to limit their family size. 
Although the majority of these women stated a numeri-
cal size in response to the questions on ideal family size 
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and suggested reasons for their norms, it is necessary to 
assess the meaningfulness of these responses. For this pur-
pose, the respondents were also asked how many children, in 
addition to the surviving number, they would want to have 
(University of Kerala, 1965; Knodel and Prachuabmoh, 1973). 
If the family size ideals that they stated had some intrin-
sic significance for them, the majority of the respondents 
whose family size has exceeded or is equal to their ideal 
would say 'no more children' while those with smaller fa~ily 
size than ideal would want to have more children. Event-
hough this comparison is between a hypothetical (ideal) and 
real situation, a comparison is still feasible. The ideal 
family size under ideal conditions would provide the ceiling 
of the family size norms of these women. If a respondent 
considers three children the norm under the most ideal con-
ditions and she already has three children in actuality when 
circumstances are far from perfect, she can be logically 
expected not to want any additional children. Extenuating 
circumstances, such as dissatisfaction with an existing sex 
combination, could lead such a respondent to want more chil-
dren even though she has achieved her ideal. 
A crosstabulation of the additional number of children 
wanted by their actual family size is presented in Table 4 
for each of the ideal family size categories. The data lend 
credibility to the ideal family size responses of these 
women. For example, a vast majority of the respondents with 
an ideal family size of two and an actual of two or fewer 
TABLE 4 
CROSSTABULATION OF ]Ui1:3ER OF ADDITIOi~AL CHILDREi.~ BY ACTUAL F&ULY SIZE 
AND BY IDEAL FM1ILY SIZE 
Ideal F~~ily Size Ideal Family Ideal Family Ideal iamily 
Size = 2 Size = 3 Size = 4-6 
Actual ' Numher of Additional Children Wanted 
Family 
Size ~ +0 +1 +2 l~ +0 +1 +2 N +0 +1 +2 N 
100% 100% 100% 
0 - 2 72% 2'6 2 (53) 69% 29 2 (35) 78% 22 - ( 9) 
100% 100% 100% 
3 - 4 96/~ 4 - (54) 88% 12 - (34) 81% 19 - (21) 
100% 100% 100% 
5 - 11 91% 9 - (11) 100% - - (26) 100% - - (16) 
N 118 95 46 
t-' 
t-' 
\() 
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children stated that they wanted no additional children. 
Two groups deserve special menton in this connection. Seven 
out of fifteen (47%) of the women with an ideal family size 
of two and four out of six (67%) with an ideal family size 
of three, prefer not to have any more children, despite hav-
ing just one surviving child. These two groups, even though 
small, represent a significant deviation from the tradi-
tional view of high fertility desires and behavior that is 
expected to prevail in a developing society. If this trend 
becomes more widespread, it- could, to some extent, cushion 
the exponential effects of normative and actual fertility 
that are above the replacement level of two on population 
growth. 
Some data is also available on why respondents do not 
want additional children. 81% of the women cite economic 
reasons for not wanting any more or more than one additional 
child while 15% fear for the health of the mother. It is 
possible that these respondents would desire more children 
if economic and health conditions improve. Yet, their 
responses to the ideal family size determined under ideal 
conditions when economic and health restrictions were hypo-
thetically absent, provide some indication that even if this 
ideal situation were to be actualized partially, the 
increase in desired family size would not be too drastic. 
On the contrary, dissatisfaction with the existing number or 
sex combination of their children and family pressure to 
have more children are reasons for wanting more children. 
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These results support one major conclusion of the 
Value of Children study (Espenshade, 1977: 17), viz., that 
economic factors constitute the primary basis for decisions 
regarding family size. Specifically, respondents desire to 
limit their ideals to a size that is compatible with their 
financial means and that will enable them to derive the max-
imum benefit from a given economic situation, even if it is 
an ideal one. Further, compared to earlier research, the 
data also presents evidence of the increasing popularity of 
the small family norm, a welcome trend in the population 
history of Kerala. The responses to the ideal family size 
questions also appear quite meaningful, even if some respon-
dents may have rationalized their achieved fertility. 
Actual Family Size 
Changes in family size norms are an important prere-
auisite for slowing down the growth rate of the population. 
Yet, the actual fertility performance of women is by far the 
most concrete indicator of population change. Actual family 
size is measured as the total number of surviving children 
at the time of the interview. When couples envision a fam-
ily size, they generally refer to the number of living chil-
dren who can either provide them economic security or emo-
tional support or any other benefits that parents attribute 
to children. Further, it is the number of surviving chil-
dren that would either accelerate or decelerate the rate of 
growth in population. Hence, the decision was made to use 
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the number of surviving children rather than the number of 
live births as the index of fertility behavior. 
Operationalizing fertility performance as the number 
of surviving children at the time of the interview, however, 
involves a methodological problem. The actual family size 
variable underestimates the level of fertility performance 
of the respondents because many of them have not yet com-
pleted their childbearing. Certain safeguards were, how-
ever, built into the study design to counter the problem, 
although they by no means provide a perfect solution. 
Slightly more than half the respondents (51%) have undergone 
sterilization and consequently have terminated their preg-
nancy histories permanently. The problem of underestimation 
is, therefore, limited to the non-sterilized respondents. 
Of the 265 non-sterilized respondents, about 5% have 
completed their childbearing since they are over the age of 
45. As for the rest (N= 253), the non-sterilized sample 
included only women who are thirty years of age or older 
(Table 5). Nearly 50% of these women were married at the 
age of twenty or earlier and consequently have spent at 
least ten years, if not more, in childbearing. On the other 
hand, only 12% of the women were married after the age of 
25. Given the relatively high chronological age and low age 
at marriage of these respondents, it could be assumed that 
most of these women would have completed a major part of 
their childbearing at the time of the interview or at least 
that by then final decisions about family size will have 
Age 
Age 
30 
35 
40 
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TABLE 5 
FP~QUE~CY DISTRIBUTIO~ OF AGE A~D AGE AT 
HARRIAGE OF ~0:-1-STERILIZED RESPONDEi.nS 
Age of Harriage 
of The ResEondent of The ResEondent 
Sroups F (%) Age Groups F (%) 
- 34 42.6% 10 - 17 28. 7~~ 
- 39 33.6 18 - 20 27.9 
- 44 19.2 21 - 24 31.3 
45+ 4.5 25+ 12.1 
100% 100% 
N (265) ]" (265) 
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been made. 
Additional evidence on the length of time since the 
last pregnancy lends further support to the assumption that 
most of these women had to a large extent completed their 
childbearing at the time of the interview. For example, 52% 
of the non-sterilized women below the age of 45 (total 
N=253) had not had pregnancies for at least five years.3 
Another 35% fell in the intermediate range of two to four 
years since their last pregnancy. The relatively long peri-
ods during which these women had not experienced pregnan-
cies, coupled with their low age at marriage, and high chro-
nological age substantiate the assumption that the actual 
fertility of these respondents at the time of the interview 
closely approximates their ultimate fertility. 
A rough idea of the extent of underestimation involved 
in the measurement of achieved family size can be obtained 
through, a comparison between preferred family size and 
actual family size (Table 6). Preferred family size is 
derived by adding the additional number of children wanted 
to the actual family size. There are no major differences 
between the actual and preferred family size of the respon-
dents in any of the age categories. The largest difference 
is among the youngest women (the 30 to 34 age group); but 
even for this category the average addition is only 0.3 
iThe actual range of time since their last pregnancy 
varies from five to twenty years. 
(1) 
TABLE 6 
HEAN ACTUAL FAMILY SIZE, ADDITIO~~AL NUMBER JF ClliLDRE~ ~-JA:~TED, 
AND PREFERRED FAHILY SIZE BY AGE OF ]ON-STERILIZED RESPO:WENTS 
(2) (3) 4 = (2+3) 
Age of the Respondents Actual Family Number of Addi- Preferred 
Size tional Children Family Size 
Uanted 
General 3.3 0.2 3.5 
30 - 34 2.8 0.3 3.1 
35 - 39 3.3 0.2 3.5 
40 - 44 4.4 0.02 4.4 
45+ 4.3 0.0 4.3 
(5) 
N 
265 
113 
89 
51 
12 
...... 
N 
\JI 
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children. Thus, it can be assumed that actual family size 
is a fair approximation to the number of children the 
respondents will ultimately have. To examine this thesis 
further, the difference between actual and ideal family size 
will be analyzed in some detail. 
If a comparison of the distribution of the actual and 
ideal family size 4 presented in Table 2 is analyzed, it sug-
gests clearly that the fertility performance of these women 
generally exceeds the norm. For example, while 40% of the 
respondents idealize replacement level fertility (two chil-
dren or fewer), only a third of the sample has an actual 
fertility of two or less. Conversely, although a mere 4.5% 
of the women consider five or more children as constituting 
the ideal family size, nearly five times that proportion 
have that many surviving children. The closest correspon-
dence between ideal and actual fertility lies in the family 
with three or four children. Although this is the most corn-
rnon family size with regard to fertility norms and actual 
fertility, it is double the replacement level. Persistence 
of these fertility values and behavior patterns will post-
pone further the attainment of the goal of zero population 
4The ideal family size under ideal conditions is used as 
the index of fertility norms. For reasons discussed ear-
lier, of the three types of ideal family size (ideal under 
ideal conditions, ideal for an average family, and ideal for 
a family like the respondent's) that were ascertained, ideal 
under ideal conditions would be the least influenced by the 
respondent's fertility behavior. It is also the only per-
sonal ideal referring to the respondent's own family. 
growth. Thus, despite the limited success that has been 
achieved in popularizing smaller family size values, much 
more work is needed before replacement level fertility 
becomes the modal family size. 
The Gap Between Actual And Ideal Family Size 
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Thus far the discussion centered on the comparison of 
the fertility norms and behavior of the respondents as a 
group. It is also necessary to evaluate the individual fer-
tility performance of these, women in relation to their per-
sonal norms. In the earlier analysis of ideal family size, 
it was noted that family size norms of the respondents were 
generally smaller in comparison to the findings of previous 
research. Comparing actual fertility with ideal fertility 
will signify the extent to which that trend toward small 
family norms has been accompanied by changes in fertility 
behavior. 
The gap is basically a measure of the difference 
between actual fertility and ideal fertility for each of the 
respondents. Three groups of women can be identified in 
terms of the differences between their ideal and actual fam-
ily size: those whose actual family sizes are equal to 
their ideals; those whose actual family sizes exceed their 
ideals; and those whose actual is lower than their ideal. 
Of the three groups, the second--those whose .actual fertil-
ity exceeds their ideals--is the most problematic from the 
standpoint of population growth. Eventhough they generally 
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consider four or fewer than four children as the ideal 
family size (see Table 2), these women represent a classic 
situation where they have more children than they desire. 
Changes in their behavior apparently lag behind shifts in 
their values toward the smaller family. Barring attempts at 
rationalizing their actual family size, respondents whose 
actual fertility corresponds with their ideal are more mod-
ern in their fertility behavior. In other words, these 
respondents have lower ideals (four or below) and they have 
(at leas.t at the time of the interview) restricted their 
actual family sizes to their ideals exemplifying correspon-
dence between their values and behavior. The third group 
would also be effective contributors to curtailing popula-
tion growth, especially if they decided not to complete 
their family size ideals. These comparisons of norms with 
behavior would, thus, provide an indication of the intensity 
and permanence of the popularity of the smaller families. 
Actual Family Size Equal To Ideal Family Size 
Among the non-sterilized respondents, there are 24% 
whose actual family size corresponded with their idea1. 5 49 
(79%) of these respondents have been using some form of 
birth control to avoid further pregnancies. Moderately 
!:) 
There are a total of 265 non-sterilized respondents of 
which 64 have a gap of zero between their actual and ideal 
family size. The relevant data on contraceptive methods 
used and influence of sex combination on family size were 
available from only 62 of these women. 
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reliable methods (condoms and rhythm method, Khalifa, 1973: 
437) are the most commonly used by almost 71% of these women 
who used some method. Only 4 of these respondents used a 
combination of two methods. 6 The rest of the respondents 
used abstinence as a means to avoid future pregnancies. 
Judging from their past history of family planning, however, 
these women whose actual fertility is equal to their ideal 
fertility have been the most successful in effectively plan-
ning their families. They have the highest family planning 
effectiveness score (see Appendix B for a description of 
this measure) among the three gap categories which suggests 
a high probability of their avoiding future unwanted 
births. 7 Thus, the agreement in the ideal and actual fertil-
ity of these women appears to be not a matter of chance, but 
of deliberate choice. They have used family planning effec-
tively in order to limit their actual family size to their 
norms. These women can be considered modern in their fer-
tility behavior. Besides, the chances of their having addi-
tional children appear slim, thereby limiting the probabil-
ity of underestimating their actual fertility. 
While 21% (N=l3) of the women whose actual family size 
6 Condoms and pills, condoms and rhythm method, rhythm 
method and abstinence, and rhythm method and withdrawal are 
the four combinations used. 
7Hean family planning effectiveness scores for the non-
sterilized sample and the three gap groups are as follows: 
overall=2.7; actual less than ideal=2.8; actual greater than 
ideal=l.95; actual equal to ideal=3.6. For the sterilized 
respondents it is 2.3. 
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was equal to their ideals did not use any method, a discus-
sion of their reasons for not using family planning indi-
cates that some of them (N=4) definitely do not intend to 
have more children. Two of these respondents are biologi-
callY subfecund and the husbands of the remaining two women 
were undergoing vasectomy fairly soon after the interview. 
Among the rest (N=9), a third of them discontinued practis-
ing any form of family limitation because of the side 
effects of the contraceptives they used. The remaining 
(N=6) have not used any contraceptives due to their dissat-
isfaction with the sex combination of their families and 
wanting an additional child. These women, thus, will most 
probably have an additional child. Yet, since they form a 
very small percentage of the total non-sterilized sample 
(3%), the additional pregnancies, if they do occur, would 
not drastically alter the results obtained using actual fam-
ily size at the time of the interview. 
The respondents were also questioned about their rea-
sons for the conformity between their ideal and actual fer-
tility. Satisfaction with the sex combination of their fam-
ily size was the reason why the fertility norms of 49% of 
8 the respondents corresponded with their performance. Among 
the rest (N=30), health problems (57%), economic difficul-
ties (27%), satisfaction with the number of children irres-
8 The N here is 59 because responses were not available in 
the case of five women. 
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oective of the sex combination (13%), and their husband's 
desire for just two children (3%) were the reasons cited for 
the equivalence between actual and ideal family size. Hav-
ing children of both sexes, and not just children, is of 
considerable significance to these women. It also suggests 
that if the desired sex combination had not been reached, 
they would have had more children in an attempt to acquire 
the right combination. Thus, even though these women appear 
modern in their fertility behavior, traditional concerns 
(such as offsprings of both sexes) are still an integral 
oart of their family size decisions. 
Actual Family Size Greater Than The Ideal 
Achieved family sizes exceed ideals in the case of 46% 
of the non-sterilized respondents, constituting the largest 
of the three gap categories. However, their pregnancy his-
tories were not completely haphazard processes since 75% of 
these women did say they wanted to stop having additional 
children at some earlier point in their childbearing, but 
for reasons discussed later they either could not or did not 
stop. Nearly 51% desired to stop after their second child 
while another 37% wanted to stop at least after the third 
child. The parity at which they desired to stop corresponds 
closely with their ideal family size as seen in Table 7. 
Views about their ideal family size, thus, do not appear to 
be responses that these women provided on the spur of the 
moment. They, in all probability, had some notion of the 
TABLE 7 
CROSSTABULATION OF THE BIRTH AFTER ilHICH THE RESPONDE:n 
WISHED TO STOP CHILDBEARING BY HE~ IDEAL F~~ILY SIZE 
FOR NON-STERILIZED tvOHEN WHOSE ACTUAL FAi1ILY SIZE 
EXCEEDS THEIR IDEAL 
Parity Ideal Family Size 
At ~fuich 
:lespondent 
Wished to 
Stop 2 3 L~ -
2 93.8% 6.1% 
3 6.2 93.9 
5 
4 . . . . 72.7% 
5 . . . . . 18.2 
6 . . 9.1 
100% 100% 100% 
~ (48) (33) (11) 
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family size that would be suitable for them earlier in their 
pregnancy histories. 
Although these respondents desired to stop their preg-
nancies after a certain child, very few of them (15% or 18 
respondents) adopted some method of family limitation to 
actualize their desires. Nearly 53% of this group used mod-
erately reliable methods, such as condoms and rhythm, while 
only 32% used reliable methods (IUDs and Pills). The major 
reason why they conceived despite using a method of birth 
control was that 74% of them were, by their own judgement, 
not very careful or were irregular in using the methods. 
This is also evident in their low family planning effective-
ness score (1.95). Another 21% had to discontinue using 
birth control measures because of side-effects. Finally, 
there was one case in which the woman had become pregnant 
due to a vasectomy failure.9 
On the other hand, 85% (104) of the respondents whose 
actual family size exceeded their ideal did not take any 
measures to limit their family size, even though they wanted 
to stop at some point. One of the most common reasons for 
their inaction was that they were dissatisfied with their 
sex combination. In a developing society, with its male 
dominated culture, it is not surprising that more women 
wanted one more boy (23%) than a girl (14%). Another third 
q 
This respondent's husband did undergo vasectomy for a 
second time on the day of the interview. 
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(28%) of the women stated that they lacked information about 
family planning methods at that time and hence did not know 
what measures to take to prevent pregnancies. Health prob-
lems (15%) and husband's or relatives' objection to using 
birth control methods (13%) were some of the other reasons. 
This group, thus, presents a typical example of the 
conservative women who for various traditional reasons were 
motivated to have large families, and very often, ended up 
with more children than they said they wanted. Two of the 
most common characteristics of these women need to be men-
tioned again because they suggest elements that would 
require special attention in any population policy. Further 
education with regard to systematic and careful use of birth 
control methods is essential if fertility is to be cont-
rolled. Dissatisfaction with the sex combination, reflected 
particularly in the desire for more boys has its basis in 
the social and economic structure of the society. The 
patrilineal system of lineage and inheritance predominates 
in Kerala. It also places the responsibility of providing 
economic security for their older parents on the sons since 
a formal social security system is not available. Thus, 
alternative means of economic security will have to be 
devised, if the undue emphasis on sons is to be lessened. 
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Actual Family Size Smalle~ Than Ideal Family Size 
The last g~oup among the non-ste~ilized ~espondents 
comp~ises those women whose actual family size is smalle~ 
than thei~ ideal. Although they comp~ise 30% (N=78) of the 
non-ste~ilized sarnple, 10 68% (N=50) of them did not intend 
to complete thei~ family size while one ~espondent had not 
decided about it. Biological difficulties (44%) is one of 
the most common ~easons why the women could not complete 
thei~ ideal. This g~oup is especially significant f~om the 
methodological point of view because they have p~actically 
completed thei~ actual family size. But f~om a theo~etical 
pe~spective thei~ fe~tility behavio~, pa~ticula~ly thei~ 
small family size cannot be cha~acte~ized as mode~n and as 
the outcome of delibe~ate choice. It was dependent on 
ext~aneous ci~curnstances that we~e beyond thei~ cont~ol. 
On the contrary, the rest of this group was motivated 
not to have any more children for two reasons. Economic 
difficulties were the reason why 46% of the women decided 
not to complete their ideals. Even among these women who 
cited economic reasons 19% (4) were also hindered by biolo-
gical difficulties in having more children. The lack of 
time at the disposal of the working mother for child care 
was the second major reason why 8% of the women decided not 
to complete their ideals. Unlike the women whose family 
10 In this section, data is available only for 74 respon-
dents. 
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size was involuntarily limited by subfecundity, this group 
seems to recognize the economic disadvantages of large fami-
lies. Employment of women which is also perceived as incom-
patible with large families, presents another effective 
means of fertility control. 
Among the women (N=74) whose actual family sizes were 
smaller than their ideals, 23 (31%) of them intended to have 
more children. Dissatisfaction with the sex composition of 
their actual family size is the reason why 65% of these 
women intend to complete their ideal family size. However, 
unlike the women whose actual fertility was higher than 
their ideal, a larger proportion of these respondents who 
had a smaller actual family size than ideal wanted one more 
girl (37%) as opposed to wanting one more son (28%). One 
probable cause for this preference of daughters over sons 
could be that more of these women have experienced deaths of 
female infants. Higher infant mortality for girls than for 
boys along with a shorter life expectancy for females over 
males has been recorded in India (U.N., 1973: 115). In 
short, desire to have one or even two children of each sex 
is very predominant among these respondents and is one of 
the important reasons contributing to larger families. Very 
few women (9%) intend to have more children for the sake of 
having more children. At the same time, 17% of the women 
fear the possibility of infant mortality and intend to have 
more children to counteract the potential loss. Finally, 
the pressure from their husbands or parents to have more 
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children is another reason why 9% of the respondents intend 
to complete their ideals. 
Once again, although the probability of these women 
having an additional child or two is high, they form only 9% 
of the non-sterilized sample. Thus, the chances of underes-
timating the actual family size, while not completely elimi-
nated, is considerably reduced. At the same time, it is not 
merely children that these respondents are interested in. 
They desire to have a definite proportion of sons and daugh-
ters and they will attempt to attain that desired sex compo-
~ition. As noted earlier, sons are perceived as a source of 
security. Daughters, on the contrary, are expected to pro-
vide emotional fulfillment because girls, these women con-
tend, will maintain their familial ties, particularly to the 
mother, even after marriage. This division of functions or 
benefits attributed to sons and daughters is rooted in the 
social fabric of India and is another factor that contrib-
utes to the higher fertility rates. 
Sterilized Respondents 
While dissatisfaction with the sex composition was one 
of the most significant inducements to having additional 
children among the non-sterilized respondents, it is satis-
faction with the overall number of children that was the 
most common motivation for respondents to undergo steriliza-
tion (75%). Of these 205 women, only 18% accepted sterili-
zation because they were also satisfied with their sex com-
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position. Another important reason for undergoing 
sterilization was health problems (20%), although almost 
half (48%) of these women also mentioned satisfaction with 
number of children. It is possible that the sterilized 
respondents, in their attempt to achieve a definite sex com-
bination, had more children than they could afford to and 
wanted to have. Some indication of this is evident in a 
comparison of their ideal with their actual family size. 
There are more sterilized (59%) than non-sterilized respon-
dents (46%) whose actual fertility exceeds their ideals. 
Alternately, the proportion of sterilized women whose fer-
tility performance is below their ideal is smaller (19%) in 
comparison with their non-sterilized counterparts (30%). 
Further, the sterilized respondents have, on the average, 
also been less effective in planning their families (effec-
tiveness score=2.3). Hence, instead of risking further 
pregnancies, it appears that they decided to undergo steri-
lization. 
In any event, very few (16%) of these women have 
regretted their decision to opt for a permanent method like 
sterilization. Among those who did regret, side-effects, 
both physical and psychological, is the most commonly stated 
reason (51%) for regret. Insufficient number of children 
(21%) and dissatisfaction with their sex composition (28%) 
are further causes for regret. Nonetheless, what is more 
significant is that 84% of the women who are sterilized, 
irrespective of the reason for which they adopted that 
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method, are happy with their choice. 
Earlier it was noted that a larger proportion of ster-
ilized respondents (59%) than the non-sterilized (46%) have 
exceeded their ideals in their fertility behavior. More 
sterilized respondents (43%) also wanted to stop after their 
third child compared to the non-sterilized women (37%). 
conversely, fewer sterilized women wanted to stop after two 
children (43%) in comparison to the non-sterilized respon-
dents (51%). Yet, like their non-sterilized counterparts, 
although a majority (81%) of them wanted to stop having 
additional children earlier in their pregnancy history, 
almost 83% did not do anything to prevent their pregnancies. 
Once again, dissatisfaction with their sex combination11 
(36%) and not knowing what to do (27%) seem to be the most 
common reasons for their inaction. Lack of means (money and 
facilities for operation--15%) and the objection of husbands 
or relatives (15%) are the other reasons for not using birth 
control earlier. Thus, prior to sterilization, the steri-
lized women do not differ much from the non-sterilized women 
in their motivation for not using any methods even when they 
desired to stop, resulting in more children than they wanted 
for both groups. 
Among those who used some method prior to steriliza-
11The influence of the respondent's desire to have either 
a boy or a girl on their decision to postpone using any 
method of birth control lends support to the earlier expla-
nation with regard to the predominance of satisfaction with 
the number of children as a reason for sterilization. 
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tion, a majority of them (67%), like the non-sterilized 
women, still conceived because they were not careful in 
using the method of their choice. Another 29% of these 
women had to stop using contraceptives because of side 
effects. Further, more of the sterilized respondents (54%) 
used only moderately reliable methods of condoms and rhythm 
in contrast to the reliable methods of IUD and Pills (37%). 
In short, three factors--dissatisfaction with the sex 
composition of their children, lack of information on con-
traceptives, and inefficient use of contraceptives prior to 
sterilization--have been important contributors to higher 
fertility than desired in the case of the sterilized respon-
dents as well as with their non-sterilized counterparts. 
Given these similarities between sterilized and non-steri-
lized women whose actual family sizes exceed their ideals, 
the question can be raised whether many of these non-steri-
lized women would adopt sterilization in the future. If the 
evidence presented in the next three chapters is any indica-
tion, the answer would be 'no,' because adoption of a perma-
nent method, such as sterilization, is not an example of 
modern status and modern family planning behavior in Kerala. 
In other words, significant socioeconomic and family plan-
ning status differences are found between the sterilized and 
non-sterilized women. These issues will be discussed in the 
following chapters. 
However, before proceeding to that discussion it is 
important to reiterate that the notion of having children in 
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marriage and having a desired sex composition seems crucial 
to the women of Kerala. Any population control policy will 
have to be concerned with this basic premise. The goal of 
the population policies is not to eliminate the desire for 
children altogether, but to effectively reduce the desire 
for many children and the practice of having large families. 
Even more significant is the desire to have at least one son 
and a daughter, if not two of each sex. Educational pro-
grams aimed at popularizing the concept of two children as 
opposed to one of each sex will have to be designed. Ironi-
cally, the existing posters depicting an ideal family with 
two children involves a couple with a son and a daughter. 
Grass-root level campaigns will also be needed to dissemi-
nate on a regular basis both the available information 
regarding various birth control methods and contraceptives. 
Further, policies designed to provide supplementary sources 
of meaning and happiness, especially in the life of the 
woman, such as increasing opportunities for careers and some 
security in old age, will be necessary to offset the impor-
tance attached to large families. 
CHAPTER V 
MODERNIZATION, FAMILY PLANNING, AND FAMILY SIZE: 
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
The preliminary discussions, both theoretical and ana-
lytic, presented in the preceding chapters leads to the 
basic conclusion that one of the most urgent tasks facing 
India in her attempt to curb rapid population growth is to 
lower her birth rates. Modernization and an effective fam-
ily planning program are two major aspects of a coherent 
solution to the population problem. Both of these factors 
can influence fertility in two ways: at the normative 
level, they may bring about changes in individuals' atti-
tudes toward and desires for large families; at the behav-
ioral level, they can lead to smaller achieved families. An 
effective family planning program in the context of modern-
ization can be operationalized as representing structural 
and individual causes and correlates of fertility decline. 
The model used in this study, therefore, progresses from the 
structural aspects of modernization through several layers 
of intervening modernization and family planning variables, 
with each successive layer impinging more directly on family 
size. In establishing the empirical validity of this model, 
the first step is to examine the direct relationship of the 
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explanatory variables to fertility and the relationships 
among the independent variables. This procedure would also 
orovide a description of the sample in terms of these micro 
and macro level factors affecting fertility. 
Background Variables 
Four background variables are used in the model as 
macro-structural indicators of modernization. Rural or 
urban area of residence is probably one of the most basic 
structural variables influencing fertility, both directly 
and indirectly. It directly represents diverse levels of 
urbanization and industrialization; at the same time, each 
area offers its members different opportunities for partici-
pating in its economic, social, cultural, religious, and 
demographic sectors. Because they represent different lev-
els of modernization, rural-urban differences need to be 
assessed throughout. 
or the 540 respondents in the sample, 326 were 
selected from two city corporations, with 168 respondents 
from Trivandrum city (an administrative-industrial center) 
and 158 from Cochin city (a commercial-industrial center). 
105 women were selected from the rural area in Trivandrum 
district and 109 from the rural area in Ernakulam district, 
making a total of 214 rural respondents. 
Religion, the second background factor, is a signifi-
cant traditional influence in Indian life, although secular-
ization processes (another aspect of modernization) are more 
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evident in the cities. The western influence in Indian 
Christianity lend plausible the hypothesis that Christian 
respondents would be more modern in their life experiences, 
including their fertility behavior. It could also be 
hypothesized that the secular effects of Christianity may be 
more intense in the cities. 
Caste status of the individuals, with its religious 
and social influences, is another significant background 
variable. In the context of modernization, caste status may 
influence fertility through the process of secularization 
and through the availability of economic and social opportu-
nities to members of different caste groups. The Hindu 
respondents in the sample belong to either the Brahmin, 
Nair, Ezhava, or Scheduled castes. In the ritual hierarchy 
of castes, Brahmins have the highest caste status. Though 
the Nairs are lower than the Brahmins in the ritual hier-
archy, they are the dominant caste in Kerala in terms of 
oolitical and economic power, a feature which may be signif-
icant in its relation to social and economic status and fer-
tility. Ezhavas, an economically backward caste, are next 
to the Nairs in the caste hierarchy. The lowest caste, the 
Scheduled caste (called so because they are listed by Presi-
dential orders under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitu-
tion, Government of India, 1972: 121), comprises all the 
'untouchable' castes. Affirmative action programs of the 
Indian government since Independence have altered their 
opportunities for participation in the modernization pro-
145 
cesses in the country. 
Corresponding to the Hindu caste ordering, caste dis-
tinctions are found among the Christians too. The Jacobite/ 
Marthomite denomination in the Christian church, the power-
ful landowning group, occupies the highest status in the 
Christian hierarchy followed by the C.S.I. (Church of South 
India) denomination, and last by the Nadar Christians. Two 
factors are generally considered relevant in the Christian 
status: the preconversion caste status and the timing of 
the conversion. If a group had a higher status before con-
version to Christianity, it maintained a commensurate status 
in the present hierarchy. Upper caste Christians also claim 
to have been converted earlier than the lower castes. 
Table 8 presents the distribution of respondents by 
area of residence, religion, and caste status. The general 
distribution by religion roughly approximates the distribu-
tion in the state of Kerala. 1 In the case of caste status, a 
greater proportion of the lower castes--Ezhavas, C.S.I., and 
Nadar Christians are in the rural than in the urban sample, 
which has a larger percentage of the upper castes--Brahmins, 
Marthomites/Jacobites--and Scheduled castes. Nairs are 
almost in the same proportion in the rural and urban sam-
ples. This distribution partially projects the traditional 
rural-urban differences with a possible selective migration 
1According to the 1971 population figures only 5.6% of 
the total Kerala population is non-Catholic Christian (Gov-
ernment of India, 1979). 
Religion 
Hindu 
(H = 509) 
Christian 
(N = 31) 
N 
TABLE 8 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY RELIGION, 
CASTE, A..~D AREA OF RESIDENCE 
-~--- --------- --- --------
~f Residence 
e General Rural 
Brahmins 11.3% 2.3% 
Nairs 30.5 31.3 
Ezhavas 29.4 38.3 
Scheduled Castes 22.9 18.2 
Marthomite/Jacobites 1.7 . . . 
c.s. I. 0.4 0.9 
Nadar Christians 3.8 8.9 
100~~ 100% 
(532) (214) 
· Urban 
' 17.4% 
30.0 
23.3 
26.2 
2.8 
. . . 
0.3 
100% 
(318) 
t: 
<l' 
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of the scheduled castes to the cities where better opportu-
nities are available. 
The mean age of the respondent in the sample is 34.6 
while the average age of the rural respondents is lower 
(32.7) than that of the urban respondents (35.6). This dif-
ference suggests two possible modernization trends: (a) the 
lower age of the rural women may be a reflection of the 
higher rural fertility (traditional) and the consequent 
younger populaton; (b) it may also denote selective reten-
tion of older couples in the cities, especially in the 
higher status groups. Seniority is still a dominant cri-
teria for upward movement in the Indian occupational struc-
ture. Another interesting aspect of the age of the respon-
dent is the traditional pattern of a larger age gap between 
the respondent and her husband for older women that is evi-
dent in the rural area alone (r=.12; <.05). That this rela-
tionship is absent in the cities connotes a modern trait of 
smaller age differences between husband and wife. 
What are the implications of these patterns for fer-
tility orientation and actual fertility? Contrary to the 
modernization hypothesis, the rural and urban areas do not 
differ significantly in their ideal and actual family size 
and consequently in the gap between the two. The average 
ideal family size for rural and urban areas is 2.9 and 2.8 
respectively and the mean actual family size is 3.5 in both 
samples. Compared to an ideal family size of 3.1 found in a 
1965 study of three villages in Trivandrum district (Univer-
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sity of Kerala, 1965) or of 3.7 children found in the least 
developed village and 3.1 in the highly developed village in 
Gujerat (Anker, 1973), the rural and urban ideals in this 
study are low. Differences in the actual family size 
between this study's sample and earlier studies (for exam-
ple, an expected family size of 5.4 in the Trivandrum vil-
lage study and 6.0 in the Gujerat study) is even more pro-
nounced. Even when the average family size of sterilized 
respondents in this study is considered (rural steri-
lized=3.5 and urban sterilized=3.8), it is lower than that 
of the two previous samples. Yet, the achieved family size 
of the respondents in this study is higher than their ideals 
suggesting a slower responsiveness of family size behavior 
to modernization and the family planning program compared to 
the norms. 
These rural urban similarities, however, conceal sig-
nificant variations within each area. For example, signifi-
cant religious and caste differences in ideal family size 
are found in the rural area. Cities, in contrast, provide a 
secular atmosphere facilitating favorable reception to the 
intensive family planning propaganda on the necessity of 
having two children or less across the religious and caste 
groups. 
Religious and caste differences in the rural ideals, 
however, are not completely in the hypothesized direction. 
Rural Christians are not only more conservative in their 
ideals than their urban counterparts, but are so in compari-
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son to the rural Hindus too. 2 Christianity appears to be 
more traditional than Hinduism in the rual areas. The flex-
ibility of Hinduism in adopting external elements (such as 
family planning propaganda) and reinterpeting them according 
to its principles is evident in the similarity in ideal fam-
ily sizes of urban and rural Hindus. 3 Lower caste status of 
the rural Christians (who are either C.S.I. or Nadar Chris-
tians--the two lower castes) may be an additional explana-
tory factor. 
2Mean ideal family size for the different religious 
groups are: 
Rural Urban 
Christians 1.4 2.8 
Hindus 2.9 2.8 
~As Bondurant (1963) pointed out, the concept of Dharma 
(duty) is central to the Indian social and religious struc-
ture. Every individual has a specific dharma commensurate 
with his status in society. But, a given individual's 
dharma may change depending on circumstances and hence norms 
are laid down to guide actions under extraordinary condi-
tions. Though an individual's behavior under these stress-
ful conditions may be very different from what is regularly 
required of him, he still will be acting 'dharmically.' At 
the societal level too, dharma is viewed as changing from 
age to age and each era has a different value system. 
Social and political leaders like Ghandhi are considered 
competent in interpreting when an age has ended and another 
has begun. Thus, the accomodative nature of dharma and Hin-
duism, which permits change without destroying its basic 
principles is an important aspect of India's modernization. 
It is in this context that the smaller ideal family size of 
the rural Hindus, which is in direct contrast to the reli-
gious and social values placed on a large number of children 
needs to be understood. 
150 
While the Christian castes in the villages do not 
differ from each other in their family size norms, the dif-
ferences among the rural Hindu castes do not conform to the 
traditional hypothesis. The Scheduled castes, the lowest 
castes, have the lowest mean ideal family size (2.5) fol-
lowed by the Nairs (2.8), Brahmins (3.0), and Ezhavas (3.1). 
These differences need to be explained in terms of both the 
ritual and secular aspects of caste. In the rural areas, 
caste status has a traditional influence (higher ideal fam-
ily size) in two instances: when the basis of upper caste 
status is purely ritual or religious, as in the case of the 
Brahmins and when the basis of lower caste status is both 
ritual and economic as with the Ezhavas. In contrast, upper 
caste status becomes a modernizing force when the high rit-
ual and secular statuses coincide as in the case of the 
Nairs. Modern fertility orientations of the lower castes--
-may be a reflection of the mobility aspirations of these 
once down trodden groups, in the context of the affirmative 
policies of the government. Incidentally, these opportuni-
ties are not available to the Ezhavas. Once again, it is a 
secular factor--government intervention--that differentiates 
the two ritually lowest castes. This is a clear example of 
the unique nature of Indian modernization and consequently 
of its demographic transition. 
Unlike ideal family size, the variations in the actual 
family size and the gap between the actual and the ideal 
among the religious and caste groups are not statistically 
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significant. Yet, the actual family size of these women are 
consistently higher than their ideals, resulting in a posi-
tive gap. This pattern may be because ideals, which are 
opinions, are more easily influenced by modernization and 
fmaily planning propaganda than achieved family size, par-
ticularly when the frame of reference is a group. It sug-
gests a lag in behavioral changes following the shifts in 
norms. 
Finally, modern orientations of the younger respon-
dents and their earlier exposure to the family planning pro-
gram4 is expected to be reflected in their ideal and actual 
family size, and the ensuing gap between the two. It also 
nrovides a time dimension to the problem. Differences 
between the older and younger cohorts, if they exist, may 
represent changes over time. Further, older respondents, by 
virtue of their age, have experienced greater numbers of 
childbearing years too. Analysis reveals significant posi-
tive correlations between age of the respondent and the fam-
ily size variables suggesting more traditional ideals and 
behavior of older women and vice versa (Tables 9, 10). 
Apart from the effect of the number of childbearing years, 
4 There is no direct evidence in this study for the role 
of family planning program in influencing fertility norms 
and behavior. Yet, the programs were revitalized and have 
been implemented vigorously since the late sixties and early 
seventies. This is bound to create differences in family 
planning practices over time. For example, the percent of 
married women in the reproductive age using contraception in 
India doubled between 1969 (8%) and 1976 (17%) (Nortman and 
Hofstatter, 1980: 73). 
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modernization of fertility values and behavior (shift toward 
smaller family) seems to have occurred in the two districts 
over time. All three relationships are consistently 
stronger in the rural areas implying more pronounced fertil-
ity differences between the older and younger rural women 
than the urban. This is consistent with the modernization 
argument that older rural women would participate in and 
benefit least from the changes occurring through time in the 
Indian society. Because of their urban location, older 
respondents in the city have a better chance of participat-
ing in the modernization trends. 
In general, the influence of the background variables 
on fertility (whenever significant) lends support to the 
general argument that modernization, especially in its reli-
gious and demographic (age of the respondent) aspects, does 
lower fertility aspirations and aids in their realization. 
However, it should be noted that rural-urban area of resi-
dence, the geographical aspect of modernization, is not 
directly relevant to family size in this sample. Mere resi-
dence in a rural or urban area does not differentiate indi-
viduals in terms of their family size. The influence of 
residence is, perhaps, indirect since it is the difference 
in opportunities (economic, social, and cultural) the cities 
and rural villages provide that explain differences in fer-
tility orientations and behavior. 
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Inte~vening Social and Economic Cha~acte~istics 
Social and economic cha~acte~istics of the ~espon­
dent's family and of the ~espondent he~self comp~ise the 
fi~st set of inte~vening va~iables. They, along with the 
othe~ inte~vening va~iables, ~ep~esent diffe~ences in oppo~­
tunities p~ovided by the ~u~al and u~ban a~eas. Economic 
mode~nization (like u~banization and indust~ialization) 
leads to imp~ovements in the socioeconomic status of the 
families, the~eby, inc~easing the availability of means and 
also mode~nizing attitudes and values. It is, the~efo~e, 
hypothesized that these developments would ~esult in lowe~ 
fe~tility, both at the no~mative and behavio~al levels. 
Socioeconomic Status Of The Family Of The Respondent 
The th~ee indices of the family's socioeconomic status 
used in the model a~e husband's education, his occupational 
status, and the extent of mode~n items owned by the family. 
Since India is a mode~nizing society, its cities, 
unlike mode~nized cities, would be cha~acte~ized by the com-
olete ~ange on the socioeconomic status dimensions. Ru~al 
a~eas, howeve~, would have the t~aditional socioeconomic 
st~uctu~e. As the ~esults in Tables 11 to 14 indicate, 
u~ban families have a highe~ socioeconomic status than the 
ru~al units. They also occupy a wide~ educational, occupa-
tional, and owne~ship (of mode~n items) ~ange than the ~u~al 
a~eas. Ru~al a~eas, on the other hand, have a p~edominantly 
t~aditional economic structu~e and the absence of the neces-
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TABLE 11 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS( A~D THEIR HUSBANDS' 
EDUCATIONAL STATUS BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
Husbands' Wives' 
Educational Education Education 
Categories Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Below High School 76.2% 42.6% 78.0% 57.7% 
High School 14.5 28.2 13.1 27.6 
Above High School 9.3 29.1 8.9 14.7 
N 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(214) (326) (214) (326) 
x2 a a 
Gamma .58 .40 
1a = significant at <.001 level. 
TABLE 12 
DISTRIBUTION OF HUSBANDS' AND WIVES' OCCUPATIONAL 
STATUS BY AREA OF RESIDENC£1,2,3 
Husbands' Wives' 
Occupational Occupation Occupation 
Categories Rural Urban Rural 'Jrban 
Unemployed 1. 8% 
Unskilled Labor 53.3% 21.2 
161 
Si<.illed Labor 20.1 10.1 77.8% 28.1% 
Clerical and Service 
Occupations 14.0 34.7 3.2 28.1 
:1anagerial and 
Professional 
Occupations 12.6 32.2 19.0 43.9 
N 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(214) (326) (63) (57) 
x2 a a 
Gamma .52 .66 
1 . . f. a = sLgnL Lcant at < . 001 level. 
2unemployed women were omitted from the distribution in 
this table. 
3The first categorv in Women's Occupational status 
refers to both ~nskilled and skilled labor. 
No. of 
TABLE 13 
EXTENT OF OWNERSHIP OF MODERH ITENS BY 
AREA OF RESIDE~CE1 
Area, of Resi.dence. 
Items 
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Owned General Rural Urban 
0 Items 31.3% 52.3% 17.5% 
1 - 3 Items 45.4 43.5 46.6 
4 - 7 Items 17.6 3.7 26.7 
8 -17 Items 5.7 0.5 9.2 
100% 100% 100/o 
N (540) (214) (326) 
x2 a 
Gamma .70 
la = significant at < . 001 level. 
TABLE' 14 
l~ANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND RESULTS OF T-TEST FOR 
SELECTED VARIABLES BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
Area of Residence 
:1ean Standard Dev~at~on 
Variables Riiral-c~-.-. ·-. -. Uroan 
Background 
Variable Age of Respondent 
. Education of Husband ~ocioe<:ono~~clownership of H<;>dern Items .i.1odern~zat~on Education of W~fe 
Demographic !Age at First Marriage 
11odernization Infant Mortality 
Social-Psycho 
logical 
AodernizationiConjugal Role Relationships 
Family 
Planning 
Variables 
Son Preference 
Parity of FP Initiation 
Family Planning Effectiveness 
32.7 
6.1 
0.9 
5.5 
18.8 
11.5 
126.2 
12.7 
2.6 
2.3 
1a = H.:ural-Urban differences 
b = ltural-Urban differences 
c = Rural-Urban differences 
significant at 
significant at 
significant .at 
35.8a 
9.6a 
3.oa 
7.9a 
'19. 5c 
11.4 
-
141.2a 
9.9 
2.9 
2.7a 
< . 001 level. 
<. 01 level. 
<. 05 level. 
Rural Urban 
4.7 
4.0 
1.3 
3.9 
3.5 
16.6 
29.5 
-18.2 
1.9 
1.3 
5.2 
4. 7b 
2. 7a 
4.1 
4.lc 
18.2 
32.7 
19.6 
2.2 
1. 5c 
1-' 
0"\ 
w 
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sary infrastructure (electricity, good roads) disallows pos-
session of some of the modern items. 
High intercorrelations among the three indices--educa-
tion, occupation, and ownership of modern items--also pro-
vide a consistent picture of the socioeconomic structure of 
the families (Tables 9,10). As might be expected, higher 
education, higher occupational status, and higher material 
status are consistently associated with each other, both in 
the cities and the rural areas.5 
It is also necessary to assess the role of religion 
and caste in the socioeconomic achievements of the sample. 
Contrary to the expected pattern, Hindus and Christians gen-
erally do not differ significantly in their opportunities 
for participation in the social and economic development. 
Caste status, on the other hand, is significant in 
explaining variations in socioeconomic status, even in mod-
ernizing India (Table 15). The data supports the expected 
pattern of the higher socioeconomic status of the upper 
castes and vice versa, particularly in the cities. 6 Inspite 
5Hence, only husband's education will be used as an index 
of the family's socioeconomic status in the later analysis. 
n The following are the Chi-square and Gamma values for 
the relationships between caste and occupational status in 
the rural areas and cities: 
Rural Areas: 
Cities: 
Chi-square=p<.OOl 
Gamma=-.01 
Chi-square=p<.001 
Gamma=-.31 
TABLE 15 
l'1EANS AND RESULTS OF ANOVA ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF CASTE WITH HUSBAiW '· S EDUCATION. 
MODERN ITEi'1S. AND WIFE'· S EDUCATION BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl· 
Area of Variables Husband's Modern Items Education of 
Residence Caste Education Owned Respondent 
J:1ean (N) He an on He an nn 
-· 
Brahmin 10.4a ( 5} 1.4 ( 5) 7.oc ( 5) 
Nair 7.4 (67) 1.2 (67) 6.7 (67) 
Ezhava 5.3 (82} 0.9 (82) 5.0 (82) 
Rural Scheduled Caste 5.2 (39) 0.6 (39} 4.9 (39) i1arthomite/ Jacobite . . . ( 0) . . . ( 0) . . ·c o) 
C.S.I 8.5 ( 2) 1.5 ( 2) 5.0 ( 2) 
Nadar Christian 5.2 (19) 0.7 (19) 4.5 (19) 
Brahmin 11.1 a (55) 3.5 (55) 8.7a (55) 
Nair 10.8 (95) 3.6 (95) 9.0 (95) 
Ezhava 8.7 (74) 2.9 (74) 7.6 (74) 
Urban Scheduled Caste 7.6 (83) 2.1 (83) 6.4 (83) 
Marthomite/Jacobite 12.3 ( 9) 5.4 ( 9) 10.6 ( 9) 
C. S. I. . . . ( 0) . . . ( 0) . . . ( 0) 
Nadar Christian 10.0 ( 1) 3.0 ( 1) 9.0 ( 1) 
1a = Differences among castes significant at <. 001 level. 
b = Differences among castes significant at <. 01 level. 
c = Differences among castes significant at <. 05 level. 
..... 
0'\ 
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of the governmental policies, the upper castes still have a 
greater share in the fruits of modernization. 
These modernization trends could, theoretically, have 
significant influences on fertility (Tables 9, 10). As 
might be expected, higher socioeconomic status is systemati-
cally associated with lower ideals, lower actuals, and 
smaller gaps between ideal and actual family size. Higher 
fertility, both in orientations and in behavior, implies a 
traditional value system as well as the economic (supplemen-
tary income, old age security, and inheritance of wealth) 
and social necessity of having more children in the poorer 
families. Additional dimensions of these negative socioeco-
nomic status-fertility relationships are evident under fur-
ther analysis. Socioeconomic differentials (indexed by edu-
cation and occupational status) in ideal family size in both 
rural areas and cities are not as pronounced as the differ-
ences in actual family size. In other words, upper and 
lower class respondents are more similar in their fertility 
norms than in their fertility behavior. Since the overall 
family size norms are small, it could be concluded that not 
everybody who subscribes to small family ideals has con-
formed to them in practice. 
Distinctions in family size norms among the socioeco-
nomic groups are stronger in the urban than in the rural 
areas. Cities, as noted earlier, have a wide range in their 
socioeconomic continuum and consequently the family size 
norms of the top strata are significantly smaller than the 
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ideals of the lowest strata. On the other hand, the compar-
atively narrower range in the rural socioeconomic status 
precludes wide disparities in the rural ideal family size. 
Yet, the socioeconomic differences in achieved family size 
are equally strong in both the rural and urban areas, 
despite the small rural socioeconomic range. Apparently, 
wider differences in actual fertility exist between the 
upper and lower classes in the rural areas than in the cit-
ies. Stated differently, rural women from lower status fam-
ilies have a higher actual family size in comparison with 
their city counterparts. Rural residence and lower socioe-
conomic status, thus, interact in contributing to their tra-
ditional fertility behavior. 
Socioeconomic differentials in the gap between the 
ideal and actual family size can be deduced from the pat-
terns in ideal and actual fertility. The gap is the excess 
in achieved family size over the ideal family size. There 
is a larger difference between the socioeconomic variations 
in ideal family size and in actual family size in the rural 
areas than in the cities. Consequently, the impact of 
socioeconomic status on the gap between ideal and actual 
fertility is also stronger in the rural area. In other 
words, there is a larger proportion of lower class rural 
respondents who have lower fertility norms but higher actual 
fertility. At the same time, there is a closer correspon-
dence in the fertility norms and behavior of upper class 
rural women. In the cities, in contrast, there is closer 
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conformity between ideal and actual family size. Higher 
status urban women who idealize smaller families have 
smaller achieved families, while lower status women have 
higher ideal and actual families. Thus, the socioeconomic 
patterns in the gap seem to be a reflection of the socioeco-
nomic variations in fertility norms and behavior. 
The third index of socioeconomic status, the ownership 
of modern items, is a more effective correlate of rural fer-
tility than urban fertility (Table 10). Given the tradi-
tional socioeconomic structure of rural areas, the opportu-
nities and means for acquiring and using modern items will 
be more limited in the rural areas than in the cities. Only 
those with very high educational and ocupational statuses 
(and probably those who have either worked in foreign coun-
tries or have children employed abroad) could afford large 
numbers of modern items. This will differentiate them from 
poorer respondents much more clearly than will be the case 
in the cities. The stronger impact of higher economic sta-
tus in the reduction of rural fertility complements the 
argument made earlier for rural economic development as a 
tool in the population control program. 
Socioeconomic characteristics Of The Respondent 
The second set of intervening social and economic 
characteristics concern the respondent and her status. 
Since the woman has a direct role in childbearing, it may be 
hypothesized that her own socioeconomic achievements, apart 
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from those of her husband, will have an independent 
influence on fertility norms and behavior. The respondent's 
status is measured by three indices--her education, her 
labor force participation, and her work status. 
As might be expected in a male dominated traditional 
culture, women, both in the urban and rural areas, have 
lower educational levels than women (Table 11). Moreover, 
just as with their husband's education, rural women are less 
educated than their urban counterparts. This fits in with 
the traditional rural and modernizing urban structures 
described earlier (Table 14). 
The labor force participation pattern of women comple-
ments these conclusions. Although a larger proportion of 
rural women (29%) than urban women work (17%), a majority of 
the former is in the lower status occupations (Table 12). 
Employment of poorer women in the unskilled and other lower 
status occupations may be expected in the non-industrial 
rural economy. In contrast, the pattern of urban women's 
employment typical of modernizing cities involves a smaller 
proportion employed, but in jobs covering the entire occupa-
tional spectrum. Limited employment opportunities for women 
and the lack of sufficient outside help in household jobs 
often require the urban women to stay at home. Yet, urban 
women with higher education tend to be employed more than 
(gamma=.66) the rural women with similar education 
(gamma=.07). Another interesting aspect of the woman's 
socioeconomic status is the stronger correlation between her 
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education and work status compared to her husband's (Table 
10). In a context where it is still not customary for the 
woman to be employed, when they do get a job, they engage in 
occupations more compatible with their education. 
Intercorrelations between the socioeconomic character-
istics of the husband and the wife indicate a coherence in 
the family's socioeconomic structure (Tables 9, 10). Women 
with higher education tend to marry men with higher educa-
tion, higher occupational status, and higher economic sta-
tus. This pattern is less consistent among the rural fami-
lies than in the cities suggesting a gradual shift in 
emphasis from family's status to individual's status as a 
criteria in urban marriages. In the modernizing cities, 
parity in educational achievements of husband and wife is 
becoming as important a criteria in contracting a marriage 
as traditional ones, such as caste status and family's her-
itage. 
Rural-urban differences in labor force participation 
of women and their work status (that a greater proportion of 
rural women tend to work, bur they work in lower status 
occupations) is carried over into the relationship between 
the husband and wife's socioeconomic characteristics. Rural 
and urban areas differ in their motivations and opportuni-
ties for women's employment. Economic factors seem to be 
the basis of the rural women's labor force participation. 
Their employment is not a matter of choice, but of neces-
sity. In the cities, however, women's employment seems to 
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be an expression of their higher status and the consequent 
emphasis on their non-traditional roles. Thus, it is only 
in the urban samples that women whose husbands have higher 
education (Gamma=.28), higher occupational status 
(gamma=.ll), and higher economic status (gamma=.lO) are more 
likely to be employed than are women whose husbands have 
lower status. Husband's education and economic statuses are 
not significant differentiating factors in the women's labor 
force participation in the rural areas while husband's occu-
pational status is. The negative relationship of husband's 
occupation to wife's labor force participation (gamma=-.33) 
supports the argument made earlier that monetary considera-
tions require rural women to work, even if it is in lower 
status jobs. Since education is not a direct or necessary 
index of economic wealth, it is not a determining factor of 
whether the rural wife works or not. At the same time, vil-
lagers generally possess fewer modern items which may 
explain the irrelevance of the economic index in the rural 
areas. 
When women are employed, their occupational status is 
consistent with their husband's status (Tables 9, 10). But, 
unlike women's education, there are no rural-urban differ-
ences in the higher correlations between their work status 
and their family status. While education is fairly wide-
spread in Kerala, the infrequency of women's labor force 
participation may explain the equally close correspondence 
between the husband's status and wive's work status in the 
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rural and urban centers. The stronger rural correlation 
between wive's work status and modern items also reflects 
the monetary contribution that their employment makes toward 
the purchase of the scarce goods available in the villages. 
Wife's socioeconomic characteristics can also be 
linked back to the background variables. The influence of 
religion on the socioeconomic status of the respondent is 
comparable to its influence on her family's status. There 
are no significant differences among Hindu and Christian 
women in their education and employment. 
Caste distinctions, once again, are operative in 
women's socioeconomic achievements lending additional sup-
port to the results found in the case of the family's sta-
tus. Inspite of the efforts of the government, upper caste 
women are still more educated than the lower castes (Table 
15). Given the traditional rural structure, it is not 
suprising that the caste distinctions in women's education 
are not as pronounced in the rural areas as in the cities. 
These patterns are also consistent with the transitional 
status of Indian cities. 
Caste differences in women's employment further exem-
plifies this modernizing structure. Although slightly more 
of the lower caste rural women tend to be in the labor force 
(gamma=.09) they are engaged in lower status occupations 
than the upper caste women (Table 16). Status considera-
tions may prevent some of the upper caste women, even if 
highly educated, from working; but the lower caste respon-
TABLE 16 
DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIOi:~AL STATUS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES 
BY CASTE AND AREA OF RESIDENCE1,2 
Area of 
Occupational Residence 
Status 
Unskilled Labor 
Skilled Labor 
Clerical and Service 
'51 Aanagerial and 
&! Professional 
~ N 
x2 
Gamma 
Blue Collar 
Clerical and Service j i•1anagerial and § Professional 
~ N x2 
Gamma 
Rural 
Upper Ezhavas 
Castes 
55. 47o 
6.8 
16.2 
21.6 
100% 
( 74) 
a 
-.01 
28.6% 
7.1 
64.3 
(1£2~ 
a 
-.69 
59.8% 
18.3 
15.9 
6.1 
100% 
( 82) 
94.4% 
2.8 
2.8 
100% ( 36) 
Lower Upper 
Castes. Castes 
41. 4io 
39.7 
8.6 
10.3 
100% 
(58) 
a4.6% 
15.4 
100% ( 13) 
b 
12.7% 
5.7 
36.9 
43.9 
100% 
(157) 
a 
-.37 
4.8% 
33.3 
61.9 
100% (21) 
-.56 
Urban 
Ezhavas 
27.8% 
11.1 
34.7 
26.4 
100% 
( 72) 
25.0% 
25.0 
50.0 
100% ( 16) 
1a =Significant at <.001 level; b =Significant at <.01 level. 
Lower 
Castes 
31.3% 
19.3 
31.3 
18.1 
100% 
( 83) 
58.8% 
17.6 
23.5 
100% ( 17) 
2upper castes include Brahmins, jairs, ~·Iarthomites/ Jacobites, and C. S. I. ; 
lower castes include Scheduled castes and Nadar Christians. 1-' 
"'-.1 
w 
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dent is engaged in lower status and traditional occupations 
constrained by lower educational attainment and required for 
economic purposes. As expected, caste restrictions in 
securing higher status jobs seem stronger in the rural 
areas. The absence of caste distinctions in the labor par-
ticipation of urban women may be an aspect of the developing 
nature of the cities. Simply, changing family structures 
(toward the nuclear family) which limits the help in house-
hold jobs available to the urban wife limit her chances of 
seeking outside employment. This may also be reinforced by 
status restrictions: until a certain societal threshold in 
women's employment and modernization is reached, social and 
economic improvements among the higher castes may increase 
their conservatism, especially in the question of women 
seeking outside employment. At the same time, contrary to 
the traditional pattern, some of the lower caste women in 
the cities are engaged in higher status occupations (Table 
16). These diverse trends, once again, reveal Kerala's cit-
ies in their transition toward modernization in contrast to 
the rural areas, which though developing, lean more toward 
the traditional end of the continuum. 
Analysis of the correlations between age of the 
respondent and her socioeconomic characteristics provides a 
time dimension to the problem (Tables 9, 10). Since the 
older cohorts of women grew up in a more traditional set up 
and lacked the chances for participating in the post-inde-
pendence development processes, their experiences and 
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achievements can differ. However, as in the case of their 
husbands, no significant changes have occurred in the educa-
tional achievements of women suggesting a selective partici-
pation of the upper castes and classes in the modernization 
processes. Data on the labor force participation of the age 
cohorts and their work statuses further reveal the juxtapo-
sitioning of the traditional and the modern elements in the 
traditional cities. Though the younger urban women (only) 
tend to be employed more frequently (gamma=-.13), they are 
engaged mainly in lower status jobs (Table 10). Seniority, 
and not merit, is still a dominant evaluation criteria in 
the occupational structure for both men and women. 
Although no significant improvements in the socioeco-
nomic status of women are evident over time, changes have 
occurred in their fertility patterns. Earlier, it was noted 
that the younger women have significantly lower fertility 
ideals, actuals, and gaps than the older women. The organ-
ized family planning program and cohort differences in their 
exposure to them may be relevant factors here. 
These patterns in the socioeconomic status of the wife 
are expected to influence fertility norms and behavior in 
ways similar to that of the impact of her family's status 
(Tables 9, 10). Higher educational and occupational status 
of women have a modernizing influence on fertility as evi-
dent in their lower ideals, lower actuals, and smaller gaps. 
But, as with their families' status, women's socioeconomic 
traits are stronger correlates of actual family size than of 
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fertility ideals in both the rural and urban areas. Once 
again, the movement toward the small family norm is not 
accompanied by similar trends in fertility behavior, espe-
cially for the lower classes. Women's education, however, 
has a stronger modernizing effect on family size norms in 
the cities with women's occupational status being its count-
erpart in the rural areas. In a traditional rural context, 
where the economic status of the family and the social 
standing of the women are low, higher status jobs are 
required to modernize women's fertility norms. Higher edu-
cation of women in itself is not sufficient in lowering 
ideal family size in the rural areas. 
Women's socioeconomic status has effects similar to 
those of the family's socioeconomic status on actual fertil-
ity. Despite the narrower range of the rural women's 
socioeconomic status, rural fertility differentials are as 
pronounced as in the cities. In other words, lower class 
rural respondents have significantly larger numbers of chil-
dren compared to lower class urban women. Just as with the 
family's status, rural residence interacts with lower class 
status in contributing to traditional fertility behavior 
among the lower class in the rural areas. 
The nature of the relationship between respondent's 
socioeconomic status and the gap between their ideal and 
actual fertility can be deduced from the socioeconomic pat-
terns in fertility norms and behavior. For example, there 
is a larger difference between the educational variations in 
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ideal and actual fertility in the rural areas than in the 
cities. Consequently, the effect of women's education on 
the gap between the ideal and actual family is also stronger 
in the rural areas. Specifically, more rural women with 
lower education have experienced a larger gap--considerably 
higher actual fertility than ideal--compared to the upper 
class ruralites whose fertility behavior corresponds more 
closely to their norms. In the cities, in contrast, there 
is greater conformity between actual and ideal family size 
among w0men with varying levels of education and hence, the 
smaller the range in the gap. Thus, the socioeconomic vari-
ations in the gap can be understood by analyzing the nature 
of the effect of women's socioeconomic status on ideal and 
actual family size separately. 
Wife's labor force participation has a modernizing 
influence only on actual family size and the gap, and that 
too only in the cities. Employed urban women have signifi-
cantly smaller achieved families (Mean=2.8) and gaps (-.04) 
than the unemployed (actual family size=3.7; and gap=0.9). 
Cities provide a modernizing framework (higher education of 
both husband and wife, higher occupational, and economic 
status) in which the urban working woman operates. Labor 
force participation is not of much consequence for the rural 
woman engaged in low status occupations and constrained by 
poor economic conditions. Once again, as with the family 
status, more pronounced differences exist in fertility 
achievements than in opinions. 
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In short, distinctions in the rural and urban patterns 
indicate that improvements in the socioeconomic status of 
women could be achieved in the process of modernization. 
such improvements also seem effective in reducing fertility 
at the normative and behavioral levels. 
Intervening Demographic Characteristics 
This set of intervening variables includes two factors 
that may influence fertility both at the normative and quan-
titative levels. Age at marriage, the first variable, quan-
titatively affects fertility by determining the number of 
childbearing years. As an intervening variable in the mod-
ernization-fertility relationship, age at marriage becomes a 
medium through which educational and occupational statuses 
of women affect fertility. 
Wife's Age At Marriage 
While socioeconomic status can be considered an index 
of primary modernization, age at marriage is an index of 
early secondary modernization since it is improvements in 
the social and economic status of women that tend to post-
none marriages. Differences among the rural and urban areas 
in women's age at marriage indicates that not only are the 
cities characterized by a higher age at marriage, but also a 
wider range in marriage ages than the rural areas (Table 
14). Larger variations in age at marriage adds another 
dimension to the transitional nature of cities. 
Further specification of the modernization-age at mar-
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riage relationship is possible in the analysis of the inter-
relationships between the socioeconomic status of the wife 
and her age at marriage. As expected, the higher the educa-
tional and occupational status of the respondent, the higher 
is her age at marriage (Tables 9, 10). There are no differ-
ences between the cities and villages in the effect of edu-
cation on age at marriage. Even in the traditional rural 
structure, higher education postpones age at marriage, 
partly explaining the modernizing effects on rural fertil-
ity. On the other hand, it is only in the cities that work-
ing women have significantly higher age at marriage 
(mean=22.8) than the unemployed women (18.8). Differences 
in age at marriage among women in higher and lower status 
occupations are also more pronounced in the cities. Rural 
areas are characterized by a pattern of early marriage among 
its women (Table 14) as well as by a traditional occupa-
tional structure. As noted earlier, while a larger percent-
age of rural than urban women were in the labor force, a 
majority of the former were engaged in lower status jobs. 
These factors may explain the absence of significant differ-
ences in age at marriage among working and non-working rural 
women and the weaker rural correlations between age at mar-
riage and wife's work status. 
There is a close similarity between the impact of the 
family's and the wife's socioeconomic characteristics on her 
age at marriage (Tables 9, 10). Two such similarities evi-
dent in this analysis are: higher socioeconomic status of 
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the family is associated with higher age at marriage; and 
higher status operates as a modernizing agent not only in 
the cities, but even in the traditional rural context. How-
ever, correlations between family's socioeconomic status and 
age at marriage are stronger in the rural areas indicating a 
greater disparity between higher and lower status rural fam-
ilies than urban families. Although this pattern does not 
fit in with the thesis of the transitional nature of cities 
versus the more homogenous structure of the rural areas, the 
weaker urban correlation suggests the facilitating influence 
of the cities in secondary modernization. More specifi-
cally, women from urban families with low socioeconomic sta-
tus tend to marry later than their rural counterparts. At 
the same time, improvements in the rural family's socioeco-
nomic status is as strongly associated with higher age at 
marriage for their women as for their urban counterparts. 
In order to complete the analysis of the extent of 
secondary modernization of the sample, it is necessary to 
relate wife's age at marriage to the background variables. 
The absence of socioeconomic differences (both family's and 
respondent's) between the two religious groups is carried 
over into the (lack of) religion-age at marriage relation-
ship too. In contrast, caste differences in age at marriage 
may be traced back to the different socioeconomic statuses 
of the upper and lower castes (Table 17). Families and 
respondents of the upper caste tend to have higher socioeco-
nomic status leading to higher age at marriage of the women 
~ 
------
Caste 
TABLE 17 
HEANS AND RESULTS OF A~WVA OH WIFE~ S AGE AT HAR.RIAGE 
BY CASTE AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
A~a~ n~ ~aci~an~o 
.Hean Age at l1arriage 
-----------
GenerRl ( N) Rural ( N) Urban 
Brahmin 19.8c (60) 18.6C ( 5) 19.9a 
Nair 19.6 (162) 19. 2. (67) 19.9 
Ezhava 19.1 (156) 18.6 (82) 19.7 
Scheduled Caste 18.6 (122) 18.9 (39) 18.5 
Marthomite/Jacobite 22.3 ( 9) . . . ( 0) 22.3 
c.s. I. 18.0 ( 2) 18.0 ( 2) . . . 
Nadar Christian 18.1 (20) 18.1 (19) 18.0 
la ::: <.001 level of significance. 
c ::= <.05 level of significance. 
( N) 
(55) 
(95) 
(74) 
(83) 
( 9) 
( 0) 
( 1) 
1--' 
(X) 
1--' 
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in the cities. But caste disparities in age at marriage are 
not as marked in the rural areas. A plausible explanation 
may lie in the economic component of the caste-socioeconomic 
status association in the rural area. There were no signif-
icant differences among the rural caste groups in their eco-
nomic status (Table 15). Given the relatively low standards 
of living and the difficulty in obtaining a number of modern 
goods in the rural areas, both the husband and wife would 
have to work to afford some of them. But the upper caste 
woman generally does not work and eventhough the lower caste 
woman works, both she and her husband are engaged in lower 
status jobs. Thus, the weaker caste differences in age at 
marriage may be a function of the lack of economic differ-
ences among the rural castes. Caste distinctions are also 
not too pronounced in the rural areas leading to the simi-
larities in age at marriage among the rural castes. 
Finally, no significant changes are evident in the age 
at which older and younger cohorts of women in the sample 
were first married (Tables 9, 10). This could also be 
linked back to the lack of age differences in their respec-
tive socioeconomic status. 
Having established the positive relationship between 
socioeconomic modernization and wife's age at marriage, it 
is necessary to assess the latter's role in influencing fer-
tility (Tables 9, 10). As expected, a woman who married 
later generally has a smaller ideal and actual family size, 
and a smaller gap between the two in both the cities and the 
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rural areas. The similarity in the strength of the rural 
and urban relationships of age at marriage with ideal and 
actual family size, despite the smaller age at marriage 
range in the rural areas, points out another traditional 
pattern among rural women. Rural women who marry early 
idealize and have larger families compared to the urban 
women who marry early. Moreover, continuing the trend 
noticed in the case of both the family's and the respon-
dent's socioeconomic status, age at marriage distinctions in 
actual family size are stronger than distinctions in ideals 
possibly due to the small variations in the ideal family 
size. Raising the age at marriage of women in India, thus, 
can be an effective tool in achieving fertility declines 
both directly and indirectly as a consequence of improved 
socioeconomic status. 
Infant Mortality 
Extent of infant mortality experienced by a family is 
the second demographic variable in the model. Like age at 
marriage, it is not only an index of secondary moderniza-
tion, but it also can directly influence fertility. Two 
types of effects can be hypothesized: a quantitative rela-
tionship in which extent of infant mortality determines the 
number of surviving children a couple has; and a motiva-
tional relationship where it influences the couple's desire 
for having children. The index is operationalized as the 
percentage of all pregnancies that have been spontaneous 
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abortions, still births, and deaths of infants, four years 
and below. 
Infant mortality viewed as an index of modernization 
implies that as a society progresses, the extent of infant 
mortality experienced by families can be expected to 
decrease. Though rural and urban areas, representing tradi-
tional and modern contexts, do not differ significantly in 
their infant mortality (Table 14) the intervening vari-
ables--socioeconomic status characteristics, age at mar-
riage, and the background variables--are significant deter-
minants of fertility within each area. 
In the cities, higher social status of the husband, 
measured by his education and occupation, is significantly 
associated with lower mortality (Tables 9, 10). More ·effi-
cient health care and improved sanitation facilities are 
available in the cities than in the rural areas. But in 
these modernizing cities, it is the husband or the head of 
the household who generally initiates and maintains contacts 
with non-familial institutions, such as the hospital; hence 
the relevance of husband's status to urban infant mortality. 
Higher education of the husband may represent health care 
values, such as beliefs in preventive care and in modern 
systems of medicine that are more easily available in the 
cities. Further, since most of the urban wives do not work, 
their husband's occupational status will determine the fami-
ly's accessibility to modern health care. 
On the other hand, it is the wife's characteristics--
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-her education, her age at marriage, and her age at the time 
of the interview--and the modern items index representing 
the economic status of the family as a unit that are rele-
vant correlates of rural infant mortality. In the tradi-
tional rural society where familial roles are segregated, 
childbearing and childcare are relegated primarily to the 
wife. Improvements in the rural woman's status, therefore, 
tend to be associated with more efficient use of health care 
and ultimately lower infant mortality. Moreover, with the 
meager health services, poor living conditions, and gener-
ally low socioeconomic status in the rural areas, the eco-
nomic means of a family (modern items index) will determine 
whether it can afford immediate treatment and care either in 
the rural area itself or in the nearby city.7 Finally, older 
women and those who married early have experienced longer 
periods of childbearing and, therefore, more pregnancies. 
The possibility that such women have also experienced higher 
infant mortality in the rural areas than found in the city 
is explained by the poorer health care and economic condi-
tions in the villages. 
Analysis of the relationships between infant mortality 
and the family size variables will help specify further the 
impact of modernization on infant mortality and ultimately 
fertility itself (Tables 9, 10). It may be hypothesized 
7 Economic status was a stronger correlate of rural actual 
family size too. 
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that the higher the infant mortality experienced, the larger 
the family size idealized. Conversely, as the society pro-
gresses and rates of infant mortality decrease, smaller fam-
ilies would be preferred. Lower infant mortality could also 
be expected to motivate couples to have fewer children and 
consequently have smaller gaps between their ideals and 
actuals. A purely quantitative relationship, however, could 
reverse the direction of the relationship: a higher rate of 
infant mortality would result in fewer surviving children. 
As per the data, only actual family size and, therefore, the 
gap between ideal and actual family size are influenced by 
infant mortality in the cities, while the direction of the 
relationship (-.14) indicates a quantitative association. 
This is further supported by the absence of the influence of 
infant mortality on ideal family size, the motivational 
aspect of family size. 
In the initial stages of modernization, reductions in 
infant mortality may have a quantitative effect on fertil-
ity. Only when a certain threshold level of modernization 
has been crossed and substantial reductions in infant mor-
tality have been achieved, will its effects be felt at the 
motivational level. Kerala's modernization and infant mor-
tality, which although the lowest in India in 1971 at about 
~1 per 1000 (United Nations, 1975: 134), are not sufficient 
to have motivational impacts on fertility. In the rural 
areas where modernization is yet in its early stages, infant 
mortality does not have much influence. Even the quantita-
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tive effect of infant mortality, therefore, will not be evi-
dent until a certain a threshold level of modernization (as 
in the cities) has been attained. Results of the analysis 
of infant mortality, viewed as an index of modernization, 
fits the transitional nature of India's modernization. 
Social Psychological Characteristics 
Conjugal Role Relationships 
Another medium through which the relationship between 
modernization and fertility can be specified is the social 
psychological level. Modernization influences fertility 
through the values, attitudes, and capabilities that indi-
viduals acquire in the context of development. A shift from 
an attitude of resignation to a sense of control over one's 
life, including the number of children born to a couple and 
reflected in active decision making are two examples of such 
modern attitudes. Flexibility of role prescriptions, espe-
cially in the family and the ability of the couple to inter-
change roles are yet other modern traits. A traditional 
conjugal role pattern is charcterized by division of labor 
where the husband performs the male jobs of breadearning and 
decision making and the wife, the household tasks. In con-
trast, modern conjugal role relationships reflect joint par-
ticipation in interchangeable functions and decision making 
(Bott, 1971: 53). The modern woman would also have a strong 
interest against a large family which would conflict with 
her role obligations outside the home. Therefore, families 
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where the wife participates in decision making and where 
there is communication, discussion, and sharing between the 
couple will succeed in limiting their family size. 
As discussed in Chapter III, conjugal role relation-
ship is a cumulative index of seven individual dimensions 
with a higher score indicating greater jointness in rela-
tionships.8 Consistencies in the indices are evident in the 
significant positive correlations among the seven indices 
(Table 18). In other words, joint participation in decision 
making, in dealing with outsiders, and in religious activi-
ties is associated with more sharing, lesser disagreements, 
greater tendency to resort to discussion and compromise in 
the event of disagreements, and to contain solving disagree-
ments within the family. 
If role relationship is an index of advanced secondary 
modernization, significant differences may be expected 
between rural and urban couples in the nature of their 
respective role relationships (Table 19). Urban wives do 
participate jointly with their husband to a more significant 
extent than their rural counterparts. Extent of joint par-
ticipation in religious activities is one of the three 
scales that does not differentiate the rural and urban cou-
ples. Hinduism (the majority religion in the sample) is an 
individualized religion which may explain the infrequency of 
8 A detailed description of the seven indices is available 
in Appendix A. 
TABLE 18 
CORRElATIONS AM:>NG THE ROLE RElATIONSHIP INDICES1 ' 2 
f § Cll ~~ .w .w o.-{ ~m m .w ROLE RElATIONSHIP INDICES § ~ 8.~ •r-1 .~ ·~U .WQ.l §~ ·~~ CJl o.-{ ·r-1 ~~ •.-I ~ ~ • .w u rita .j..J(/J .w (/J ..--IC/l ~ ~P-I ~iS 6iS ~iS 
Decision ~faking .6sa .76a .3la .57a .soa .36a 
Extent of Sharing .67a .43a .6la .49a .36a 
Dealing VJith Outsiders .3la .56a .45a .32a 
Religious Participation .35a .24a .20a 
Extent of Disagreements .42a .46a 
Outcome of Disagreements .27a 
Pattern of Solving 
Disagreements 
1 a= < . 001 level of significance 
2 N= 540 
1-' 
CX> 
"' 
TABLE 19 
HAXJMJM, MINIMUM, AND MEAN SCORES ON 'IHE ROlE 
RElATIONSHIP INDICES BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
Role Relationship Indices Maximum-Minimum Rural X 
(N = 214) 
Decision Making 55 - 0 32.3 
Extent of Sharing 55 - 11 26.5 
Dealing \vith Outsiders 30 - 5 16.2 
Religious Participation 18 - 0 10.8 
Extent of Disagreem:mts 42 - 6 32.6 
Outcome of Disagreem:mt 4 - 1 1.8 
Pattern of Solving Disagreements 7 - 1 6.0 
CRR (Composite) 211 - 24 126.2 
1 a = Rural-Urban differences significant at < .001 level 
b = Rural-Urban differences significant at < .01 level 
c -- Rural-Urban differences significant at < .05 level 
Urban X 
(N = 326) 
39.10a 
29.2a 
19.3a 
11.0 
34.5b 
1.9 
6.2 
14l.Oa 
1-' 
\..0 
0 
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joint participation in religious activities. When religion 
is related to the different role relationship indices, the 
only significant difference between the two religious groups 
is on the religious participation index. Christian couples 
(mean=14.4) tend to participate in religious activities more 
jointly than the Hindus (mean=l0.7) confirming the indivi-
dualistic nature of Hinduism and the community orientation 
of Protestantism. 
Another dominant pattern in the data on role relation-
ships can be seen if the mean scores are compared to the 
maximum and minimum that could be attained theoretically 
(Table 19). In general, respondents tend to lean away from 
the jointness end of the continuum, a pattern that is con-
sistent with the modernizing status of the society. The 
absence of significant differences between the rural and 
urban areas in the outcome of disagreements, once again, 
reflects the prevalence of traditional role structure in the 
family, even in the cities. Although the urban couples have 
a greater degree of concurrence (extent of disagreement 
index) than the villagers, in the event of disagreements the 
husband's opinion still prevails in both the cities and 
rural areas. On the other hand, in the villages as in the 
cities, disagreements tend to be solved predominantly within 
the conjugal family. Thus, some progress has been achieved 
in breaking the traditional segregated conjugal role struc-
ture, although it has not been substantial. 
Differences in socioeconomic status between the urban 
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and rural areas are also seen in their influence on role 
relationships (Table 20). Higher socioeconomic status of 
the family and the wife is more conducive to jointness in 
role relationships while lower status is associated with 
segregated relationships. Higher educational, occupational, 
and economic status creates an egalitarian and open atmos-
phere where restrictive customs can be modified to suit the 
changing times. These adaptations seem to be accomplished 
more easily in the cities than in the rural areas as the 
stronger urban correlations between socioeconomic status and 
role relationships indicate. Another reason why the rural 
correlations are weaker is the traditional nature of its 
socioeconomic and conjugal role structure. In short, rural 
households with higher socioeconomic status are not markedly 
different from the rural households with lower status. 
Peculiarities in the wife's labor force participation, 
especially in the rural areas, are reflected in their influ-
ence on role relationships. Wife's labor force participa-
tion is related to role relationships in the cities but not 
in the rural areas. (The average scores on the composite 
conjugal role relationships index is 155.9 for the working 
wife in the cities and 138.1 for the non-working wives in 
the cities.) Two aspects of the rural wife's socioeconomic 
status need to be recalled here: (1) although more rural 
women than urban women are employed, a majority of the rural 
women were in lower status occupations; (2) the lower the 
occupational status of the rural husband and the lower the 
TABLE 20 
CORRELATIONS OF TilE CONJUGAL ROLE RELATIONSHIP L.""'DICES WI'IH SELECTED 
CORREI.A'IES OF FERTILITYl, 2 
(Rural) 
ROLE RELATIONSHIPS 
(I) § I I H ·r-l ~ ~ I •r-l .~ .~ Cll ~ a C) ~ f •r-l ,...... ~ ~ Cll ~ Q) (I) ·r-l -1-J -£ •r-l t:::l ·r-l t:l-t t:::l (I) (I) ·~ 4--1 ·r-l 0 4--1 g 4--1 0 t:::l ! § 0 0 
·r-l ~ .~ •bb ~ ~ ·W (I) ........... •r-l ] •r-l C) ~ C) ~ r-l ~ a r-l ~ ~ c51 
Husband's Education .2Qb .39a .22b .13c .27a .26~ .22b .32a 
Husband' s Occupation .10 .29a .lsc .1sc .26a .22 .24a .24a 
llidem I terns Owned .24a .39a .2sa .1~ .26a .28a .18b .34a 
Respondent 's Education .27a .48a .30~ .18b .30a .39a .24a .4la 
Respondent's Occupation3 .24~ .43a .4~ .33 .39b .54~ .34b .47a 
Age at "M:lrriage .18 .2Sa .16 .11 .19b .22 .07 .24a 
Infant MJrtality -.07 -.07 -.06 -.03 -.06 -.01 .OS -.07 
Family Planning Attitudes 
-.04b -.13C -.12c -.12c -.12C -.01 -.11 -.13c 
Parity of FP Initiation -.21 -.27a -.23a -.24a -.27a -.2Qb -.16b -.3la 
Family Planning Effectiveness .35a .44a .3la .37a .27a .34a .2ob .4sa 
Ideal Family Size -.14c -.08 -.15~ -.004. -.07b -.07 -.08 -.13c 
Actual Family Size -.3oa -.26a 
-.19 -.1sc -.22 -.13c -.19b -.3la ~ 
Gap -.24a -.23a -.14c -.18b -.13c 
\,() 
-.12C 
-.11 -.2sa w 
§ 
·M I ~· 
Husband's Education .32a 
Husband's Occupation .25a 
l'bdern Items Owned .3oa 
Respondent's Education .40~ 
Respondent 's Occupation 3 .35 
Age at Marriage .23a 
Infant tvbrtality -.04 
Family Planning Attitudes -.2la 
Parity of FP Initiation -.44a 
Family Planning Effectiveness .43a 
Ideal Fanily Size -.01 
Actual Family Size -.29a 
Gap -.3la 
TABLE 20 
(Continued -- Urban) 
ROLE RELATIONSHIPS 
-E § ·M 
~ ·~ til til 
obO .~~ g.~ ~.s •rl 0 bO·r-l ~~ r--4tll •M -i-J ~8 ..-4fit &P-I 
.42a a .24a 
.40a 
.35a .33 .23a 
.33a .35a .24a 
.sla .47~ .24a a 
-.00 
.43a .36 
.27 .27a .llc 
-.04 -.08 
-.07b 
-.28a -.27a -.13 
-.49a -.soa -.24a 
.soa .s2a .22a 
-.2oa -.loc -.06 
-.40a -.39a -.19a 
-.3la -.36a -.1sb 
~I ~~ .j.J m ,..._ 3 •rl 0 (],) ~~ bl (],) til ~~ ·~ ru ~~ 0 ctl .j.JtfJ ;goo ..-4tll rn~ •r-l b5B A 
.4la .29a .35a .45a 
.36a .21a .3oa .37~ 
.39a .2la .32a .13 
.44~ .36a .34~ .s2a 
.29c .42a .35 
.3lb 
.12c .27a .16 .26a 
-.07 -.03 -.01 -.07 
-.23a -.09C -.28a -.28a 
-.4oa -.35a -.27a -.52a 
.4sa .26a .3la .54~ 
-.21a -.1sb -.llC -.14 
-.35a -.2sa -.23a -.4la 
-.2sa -.18a -.17b -.35a 
1. a= < .001 level of significance; b = < . 01 level of significance; c = < . OS level of significance 
2. N - Urban= 326-305; Rural= 214-206 
3. N in the case of wife's occupational status - Rural ·= 63-56; Urban = 59 
t-' 
\.() 
+:-
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family's economic status, the greater the tendency for the 
wife to be employed. Urban women's employment, on the other 
hand, is more a matter of choice than economic necessity. 
These differences in motivation combined with the wider 
range of occupations in which women are engaged may explain 
why women's labor force participation plays an important 
role in modernizing conjugal role relationships only in the 
cities. Yet, higher occupational status of rural women, 
when it is achieved, does lead to jointness in relationships 
which is significantly higher than lower status women and 
comparable to higher status urban women (Table 20) Socioeco-
nomic modernization, thus, has its correlates in social psy-
chological modernization, of which role relationships is one 
aspect. 
Aside from its demographic impact on fertility, age at 
marriage could have social psychological effects too, espe-
cially through its influence on conjugal role relationships 
(Table 20). The strong positive correlations between 
socioeconomic status and age at marriage lend further credi-
bility to this hypothesis. In other words, women with 
higher social status tend to marry late, to be more indepen-
dent and less likely to let themselves be dominated by their 
husband. When the age at marriage is low, as in the tradi-
tional setup, the role relationships tend to be more segre-
gated. Since the variation in age at marriage is typically 
greater in modernizing cities stronger urban correlations 
are to be expected. In the more traditional rural areas, in 
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contrast, where women generally get married at a relatively 
younger age, the respondents do not differ as much in their 
role relationships. Yet, as the significant rural correla-
tions reveal, age at marriage does have its modernizing 
impact on role relationships. An example is the disagree-
ment index where the rural correlation is stronger than the 
urban. In a culture (especially the rural) where age at 
marriage and the status of women are low, higher age at mar-
riage, if it can be achieved, promotes lesser disagreement 
among the couples. Even in the rural areas, the potential 
for the spillover effects of modernization in one aspect 
into other aspects related to fertility does exist. To com-
plete the description of the extent of social psychological 
modernization, it is also necessary to examine the influence 
of caste--an important feature of the Indian social struc-
ture--on role relationships and the trends in patterns in 
role relations over time. 
When caste status is related to role relationships, 
the only index on which both the rural and urban castes dif-
fer among themselves is the religious participation index 
(Table 21). It is the religious aspect of caste that is 
reflected in the Christian caste groupings scoring higher on 
the scale than the Hindu castes. Further, while the urban 
castes differ only on the extent of sharing index, it is the 
disagreement index that is important among the rural castes. 
Sharing (indicating harmony in relationships) is a modern 
trait while disagreement (or family discord) is more typical 
TABlE 21 
MEANS AND RESULTS OF PNJVA ON CONJUGAL ROlE RElATIONSHIPS BY CASTE AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
AREA Index of Role Marthomites/ Scheduled 
Relationships Bralunin Nair Jacobite C.S.I. Ezhava Nadar Caste 
. 
Extent of Sharing 29.9 29.4 31.9 32.5 27.7 27.7 25.9 b 
Dealing \vith Outsiders 19.4 18.5 22.1 12.0 18.0 15.4 17.ob 
Religious Participation 12.0 10.6 14.7 15.0 10.7 13.8 10.4b 
General 
31.9b Extent of Disagreenent 35.6 35.0 33.6 37.0 32.9 35.2 
Outcome of Disagreement 2.4 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.7 2.2 1.8b 
CRR (Composite) 143.6 138.6 156 138.5 133.4 133.7 127.3c 
N (60) (162) (9) (2) (156) (20) (122) 
Religious Participation 8.2 10.8 - 15.0 10.6 13.7 9.6b 
Rural 
Extent of Disagreernent 36.6 33.6 - 37.0 31.7 35.3 30.6 
N (5) (67) (0) (2) (82) (19) (39) 
Extent of Sharing 29.9 30.6 31.9 - 29.5 35 26.7c 
Religious Participation 12.4 10.4 14.7 - 10.8 15 10.8b 
Urban 
N (55) (95) (9) (0) (74) (1) (83) ~ 
1 b = p < .01; c = p <.05 \.0 '"-.1 
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of the traditional rural culture, especially the lower sta-
tus cultures. On both indices, Christian castes are more 
joint in their relationshi~s than the Hindu castes indicat-
ing that caste is not totally devoid of its religious conno-
tation. Within each religious group, however, higher status 
is associated generally with joint role relationships, an 
expected pattern given their higher socioeconomic status. 
Nairs and Nadar Christians in the cities who have the high-
est scores are exceptions. The dominant caste status of the 
urban Nairs and the Anglican leaning of the Nadar Christians 
may explain their modern role relationships. Once again, 
the caste differentials in socioeconomic modernization are 
evident at the social psychological level too. 
There are no differences between the older and younger 
couples in their role relationships in the urban areas, con-
tinuing the pattern discussed earlier of selective partici-
pation of the upper status groups in modernization trends. 
In contrast, though class and caste biases in modernization 
do exist, some modernization in role relationships has also 
occurred in the rural areas (r=-.16). One factor responsi-
ble for this pattern is the closing of the age gap between 
the husband and wife in the rural areas over time. It is 
only in the rural areas that the age gap between the husband 
and wife is much smaller for the younger cohorts than for 
the older (r=.l2). In a culture where age and sex are 
important criteria for respect and authority, marriages in 
which the husband is much older than the wife tend to be 
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traditional, reflected especially in the subordinate status 
of women. The data indicate some improvement in women's 
status over time in the villages. 
If the repercussions of social and economic moderniza-
tion are felt in the area of conjugal role relationships, 
then modernization should have some effect on fertility ori-
entations and actual fertility. Couples with joint role 
relationships will not only want smaller families, but will 
also have better success in limiting their achieved family 
size to their ideals (Table 20). Pearson correlations 
between role relationships and fertility variables indicate 
that women who are equal partners in the conjugal role rela-
tionships tend to idealize smaller families, actualize those 
smaller ideals, and consequently experience smaller gaps 
between their orientations and behavior. Further, respon-
dents in joint role relationships do not differ from those 
in segregated relationships as systematically in their 
ideals as in their actual family size. This pattern pro-
vides further evidence for the general trend toward accept-
ing the small family norm. In general, social psychological 
modernization does contribute to modernization of values and 
behavior. 
Additional proof for this influence can be obtained by 
c:omparing rural-urban differences in the correlations. If 
modern role relations are effective in reducing fertility 
the urban correlations should be stronger than the rural. 
Urban respondents not only have higher average scores on the 
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role relationship indices but also vary more among them-
selves compared to the rural sample. While there is general 
support for this argument in the data on actual family size 
and the gap, certain differences exist in the case of ideal 
family size. Rural ideals can be differentiated only in 
terms of the respondent's status on two indices--decision 
making and dealing with outsiders--which are also more 
effective in the rural area than in the cities. The indices 
significant in the cities (all except decision making) deal 
with the husband and wife's particip~tion in carrying out 
the family functions (behavior aspect of roles). Decision 
making involves verbal interaction between the husband and 
the wife. In the rural area, where women's status is gener-
ally low, ability to participate in decision making and 
dealing with outsiders may represent the starting point in 
the shift toward egalitarian relationships. When women 
enjoy a comparatively higher status, as in the cities, 
jointness in role relationships does not contribute to lower 
ideals unless there is a shift from verbal equality to 
equality in behavior. In general, the data on role rela-
tionships in the sample fit the modernization thesis and its 
effect on fertility. 
Intervening Normative Family Size/Family Planning Indices 
Thus far the analysis concentrated on the role of mod-
ernization in reducing fertility. Family planning--both at 
the normative and behavioral levels--forms the other aspect 
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of the problem and is the focus of the second part of the 
model. In fact, the family planning variables, since they 
directly impinge on fertility, bring the model closer to the 
problem of lowering family size. They are also a medium 
through which modernization affects fertility. Ideal family 
size, as noted in Chapter III, is one of the normative vari-
ables. The other normative variable included at this stage 
is the respondent's attitudes toward family planning. 
Respondent's Attitudes Toward Family Planning 
Favorable attitudes toward family planning methods is 
considered a basic prerequisite to the use of family plan-
ning. This intervening variable is measured at the ordinal 
level with the respondents' attitudes ranging from indispen-
sable (value of 1) to totally opposed (value of 8). 
Attitude to family planning is conceived as a conse-
quence of modernization so that as the society develops fam-
ily limitation methods will be perceived more favorably. If 
this is true, then, cities, with their higher levels of 
socioeconomic development should differ from the rural areas 
where development is comparatively limited. However, Chi 
square tests indicate no significant differences between 
rural and urban samples in their attitudes. Almost 50% of 
the respondents in both the rural and urban areas are favo-
rable to using some method, while only about 10% in the 
rural areas and 15% in the cities are not favorable or 
totally opposed to it. The side effects of most methods 
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seem to dampen the enthusiasm of nearly a third of the 
respondents regarding family planning in both the samples. 
Religion and caste, the two other structural variables, also 
do not differentiate among the respondents' attitude to fam-
ily planning. This general acceptance of the importance of 
family planning, irrespective of the socioeconomic develop-
ment at the structural level, may be the result of the 
intense family planning program in Kerala, especially in its 
informational content. 
It is also necessary to look at the individual level 
differences in attitudes within each area to determine 
whether socioeconomic distinctions exist. Since attitudes 
to family planning are influenced by modernization, it is 
. 
logical to assume that as the social and the economic status 
of the families and of the women rise they tend to become 
more favorable to family planning (a modern attribute). 
Correlations between attitude to family planning and socioe-
conomic characteristics--both family's and the respon-
dent's-- substantiate this argument (Tables 9, 10). These 
associations are also stronger in the cities with their 
transtional social and economic structures. 
Analysis of the influence of the social psychological 
manifestations of modernization on attitudes to family plan-
ning also indicates that the more modern (joint) the respon-
dent's role relationships, the more favorable is her atti-
tude to family planning (Table 20). Wife's labor force 
participation is the only factor that is not significant, 
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probably due to the sMall proportion of working women in the 
cities and due to the lower status jobs of majority of rural 
women. Further, urban respondents with higher status differ 
more systematically in their attitudes from the lower status 
urban women compared to the rural variations (Table 10). 
This pattern, once again, indicates the transitional nature 
of the cities and the traditional status of the rural areas, 
particularly with regard to the lower status ruralites. 
Within this traditional context, however, rural respondents 
in higher status jobs, if they can achieve it, do have mod-
ern attitudes too. 
These status variables affect fertility by influencing 
the motivations of individuals and couples. But age of the 
respondent, her age at marriage, and infant mortality, not 
only have motivational effects, but also have quantitative 
effects on fertility. For example, an older woman or a 
woman who married early can have more children because of 
her greater exposure to childbearing.9 The quantitative 
reality of these three variables may explain why they are 
not significant differentiating factors in respondents' 
attitudes to family planning--a motivational factor (Table 
10). 
It was indicated in Chapter III that smaller family 
size norms can, theoretically, be viewed as an important 
9In fact, as will be shown in Chapter VII, these vari-
ables are significantly related to fertility even after the 
effects of the status variables are removed. 
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prerequisite for favorable dispositions to deliberate con-
trol of fertility behavior through the use of family plan-
ning. Women with small family size norms are more favorable 
to using birth control methods to limit their actual family 
size in both the cities and in the rural areas (Table 10). 
In short, there exists a congruence in the norms regarding 
family planning and a family size, which suggests the crys-
tallization of modern attitudes, particularly under the 
influence of the family planning program. 
What effects do these attitudes to family planning 
have on their actual fertility? Although rural women with 
small family size norms do favor using family planning to 
control fertility, these attitudes are not translated into 
practice (the non-significant rural correlation between fam-
ily planning attitudes and actual family size ) probably due 
to the lack of opportunities and willingness to act on their 
attitudes. In contrast, the opportunities available in the 
cities and the motivation derived from their higher socioe-
conomic status may explain why urban women with modern fam-
ily planning attitudes have smaller achieved families and 
gaps between ideal and actual family and vice versa. 
Despite these deviations, the general pattern that emerges 
from this analysis is consistent with the modernization the-
sis discussed thus far: there is a clear association 
between favorable attittudes to family planning and individ-
ual modernization on the one hand and fertility orientation 
and behavior on the other. 
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Intervening Family Planning Usage Variables 
This set of variables concerns the extent to which 
respondents have used methods of family planning and how 
effectively they have used them. Having established the 
modernizing influence of family planning attitudes on fer-
tility, these indicators of the practice of family planning 
further specify this relationship. The first variable in 
this set is the parity at which the respondent started using 
a method. 
Parity Of Family Planning Initiation 
Parity of family planning initiation is measured as 
the birth after which the method was adopted. As with the 
other variables, the first step is to determine the influ-
ence of modernization on parity of family planning usage. 
Contrary to expectations, the traditional hypothesis that 
rural and urban areas will differ in the parity of family 
planning use of its members is not supported (Table 14). 
That rural and urban areas are different on none of the fam-
ily planning variables--attitude to family planning and par-
ity of initiation--is further evidence of the effectiveness 
of the family planning program, irrespective of the struc-
tural levels of development. However, since these areas 
differ in their levels of modernization of its members, it 
can be expected that individual modernization will have an 
influence on parity. 
The socioeconomic status of the respondent and her 
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family are significant predictors of the parity at which a 
woman used birth control for the first time (Tables 9, 10). 
As expected, higher educational and occupational status of 
the husband and wife and higher economic status are associ-
ated with earlier initiation of birth control. Since rural 
and urban areas differ in their earlier socioeconomic dis-
tributions, socioeconomic variations in parity of family 
olanning usage within these areas may be different. Analy-
sis of the data support this expectation; but unlike the 
preceding sets of variables, rural correlations are stronger 
than the urban. Despite the wider range of the urban 
socioeconomic distribution, urban respondents do not differ 
among themselves as much as the rural respondents. Selec-
tive acceptance of the family planning program by higher 
status women is more pronounced in the rural areas. Alter-
nately, lower class rural women initiated family planning 
much later in their pregnancy history compared to their 
urban counterparts. Cities provide greater freedom and 
opportunities to its residents, especially the women, which 
may explain why lower status urban respondents are compara-
tively more modern in their family planning usage than the 
rural women with similar status. Primary modernization 
tends to be more of an equalizing force in the cities in 
influencing the availability and access to different family 
planning methods. 
Peculiarities in the labor force participation of 
women in the sample is reflected on parity of family plan-
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ning usage (Table 22). In the cities, as might be expected, 
working women started using birth control one parity lower 
than the non-workers. On the contrary, rural non-workers 
started using birth control earlier than the rural workers, 
a pattern that may be explained if it is remembered that a 
majority of rural women work in lower status occupations. 
Despite these deviations, rural/urban differences in modern-
ization are generally reflected in their family planning 
status too. 
It is also necessary to move further in the model to 
examine the implications of demographic modernization on 
parity of family planning initiation (Tables 9, 10). The 
data indicate that women who marry earlier tend to postpone 
using family planning methods compared to those who marry 
later. Unlike primary modernization (socioeconomic), once 
early secondary modernization has been achieved, even if it 
is only among certain segments in a society, it does have an 
equally strong effect on parity of family planning initia-
tion in both the cities and the rural areas. 
Social psychological modernization (role relation-
ships), in contrast, has a stronger correlation with parity 
of family planning initiation in the urban areas (Table 20). 
Aside from its intervening influence in the socioeconomic 
status-practice of family planning relationship, role rela-
tionships can be expected to have a direct influence on par-
ity of initial family planning use. Joint role relation-
ships, as the data suggest, provide an advantageous 
Parity of Family 
Planning Initiation 
Family Planning 
Effectiveness 
a= p < .001 
b = p < .01 
c = p < .05 
TABlE 22 
MEANS AND RESULTS OF PNJVA ON PARITY OF FAMILY 
PLANNING INITIATION AND FAMILY PLANNING EFFECTIVENESS 
BY WIFE'S lABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
Wife's Labor Force General Rural 
Participation (N) (N) 
2.93 3.7 
Wife Einployed (120) (63) 
3.3 3.0 
Wife Unemployed (420) (151) 
2.6 2.2 
Wife Einployed (120) (63) 
2.5 2.3 
Wife Unenployed (420) (151) 
Urban 
(N) 
2.12a 
(57) 
3.5 
(269) 
3.15b 
(57) 
2.6 
(269) 
N 
0 
CX> 
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framework for the initiation of family planning early in the 
marriage. Discussions about family planning are still 
socially taboo and the women still play a predominantly sub-
ordinate role in the Indian family. Under these conditions, 
unless the role relations are relatively joint, early initi-
ation of family planning will be difficult both for the hus-
band and the wife. Given the direct influence of role 
structures in family planning usage and the wider range in 
role relationships available in the cities, the stronger 
urban correlations are to be expected. 
Another aspect of the traditional rural structure is 
also evident in the association of infant mortality and 
ideal family size with the initiation of family planning 
(Tables 9, 10). As the stronger positive rural correlations 
suggest, rural women who have experienced high infant mor-
tality and who idealize larger families postpone using birth 
control much more than their urban counterparts. Tradi-
tional rural respondents, especially, seem to desire to 
insure that they have a sufficient number of children to 
make up for the loss through child mortality and to realize 
their family size norms. 
On the other hand, correlations between attitudes to 
and use of family planning are weaker in the rural areas 
than in the cities suggesting inconsistencies in rural norms 
and behavior. Urban respondents who are favorably disposed 
to use of family planning translate these values into prac-
tice. The comparatively greater inconsistencies between 
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norms and behavior in the rural areas indicate that even if 
values have been modernized to the extent found among the 
urbanites, partly as a result of the family planning pro-
gram, they have yet to govern behavior. At the same time, 
women who have used methods such as sterilization, IUDs, and 
pills early in the marriage may develop unfavorable atti-
tudes due to the side effects of these methods, thereby 
weakening the correlations in both the rural and urban 
areas. 
Before the importance of parity in determining family 
size is assessed, another set of relationships need to be 
analyzed. It is necessary to discuss how the background 
variables--age of the respondent, religion, and caste--in-
fluence parity. The importance of an effective family plan-
ning program can be seen in the cohort differences in the 
parity of family planning use (Tables 9, 10 ). 10 Older 
respondents tend to have initiated use of some method of 
birth control later in their childbearing history than the 
younger respondents. Yet, the older and younger cohorts do 
not differ in their socioeconomic and demographic status. 
This pattern may be attributed partly to the role of the 
organized family planning program initiated on a large scale 
since the early seventies in creating opportunities for 
10 Again, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, 
the role of family planning progr~~s in influencing family 
planning practices can only be deduced directly from the 
literature. 
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exposure of the younger cohorts earlier in their pregnancy 
histories. Moreover, it is the traditional status of the 
older rural women reinforced by the low socioeconomic devel-
opment in rural areas and the lack of early exposure to fam-
ily planning that is reflected in the stronger rural corre-
lations. 
There were no significant differences among the reli-
gious groups in their attitude to family planning. But they 
can be differentiated in their family planning behavior, at 
least in the cities. As might be expected on the basis of 
their relatively higher socioeconomic status, urban Chris-
tians tend to be more modern in family planning usage (mean 
parity=l.8) than the Hindus (3.27). Caste status of the 
respondents, as in the case of the earlier family planning 
variables, is not a significant differentiating element in 
either the rural or urban areas. The practical ethic of the 
Protestants and the Western influence in their religion, 
irrespective of their caste status, may be relevant factors 
in the religious distinctions in the practice of family 
planning. 
If parity of birth control initiation is an index of 
modernization and the effectiveness of the family planning 
program, it may be expected to affect family size too 
(Tables 9, 10). As hypothesized, women who initiated birth 
control later tend to have significantly more children than 
those who started planning their families early in the cit-
ies and in the rural areas. Of all the indices of modern-
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ization and family planning considered thus far, the timing 
of family planning use is the most influential in determin-
ing actual fertility. Further analysis will, however, be 
presented in the later chapters to detemine the exact 
nature of its impact on actual family size. Yet, the 
strength of the correlation suggests that early initiation 
of birth control may be one of the most effective ways of 
controlling fertility. In the case of the influence of par-
ity of family planning use on the gap between the ideal and 
actual family size, the patterns can, once again, be 
explained with the help of its component parts, ideal and 
actual fertility. For example, the larger gaps between the 
ideal and actual fertility of late users of family planning 
is due to their actual family size far exceeding their low-
e red ideals. 
In general, controlling pregnancies at earlier stages 
in the pregnancy history does reduce the achieved family 
size and the gap between ideal and actual considerably. 
Thus, early use of family planning plays an important role 
along with socioeconomic development in achieving fertility 
reduct ions. 
Family Planning Effectiveness 
It is not just the timing of birth control use that is 
important in its relationship to family size, but also the 
general effectiveness with which the methods are used and 
pregnancies planned. Modernization could be expected to 
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increase individual's effectiveness in planning their 
families and consequently realizing their ideals. In order 
to operationalize family planning effectiveness, each preg-
nancy is classified as (a) planned, (b) accidental, 
(c)unintended (where some method was being used but had to 
be stopped for various reasons), (d) unintended, yet no 
method was used, and (e) 'never-thought-of-it' pregnancies. 
The index of family planning effectiveness is defined as the 
weighted average of the proportion of pregnancies that 
belong to the five types. According to the formula, which 
is stated as ((a*5)+(b*4)+(c*3)+(d*2)+(e*l)/total pregnan-
cies), a higher score on the index implies greater effec-
tiveness while a lower score represents lesser effective-
ness. 
Family planning effectiveness can be discussed in the 
context of modernization before its influence on fertility 
is analyzed. Unlike the other family planning variables, 
when rural and urban differences in family planning effec-
tiveness are analyzed, respondents in the cities have sig-
nificantly higher mean effectiveness than the rural areas 
(Table 14). This pattern suggests that if the effective 
planning of the entire childbearing history is to be 
achieved, an organized family planning program in itself is 
not sufficient; socioeconomic modernization is an important 
catalyst to the success of the program. 
Religious and caste differences in family planning 
effectiveness also substantiate the influence of moderniza-
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tion on the success of the program (Table 23). It is only 
in the cities that Christians and higher castes are signifi-
cantly more effective in planning their pregnancies than 
Hindus and the lower castes respectively. It is also in the 
cities that Christians and higher castes have significantly 
higher status than the Hindus and lower castes respectively. 
Cohort differences in family planning effectiveness 
exist only in the rural area where the older respondents 
tend to be less effective in planning their families (Tables 
9, 10). In this case, two factors reinforcing each other 
may explain the traditional position of older rural women in 
their planning effectiveness. Rural areas were and still 
are the least developed socioeconomically. Further, older 
rural women lacked the opportunities and exposure to family 
planning knowledge that younger rural women have had since 
the family planning program was initiated when the older 
women were well into their family formation histories. 
Thus, it can be argued that family planning is most effec-
tive only in the context of a certain level of socioeconomic 
development. 
Additional support for this thesis is available in the 
influence of the individual's socioeconomic status on plan-
ning effectiveness (Tables 9, 10). Irrespective of whether 
the husband's or wife's status is used, higher status cou-
ples are more effective in their family planning (as in the 
parity of family planning initiation) than the lower status 
couples. In the cities where the general level of modern-
Hindu 
General 2.5 
(509) 
Rural 2.2 
(19Lt) 
Urban 2.6 
(315) 
1. a= p < .001 
b = p < .01 
c = p < .05 
TABlE 23 
MEANS AND RESill..TS OF N!lJVA ON FAMILY PLANNING ~GriVENESS 
BY RELIGION, CASTE, AND AREA OF RESIDENCE 
RELIGION CASTE STATUS 
Marthomite/ 
Protestant Bralmrin Nair Jacobite C.S.I. Ezhava Nadar 
3.1C 2.7 2.7 3.6 2.2 2.4 2.7 
(31) (60) (162) (9) (2) (156) (20) 
2.7 2.2 2.6 - 2.2 1.9 2.6 
(20) (5) (67) (O) (2) (82) (19) 
3.8b 2.8 2.8 3.6 
-
2.8 4. 7 
(11) (55) (95) (9) (0) (74) (1) 
Scheduled 
Caste 
2.3b 
(122) 
2.3 
(39) 
2.3c 
(83) 
N 
1-' 
V1 
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ization is higher, the differences among the higher and 
lower status couples are not very pronounced. But, rural 
respondents with lower status are the least effective lead-
ing to the stronger rural correlations. The lower socioeco-
nomic status of the couples hinders efficient utilization of 
the family planning program in the rural areas. More spe-
cifically, a fatalistic view of life and lack of planning, 
characteristic of the traditional agrarian society, is 
reflected in their family histories too. On the other hand, 
effectiveness of the higher status rural couples may be 
attributed to the sense of control over one's life and of 
planning and the desire and potential for improvement that 
higher education and occupation (especially independent of 
the agrarian economy) imbibe in them. This is also seen in 
the influence (or the lack of it) of wife's labor force par-
ticipation on family planning effectiveness in the rural 
areas where the majority of the women are in the lower sta-
tus occupations. 
Socioeconomic differentials in age at marriage can 
also be seen in family planning effectiveness (Tables 9, 
10). Respondents who marry later tend to plan their fami-
lies more effectively than those who marry at a younger age. 
Women who marry when they are older have the opportunities 
for higher education and time to mature in the role of a 
daughter before assuming an additional role, that of the 
wife. As a result, such women would have more defined atti-
tudes and plans for their family life which may partly 
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explain their effectiveness in family planning. With the 
second demographic variable, however, the differences are 
not significant (Tables 9, 10). Two contradictory influ-
ences may provide an explanation. On the one hand, modern-
ization which results in lowered infant mortality will also 
enhance family planning effectiveness resulting in a nega-
tive relationship between infant mortality and family plan-
ning. On the other hand, women who have experienced more 
infant mortality would actively desire and plan their next 
pregnancies to replac& the losses. This argument, contrary 
to the first, would lead to a positive relationship between 
infant mortality and effectiveness. Both these patterns 
probably coexist in this sample, neutralizing each other and 
leading to the insignificant correlation between infant mor-
tality and family planning effectiveness. 
Role relationships is another influential factor in 
family planning effectiveness (Table 20). Couples who par-
ticipate jointly in familial responsibilities, including 
family planning, seem to be more effective in using contra-
ception and planning their families. That this relationship 
is stronger in the urban areas may be attributed to the 
wider range in the jointness-segregation continuum available 
in the cities and the clustering of rural couples away from 
the joint relationships. 
Given the role of modernization in effective planning, 
it is necessary to analyze the latter's relationship to 
other family planning issues (Tables 9, 10). In both the 
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rural areas and the cities, women who idealize large fami-
lies tend to have been less effective in planning their fam-
ilies. This negative relationship between family size norms 
and family planning effectiveness, once again, suggests a 
congruence between fertility values and family planning 
behavior that can help actualize these fertility values. 
Respondents who are more effective in planning their 
families also have favorable attitudes toward using contra-
ception and started using some method earlier than the less 
effective couples, both in the rural and urban areas. Fur-
ther, respondents who are more effective planners have 
achieved their smaller ideals, and consequently have smaller 
gaps. It is the combined effect, once again, of the higher 
status and urban location of those urban women with high 
effectiveness and small families that sets them apart 
(stronger urban correlations) from the rest. Aside from 
socioeconomic, demographic, and social psychological modern-
ization, early and effective use of family planning is, 
thus, a valuable tool in achieving fertility declines. 
Sterilization Status 
Whether the respondent or her husband has undergone 
sterilization is the last variable in the set. Steriliza-
tion is similar to, yet very different from, family planning 
effectiveness that was discussed in the previous sections. 
While sterilization is the most effective way of avoiding 
future births, it gives no indication of the status of plan-
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ning effectiveness as the couple moves along their pregnancy 
histories. Specifying the socioeconomic, demographic, and 
family size characteristics of the sterilized and non-steri-
lized couples would have policy implications, especially in 
identifying the target populations for such a specific pro-
gram. 
Sterilized respondents generally tend to be more tra-
ditional than the non-sterilized in the cities (Table 24). 
They are of lower castes, are younger, of lower socioeco-
11 
nomic status, were married at a younger age, have more 
segregated relationships, are more unfavorable to family 
planning use, started using family planning later, are less 
effective in planning their pregnancies on the whole, and 
. 
have higher ideals and larger actual families, and larger 
gaps between their ideals and actuals. 
Accordingly, the conditions under which sterilization 
is resorted to may be specified. Sterilization is used when 
the respondents face a longer period of childbearing. They 
are generally poorer so that they cannot afford to risk hav-
11 The Chi-square and gamma values for the relationship of 
caste and husband's occupational status to sterilization in 
the urban areas are as follows: 
Caste and Sterilization: Chi-square = p .001 
Gamma = .39 
Husband's occupation and 
sterilization Chi-square = p .001 
Gamma = -.36 
TABLE 24 
l·1EANS AND RESULTS OF T-TEST FOR SELECI'ED MJDERNIZATION AND 
FAMILY PlANNING INDICES BY STERILIZATION STATUS AND AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
Husband's Age 
Wife's Age 
Husband's Education 
llidem Items CMned 
Wife's Education 
Age at First Marriage 
Infant }brtality 
CRR 
Son-Preference 
Parity of FP Initiation 
rlP Effectiveness 
Ideal Family Size 
Actual Family Size 
Gap 
N 
1. a=p 
b = p 
c = p 
< .001 
< .01 
< .05 
General 
Unsterilized Sterilized 
43.1 40.6a 
35.7 33.5a 
9.2 7.2a 
2.6 1.8a 
7.7 6.3a 
19.8 18.7a 
13.2 9.8c 
139.5 131.~ 
8.8 13.2 
3.0 3.4b 
2.7 ?..3 
2.8 2.9~ 
3.3 3.7 
0.6 0.8 
265-261 275-271 
Rural Urban 
Unsterilized Sterilized Unsterilized Sterilized 
40.9 38.la 44.4 42.3b 
34.0 31.5b 36.8 34.7: 
6.9 5.3 10.8 8.4 
1.0 0.8 3.6 2.5a 
5.7 5.4 9.0 6.9a 
19.1 18.5 20.3 18.~ 
11.7 11.3 14.2 8.8 
127.6 124.9 147.4 135.2a 
10.6 14.7 7.6 12.1c 
3.2 3.1 2.9 3.5~ 
2.4 2.2 2.9 2.4 
2.9 2.9 2.7 2.9c 
3.5 3.5 3.2 3.8a 
0.6 0.6 0.5 0.9c 
105-104 109 160-157 166-164 
N 
N 
0 
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ing more children, especially since they have an ineffective 
planning history. Their segregated relationships may par-
tially explain their ineffectiveness and delay initiation of 
birth control. Lack of knowledge about temporary methods in 
general and lack of joint determination in using them con-
sistently can further contribute to their poor planning sta-
tus. Further, they not only prefer larger families, but 
also have exceeded their ideals and sterilization is an 
effective and easier method of controlling their family 
size. 
Two additional characteristics need special considera-
tion--infant mortality and attitude to family planning. 
Respondents who are sterilized have experienced lesser 
infant mortality than the non-sterilized. The latter, con-
sequently, may fear the possibility of further deaths and 
their inability to replace them if sterilization is adopted. 
With regard to the conservative attitude of sterilized women 
to family planning (Table 25), two explanations are possi-
ble. They may be opposed to temporary methods, like the 
Pills or IUDs, and favor sterilization. On the other hand, 
it could be that, though they have undergone sterilization, 
the side effects (both physical and psychological) may cause 
them to regret it. In general, sterilization seems to 
appeal to the lower stratum of the society in Kerala. 
However, this is true only when the general level of 
development is fairly high as in the cities. Sterilized 
respondents in the rural areas are significantly different 
Area Of Residence 
General 
Rural 
Urban 
TABLE 25 
DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY PlANNING ATTITUDES BY 
STERILIZATION STATUS Al\JD AREA OF RESIDENCE 
Family Planning Attitudes/ Favorable Indifferent 
Sterilization Status 
Unsterilized 54.4% 65.4% 
Sterilized 45.6 34.6 
N 100% 100% 
(285) (26) 
NS 
Unsterilized 55.0% 68.4% 
Sterilized 45.0 31.6 
N 100% 100% 
(171) (19) 
Unfavorable 
40.6% 
59.4 
100% 
(229) 
39.0% 
61.0 
100% 
(136) 
Sumna.ry Statistics 
x2 = < .01 
Garrma = .24 
x2 = < .01 
Gamna = .27 
N 
N 
N 
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from the non-sterilized only in their age and family's 
socioeconomic characteristics. In other words, rural women, 
like their urban counterparts, undergo sterilization at a 
younger age and their families are poorer. Thus, when the 
level of modernization is low, sterilization is more uni-
formly acceptable. 
This analysis suggests different family planning pat-
terns in the modern and the traditional milieux. In the 
traditional context, respondents generally do not plan their 
pregnancies until they seek an irreversible solution in 
sterilization. On the other hand, respondents in the modern 
context, especially the upper status women, start planning 
their families early and use temporary methods more effec-
tively to maintain smaller families. These patterns imply 
the possible variations that may be required in the family 
planning program content for different audiences. 
Conclusion 
Preliminary data analysis delineates two interrelated 
dimensions of the population problem--modernization and fam-
ily planning. As expected, rural and urban areas are dis-
tinct in their modernization. Cities, represent a higher 
position on the modernizing continuum, irrespective of 
whether the indices used are socioeconomic, demographic, or 
social psychological. At the same time, cities in Kerala 
appear to be in a state of transition to modernized socie-
ties in contrast to the traditional nature of the villages. 
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But the rural and urban areas cannot be differentiated on 
any of the family planning factors, including fertility 
norms and behavior. This pattern could be attributed to the 
role of family planning program in the state. However, mod-
ernization and the family planning program are not indepen-
dent solutions to the population problem. Within both the 
cities and villages, substantial modernization-fertility 
differentials exist such that individuals who are modern on 
the socioeconomic, demographic, and social psychological 
dimensions are modern in their fertility orientations, fam-
ily planning behavior and actual fertility. Additional 
oroof for the relevance of modernization to the success of 
family planning is available in the greater effectiveness of 
urban couples. In short, family planning cannot be totally 
effective unless it is accompanied by modernization. 
Another pattern evident in this initial analysis con-
cerns the relationship between the three family size indi-
ces: ideal family size, actual family size, and the gap 
between the two. There seems to be a general convergence 
towards the small family norm in the entire sample possibly 
due to the impact of the family planning program, although 
some status differences still remain. But wider disparities 
in actual family size accross different status groups 
(defined in terms of both modernization and family planning) 
exist. Therefore, the status differences in the gap between 
the ideal and actual family size are mainly a reflection of 
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the variations in actual family size. 12 Despite the 
increased popularity of the small family norm among the 
lower status groups, their actual family size exceeds their 
ideals. Apart from the fact that the family planning pro-
gram has not been in effect long enough to affect changes in 
actual family size, these discrepancies have a more basic 
implication. If modern family size norms are to be trans-
lated into practice and the gap between the norm and behav-
ior closed, an effective family planning program has to be 
evolved in the context of modernization. That some status 
differences still exist even in the ideal family size lends 
further support to the complementarity of modernization and 
family planning. 
12A comparison of the correlations of actual and ideal 
family size with the gap also suggests the predominant role 
of actual fertility in determining the size of the gap, both 
theoretically and statistically. There is a very strong 
association between actual family size and the gap between 
the ideal and actual fertility (r= .85). In contrast, ideal 
family size explains a significantly smaller proportion (r= 
-.24) of the variation in the gap. Thus, the patterns in 
the gap between the actual and ideal family size can be 
lJnderstood by analyzing the patterns in the actual fertility 
and to a lesser extent in the family size norms. Hence, 
only ideal and actual family size will be used as indicators 
of the level of fertility in the later analysis. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONGRUENCIES AND INCONGRUENCIES IN MODERNIZATION 
AND FAMILY PLANNING: EVIDENCE FROM 
RURAL AND URBAN SAMPLES 
According to the demographic transition theory, fer-
tility declines will be an integral part of modernization in 
a society. As living conditions improve, voluntary control 
of fertility (through the adoption of family planning meth-
ods) increases, resulting in the reduction of fertility. 
Several studies (Amonker, 1973; Anker, 1973; Srikantan, 
1977) using macro level data have shown the close correspon-
dence between the level of development of an area and its 
family planning performance. In fact, these studies imply 
that the family planning program cannot be effective unless 
it is administered in the context of a high level of devel-
opment. In this study, the cities represent a considerably 
higher level of modernization than the rural areas; yet, 
there are no significant differences in their family plan-
ning performance. A clearer understanding of the absence of 
rural-urban differences on the family planning dimensions 
can be achieved if the four subsamples--two rural and two 
urban-- are studied separately. These four areas represent 
a gradient in the extent of their modernization. They, 
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thus, present an ideal framework for a natural experiment to 
test the nature of the relationship between modernization 
and family planning performance at the aggregate level. 
Based on the transition theory and other related studies, it 
can be hypothesized that areas with higher levels of socioe-
conomic development will have experienced higher levels of 
family planning performance and lower fertility. 
Capital City 
Trivandrum city, the administrative capital of Kerala, 
is the most modern of the four areas, both on the moderniza-
tion and family planning variables. When the family's 
socioeconomic status indices are used, this sample has the 
highest mean education and ownership of modern items (Tables 
26 and 27). As might be expected in a modernizing city, 
this sample also represents a wide range of occupations with 
a major concentration in upper white collar and professional 
sectors-- typifying an administrative and educational struc-
ture.1 
Commensurate with their families' status, the women in 
the Capital City have the highest education and 80% of the 
working women are concentrated in the upper white collar and 
professional jobs (Tables 26 and 28). That only 17% of its 
women are in the labor force fits in with the modernizing 
status of this city. In such a transitional set up, job 
1The median occupation is clerical/service jobs in the 
Capital city-- refer to Table 28 
TABLE 26 
MEANS AND RESULTS OF T-TEST FOR SELECTED MODERNIZATION 
AND FAMILY PLANNING INDICES BY AREA OF RESIDENCE • 
VariaoTes_____ ---- CapiEal ·clty-UCommerCTaT-- Comirie-rciar- -AamTniSTrat1ve 
City Rural Area Rural ·Area 
a. Modernization Variables N (168 - 152) N (158-143) N (109-93) N (105-92) 
Education of Husband 
Ownership of Modern Items 
Education of Wife 
Age at First Marriage 
Infant Mortality 
Conjugal Role Relationship 
b. Family Planning Variables 
Son. Preference 
Parity of FP Initiation 
Family Planning Effective 
Ideal Family Size 
Actual Family Size 
11.3abc 
4.labc 
8.9abc 
20.oabc 
10.4 
148.8abc 
8.ocb 
2.5a 
3 _2abc 
2.7ac 
3.3a 
7.7de 
1.9de 
6.8de 
18.9 
12.6 
133.1 
11.9 
3.4e 
2.2 
2.93 
3.8 
6.1 
1.1 
5.5 
18.8 
11.2 
125.4 
12.5f 
3.lf 
2.1 
2,87 
3.5 
1a = Capital City significantly different from Commercial City. 
b = Capital City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area. 
6.1 
0.8 
5.5 
18.9 
11.9 
127.1 
12.9 
2.1 
2 .5· 
2.9 
3.5 
c = Capital City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area. 
d = Commercial City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area. 
e = Commercial City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area. 
f = Commercial Rural Area significantly different from Administrative 
Rural Area. 
N 
N 
00 
TABLE 27 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND RESULTS OF F-TEST FOR SELECTED MODERNIZATION 
AND FAMILY PLANNING VARIABLES BY AREA OF RESIDENCEl 
Variables 
a. Modernization Variables 
Ea\ication of Husoan 
Ownership of Modern Items 
Education of Wife 
Age at First Marriage 
Infant Mortality 
Conjugal Role Relationships 
~· Family Planning Variables 
Son Preference 
Parity of FP Initiation 
Family Planning Effective 
Ideal Family Size 
Actual Family Size 
Capital City 
N (168 -152) 
. .,ac 
2.9abc 
4.4ac 
4.2c 
17.5 
25.9a 
20.4 
2.0 b 
1.5a 
o.8a 
1.6 
Commercial 
City 
N (158-143) 
1:9d 
3.5 
3.9 
18.9 
37.lde 
18.6 
2.2e 
1.3 
1.0 
1.8d 
Commercial Administrative 
Rural Area Rural Area 
N (109-93) N (105-92) 
4 --.~zp: :r:-s 
1.4f 1.2 
4.1 3.7 
3. 7 3.4 
16.4 16.9 
30.2 28.8 
18.1 18.3 
1.9 1.8 
l.2f 1.4 
0.86f 0.9 
l. 38 1.9 
la = Capital City significantly different from Commercial City. 
b 
c 
d 
e 
f 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Capital City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area. 
Capital City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area. 
Commercial City significantly different from Commercial Rural Area. 
Commercial City significantly different from Administrative Rural Area. 
Commercial Rural Area significantly different from Administrative Rural 
Rural Area. 
N 
N 
\0 
TABLE 28 
DISTRIBUTION OF HUSBANDS' AND WIVES' OCCUPATIONAL STATUS 
STATUS BY AREA OF RESIDENCE 
Occupational 
Categories 
Unemployed 
Unskilled Labor 
Skilled Labor 
Clerical and 
Service Occupations 
Managerial and Pro-
fessional Occupations 
N 
Unemployed 
Unskilled Labor 
Skilled Labor 
Clerical and 
Service Occupations 
Managerial and Pro-
Husbands' Occupation 
Capital Commercial Commercial Administrative 
City City Rural Area Rural Ar~a 
1. 8% 1. 9io . . , • • . 
16.6 25.9 41.4% 62.9% 
8.3 12.0 30.3 9.5 
26.1 
47.0 
100% 
(:l68) 
. 
13.3% 
26.7 
43.7 11.1 
16.4 14.7 
100% 100% 
(158) (109) 
Wive?' QccuQation 
44.4% 
3.5 
31.0 
80.0% 
2.0 
4.0 
17.2 
10.5 
100% 
(lOS) 
. 
61.6% 
fessional Occupations 60.0 24.1 14.0 38.4 
llm~ 100% 100% lUU% 
N ( 30) ( 29) ( 50) ( 13) 
N 
w 
0 
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opportunities, especially for women, will be limited with 
women playing a predominantly housekeeping role. But, when 
they do seek employment, it is generally in the higher sta-
tus occupations. 
Capital City, corresponding to its high status on 
socioeconomic modernization, is also the most modernized at 
the demographic and social psychological levels (Table 26). 
Its members tend to marry the latest and have experienced 
lesser infant mortality than the other areas. Jointness in 
role relationships is more common among couples in the Capi-
tal City than elsewhere. At the same time, this area has 
the widest range on most of these modernization indices, 
once again, characterizing a modernizing society. 
Capital City's performance on the family planning 
indices parallels its achievements in modernization (Tables 
26 to 29). Its members not only have the most favorable 
orientations to family size and family planning (son prefer-
ence and family planning attitudes), but are also one of the 
most modern in the practice of family planning (parity of 
family planning initiation and family planning effective-
ness). 
An important structural feature that may provide an 
additional explanation is the caste composition of this 
city's sample. Nairs, among Hindus, and Harthomites/Jaco-
bite Christians among the Protestants form the largest pro-
portion of this sample (Table 30). Both these castes are 
the dominant castes in Kerala in terms of economic, politi-
TABLE 29 
ATTITUDE OF RESPONDENTS TO USE OF FA}1ILY PLANNING BY 
AREA OF RESIDENCEl . 
Family Planning 
Attitudes 
Favorable 
Indifferent 
Unfavorable 
N 
x2 
Gamma 
1a = Significant at 
Areq of Residence 
Administrative Commercial Commercial 
Rural Rural City 
61.0% 45. 9i., 39.9% 
2.9 3.7 7.6 
36.2 50.5 52.5 
100% 100% 100% 
(105) (109) (158) 
a 
-.08 
<. 001 level. 
Capital 
City 
64.3% 
4.2 
31.5 
100% 
(168) 
N 
w 
N 
TABlE 30 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENI'S BY RELIGION, CASTE, A.~ A..WA OF RESIDENCE1 
Religion Area of Residence/ Capital Cornrercial City Conm=rcial Adm.:inistrative 
Caste City Rural Area Rural Area 
Hindu 95.2% 98.1% 100% 81.0% 
Brahmin 10.2% 25.3% 3.rlo 1.0% 
Nair 45.5 12.7 10.1 53.3 
Ezhava 21.6 25.3 65.1 10.5 
Scheduled Caste 18.6 34.7 21.1 15.2 
Christian 4.8 1.9 - 19.0 
Mlrthomites/ 
Jacobites 3.6 2.0 
C.S.I. - - - 1.9 
Nadar 
Christians 0.6 - - 18.1 
N 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
~- {1682 {1682 {158} {150} {109) (109) (105) (105) 
lMissing Values: 8 in Corrnercial City N w 
w 
234 
cal, and social power. The higher average age of this sam-
ple (36.5), another structural factor, may be a function of 
selective retention of older couples in the Capital City, 
especially since seniority is still an important criterion 
for the upward movement in the occupational ladder. 
Thus, this profile of Capital City characterizes it as 
the executive core of administrative life with an upper 
class of professionals, a middle class consisting of white 
collar workers, and a lower working class. It is, at the 
same time, a modernizing city in which modern and tradi-
tional elements coexist. 
Commercial City 
Cochin--Commercial City--from which the second subsam-
ole was drawn is the commercial center of Kerala and forms 
part of its industrial belt. Unlike the wide range on the 
stratification system available in the Capital City, the 
Commercial City consists of a small enclave of wealthy busi-
ness families as well as executives employed in the govern-
ment owned large scale industries and a large mass of lower 
class population. This polarization is reflected in its 
modernization and family planning status. 
Commercial City occupies an intermediate position in 
the extent of its socio-economic modernization. It ranks 
below the Capital City in the educational status of its res-
idents; yet, it is more modern than the rural areas (Tables 
26 and 27). Two factors need special consideration. As in 
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the Capital City very few women in the Commercial City are 
employed (17.7%). This relatively low labor force partici-
pation of these urban women may again be attributed to fewer 
employment opportunities, the dominance of the t~aditional 
homemaker's role, and the nonavailability of outside help in 
the household chores. However, when the women are employed, 
they are concentrated in unskilled labor (modal occupation) 
or in the clerical and other service jobs (Table 28). Hus-
band's occupational distribution follows a similar pattern 
(also in Table 28). Almost 44% of the heads of the house-
holds are engaged in white collar occupations along with 
another 15% in managerial or proprietary jobs. At the same 
time, nearly 30% are blue collar workers. This combination 
of blue collar and white collar (both upper and lower) occu-
pations reflects the industrial, commercial, and financial 
basis of the economy of Commercial City. In general, occu-
pational status of Commercial City's respondents is lower 
than that in the Capital City. 2 
It is also evident that Commercial City is midway 
between the Capital City and the rural areas in its demo-
graphic (especially age at marriage) and social psychologi-
cal (role relationships) modernization (Tables 26 and 27). 
For example, respondents here get married later than rural 
women although they are not as modernized as women in the 
2The median occupation is lower service occupations in 
the Commercial City. 
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Capital City. They are also more traditional than Capital 
City's women in their preference for sons; yet, they have 
less intense preferences for sons compared to the rural 
areas. 
From this point onwards, however, the Commercial City 
deviates from its intermediary status. Of all the four 
areas, its respondents have experienced the highest infant 
mortality rate, a possible reflection of the crowded and 
unsanitary living conditions of the poorer segments of this 
city (Tables 26 and 27). Even more interesting is that the 
Commercial City tends to be the most traditional in its res-
idents' attitudes toward family planning and also their uti-
lization of family planning. Among all the areas, it 
includes the largest proportion of respondents who are 
either indifferent to, unfavorable to or totally opposed to 
family planning (Table 29). Conversely, it has the smallest 
percentage of respondents favorable to family planning. A 
close correspondence also exists between their attitudes and 
behavior. Its residents initiated birth control latest and 
are one of the least effective groups in overall effective-
ness in planning families (Table 26). 
Commercial City's caste composition may have some 
impact on its paradoxical status alignments (Table 30). 
Brahmins, Ezhavas, and Scheduled castes predominate in this 
city's sample. Status incongruencies in the case of the 
Brahmins, who head the ritual hierarchy but not the secular 
ranking, may lead to an ambivalence in their life patterns. 
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Lower caste status of the Ezhavas and Scheduled castes on 
both the ritual and secular ranking may reinforce each other 
in creating traditional behavior patterns. 
Thus, little correspondence exists between the Commer-
cial City's status on the modernization indices and its fam-
ily planning performance. It was in this city that the 
first mass sterilization camps of one day and one month 
durations were undertaken. But the researcher's personal 
observations in the field during which she worked closely 
with the health workers associated with the family planning 
centers may provide a clue to this unique pattern. The 
overall administration of the family planning information 
and services did not appear to be as effective as, for exam-
ple, in the Capital City. Sporadic provision of certain 
kinds of services (such as the vasectomy camps) is defi-
nitely not a sufficient tool in achieving a reduction in 
family size. What is also necessary is the continued effec-
tive administration of the family planning program. 
Corroborating evidence for the ineffectiveness of the 
family planning program in Ernakulam district in which the 
Commercial City is located is available in a study on pro-
gram administration conducted by Valsan (1977). Extensive 
interviews with family planning acceptors, medical person-
nel, politicians, social workers, and civil servants 
revealed sharp contrasts in the organization of the steril-
iztion camps and that of the regular program. The manage-
rial and organizational abilities, and the planning and 
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leadership qualities of the district collector (the highest 
civil officer in the district who was also responsible for 
the organization of the family planning camps) were chiefly 
responsible for the success of the sterilization campaign. 
But when the camps were terminated, the responsibility was 
shifted to the regular district level family planning organ-
ization. Interview data from Valsan indicated that the per-
sonnel, both higher and lower level, lacked the dynamism and 
morale to carry on the intense grass-roots campaign neces-
sary for the successful implementation of the program. 
Another serious limitation on the program effectiveness was 
the lack of coordination between the family planning and 
other development programs--a finding that highlights the 
complementarity of modernization and family planning. 
Commercial Rural Area 
This rural area is part of Ernakulw~ district in which 
Commercial City is located. Consequently, both the Commer-
cial City and the rural area fall under the jurisdiction of 
the same district family planning organization. Spillover 
effects of the Ernakulam-Cochin-Alwaye region in the dis-
trict--the financial and commercial belt of Kerala--may also 
be reflected in this rural sample. 
As might be expected, the Commercial Rural Area, does 
differ significantly from the Commercial City in the level 
of its socioeconomic status (Table 26). Rural residents 
have a lower mean education, both husband's and wife's, and 
239 
own fewer modern items than the residents of Commercial 
City. A similar pattern is evident in the case of their 
occupational status too (Table 28). Almost 65% of the rural 
husbands are unskilled or skilled laborers. In contrast~ 
more than half of the heads of households in the Commercial 
City are concentrated in the middle of the occupational 
stratum (ranging from skilled to other services). Simi-
larly~ while more women in this rural area (40%) are in the 
labor force than any other~ the majority of them are uns-
killed workers compared to the wider distribution of Commer-
cial City's workers (Table 28). 
Yet~ deviations from the traditional rural structure 
are evident in this sample suggesting spillover effects from 
the Commercial City. Consequently~ the Commercial Rural 
Area is not merely rural~ but is in the initial state of 
transition from the traditional homogenous structure. For 
example, this rural village, inspite of the low general 
level of education~ exhibits wider variations in the educa-
tional distribution of its residents than the Commercial 
City (Table 27). There is also a larger proportion of rural 
husbands who are semi-professionals or professionals (~able 
28) • 
While the Commercial Rural Area has a significantly 
lower socioeconomic status than the Commercial City, they do 
not differ much in the demographic (age at marriage and 
infant mortality) and social psychological aspects of their 
modernization (Table 26). It indicates that the level of 
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socioeconomic modernization in the Commercial City and its 
rural area (but the City especially) is not strong enough to 
induce modernization in other sectors of these societies. 
These rural respondents also tend to be traditional in their 
orientation to and practice of family limitation as the 
urbanites (Table 29). That the Commercial Rural Area and 
the City are served by the same family planning organization 
may further explain the ineffectiveness of the rural sample 
on the family planning measure. Low levels of modernization 
and inefficient family planning program administration that 
characterize the Commercial Rural Area together explain its 
residents' ineffectiveness in planning their families. 
Additional support for the complementarity of modern-
ization and family planning is evident in the comparison of 
Commercial Rural Area to the Capital City (Tables 26 to 29). 
The Commercial Rural Area is markedly different from the 
administrative city not only in its socioeconomic status but 
also in its demographic and social psychological moderniza-
tion and family planning performance. Significantly lower 
levels of educational, occupational, and economic statuses, 
lower age at marriage, and more segregated conjugal role 
relationships typify the rural respondents. Corresponding 
to this traditional status is a conservatism in their atti-
tude toward and their practice of family planning. 
This conservatism is reinforced by the caste composi-
tion of this sample (Table 30). Ezhavas and Scheduled 
castes--the two lowest groups in the secular and ritual 
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hierarchy--form 86% of its population. Ezhavas, who unlike 
the Scheduled castes are not protected by the government, 
tend to be in the least favorable position with regard to 
development. 
The Commercial Rural Area is closer to the Commercial 
City than it is to the Capital City, not just geographi-
cally, but also in its social profile. Both these areas 
appear to be in the initial stages of transition, although 
their starting points differ. For the Commercial City, it 
is the beginning of a transition from an urban center to a 
modernizing society. In the case of the rural area, the 
initial shift is away from the rural organization towards a 
more diversified socioeconomic structure. 
Administrative Rural Area 
Administrative Rural Area, the last sample in the 
study, is along with the Capital City, a part of Trivandrum 
district. With regard to its general level of moderniza-
tion--socioeconomic, demographic, and social psychological--
-the Administrative Rural Area has a significantly lower 
status than that of the administrative city (Tables 26 and 
27). Its residents not only have lower education and own 
fewer modern items than their city counterparts, but almost 
60% of the heads of households are engaged in lower status 
occupations--unskilled labor and small scale farming (Table 
28). Like their husbands, most of the employed women (12. 
4% of the sample) are also engaged in either unskilled labor 
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or petty business. However, the semi-professional status of 
the rest of the employed women may be a carry over from the 
Capital City. 
Given the low socioeconomic developmer.t level of the 
Administrative Rural Area, its traditional profile in terms 
of age at marriage and conjugal role structure is to be 
expected (Tables 26 and 27). What is surprising is its high 
level of family planning performance, a level comparable to 
the Capital City. Almost 61% of these rural respondents (as 
high a proportion as in the Capital City) are generally 
favorable to using some method of family limitation while 
only 36% are either unfavorable or totally opposed to it 
(Table 30). Further, the administrative rural respondents, 
like their urban counterparts, initiated use of family plan-
ning very early (Table 26). These deviations may also be 
explained in terms of the personal observations of the 
researcher during the fieldwork concerning the administra-
tion of the family planning program in this area. Continu-
ous and intensive grass-roots level contacts in this area 
were maintained, through regular field visits, by the family 
planning health assistants. Coupled with this was the 
interest and cooperation of the medical personnel in charge 
of the primary health center for family planning. A family 
planning program can, therefore, be quite effective even 
when the level of modernization is low. 
However, if the program is to effect basic and overall 
changes in the planning of and control over family size, a 
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modernizing context is necessary. Inspite of the relatively 
effective administration of the family planning program, the 
overall effectiveness of the administrative rural respon-
dents in planning their pregnancy histories is still low 
compared to the Capital City (Table 26). Similarly, the 
intensity of preference for sons among these rural respon-
dents is the highest of all the four areas. A strong desire 
for sons is rooted in the agrarian social structure of the 
rural area. Table 28 indicates that almost 29% of its 
respondents are farmers, both small and large, compared to 
3.6% in the Commercial Rural Area, 2.5% in the Commercial 
City, and none in the Capital City. Modernization, as dem-
onstrated in the case of the Capital City would, therefore, 
prove an effective catalyst in realizing the full potential 
of the family planning program. 
Just as with the Commercial Rural Area, the Adminis-
trative Rural Area differs from the Commercial City in its 
socioeconomic modernization, but not in its demographic and 
social psychological aspects (Table 26). Educational, occu-
pational, and economic statuses of the administrative rural-
ites are significantly lower when compared to the Commercial 
City's population. But the rural area, despite its low 
level of development, is more effective in the field of fam-
ily planning than the Commercial City. This is especially 
so with regard to attitude to family planning and parity of 
initiation of birth control (Table 26). For instance, while 
52.5% of the Commercial City's sample is opposed to the use 
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of family planning, the corresponding proportion in the 
Administrative Rural Area is only 36%. Conversely, the 
rural respondents have more favorable attitudes than the 
commercial urbanites. Corresponding to these favorable 
attitudes, the rural respondents on the average initiated 
practice of family limitation one pregnancy earlier than the 
Commercial City's sample. Yet, the two samples do not dif-
fer in the overall effectiveness in planning their families. 
A major impediment to the effectiveness of the program in 
the Administrative Rural Area may be its traditional social 
structure. These findings further confirm the independent, 
yet complementary nature of modernization and family plan-
ning, the two major means to controlling population growth. 
Additional support for the distinctiveness (even if 
limited) of family planning is available in the comparison 
of the two rural samples. While the two areas are basically 
similar in their levels of modernization, the Administrative 
Rural Area is the more typically rural area of the two, at 
least in its socioeconomic status (Table 27). It has more 
clustered distribution than the Commecial Rural Area in the 
educational (husbands') and economic statuses of the family. 
Occupational concentration of the Administrative Rural 
Area's respondents in unskilled labor and farming denotes an 
agrarian and non-industrial structure (Table 28). In con-
trast, unskilled and skilled laborers predominate in the 
Commercial Rural population. And, it also includes petty 
businessmen and professionals in larger proportions than the 
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Administrative Rural Area, reflecting industrial and commer-
cial influences on its structure. 
Inspite of the similar, if not more, traditional 
structure of the Administrative Rural Area, it differs con-
siderably in its family planning status from the Commercial 
Rural Area. Administrative Rural Area--the most typically 
rural--is the more effective of the two, both in its orien-
tation to and practice of family planning (Tables 26 and 
29). In other words, the effective family planning program 
in the Administrative Rural Area is a major reason for its 
high performance on the family planning dimensions. 
A contradictory profile, thus, emerges from the analy-
ses of the Administrative Rural Area's position on the mod-
ernization and family planning indices. Caste structuring 
of this sample may be a further explanatory factor (Table 
j0). Of all the four areas, this sample has the largest 
proportion of Nairs (53.3%), the dominant secular caste in 
Kerala. While they may be restricted in their modernization 
by the traditional structure in which they operate, they 
seem to exercize greater control over a personal dimension--
-family size. 
Relevance Of The Varied Profiles For Family Size 
Comparative analysis of the two urban and two rural 
areas precludes a unidirectional and linear relationship 
between modernization and family planning status. It is 
necessary at this point to assess the implications of these 
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mixed profiles for the phenomenon that impinges directly on 
population growth--family size. 
In all the four areas, both the average ideal family 
size and especially the actual family size exceed replace-
ment level fertility which is the goal of the family plan-
ning program (Table 26). What is even more significant is 
that the traditional rural/urban differences in family size 
are not evident in these populations. Commercial City and 
Capital City seem to differ most in their ideal and achieved 
family sizes. As might be expected, Capital City, with its 
highest level of modernization and an effective family plan-
ning program, has the lowest mean ideal and actual family 
size. Commercial City is at the opposite extreme with its 
highest ideal and actual. Once again, the level of modern-
ization in the Commercial City proves insufficient to effect 
modernization of fertility orientations and behavior. It 
may also imply a short term rise in fertility in the initial 
stages of socioeconomic development as suggested by Tsui and 
Bogue (1978: 19, 24). 
In between these extremes lie the two rural areas. 
Although the Commercial Rural Area has a slightly smaller 
ideal than the Administrative Rural Area, the latter has a 
smaller achieved family size. However, only the Administra-
tive Rural Area has a significantly higher ideal family size 
in comparison to the Capital City. A higher preference for 
sons, the variable on which only the Capital City and Admin-
istrative Rural Area differ, may explain the higher rural 
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ideal. Yet, the administrative rural sample has the small-
est gap between its ideal and actual family size suggesting 
closer correspondence behreen family size norms and perform-
ance. 
Until 1970, very little difference was found between 
rural and urban fertility in India, partly because of the 
unique nature of its urbanization. Since then declines in 
urban fertility vis-a-vis rural fertility have been docu-
mented (Rele and Kanitkar, 1974: 229). The absence of the 
traditional rural-urban fertility differentials in Kerala is 
in conformity with the mixed modernization-family planning 
profiles documented in its two cities and the two rural 
areas. 
Conclusion 
Several writers have pointed out recently that the 
process of demographic transition and modernization in 
developing countries need not follow the same pattern as the 
Western transitions. In fact, due to the variations in the 
starting points, in the culture and social structure of each 
society, each national transition is bound to develop its 
unique features in the timing, sequence, and interplay of 
the traditional and modern elements. Teitelbaum (1975: 
176-177) speaks of several factors that may contribute to 
the uniqueness of the demographic transitions of these mod-
ernizing societies. Of particular relevance to this study 
are the increased planning abilities of the national govern-
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ments of which the organized family planning program in 
India is an example, increased acceptance of the small fam-
ily norm, and easier access to different methods of fertil-
ity control. 
At the aggregate level, family planning performance in 
this sample appears to be divorced from modernization sta-
tus. Commercial City, although advanced in its socioeco-
nomic modernization, is very traditional in its family plan-
ning achievements. At the opposite extreme lies the 
administrative village, the least modern area in the sample; 
yet, it has a high family planning performance status. 
These findings are at variance with studies that posit mod-
ernization as a necessary prerequisite for the success of 
the family planning program. Similarities in the small size 
of the average actual fertility, particularly between the 
rural areas and Capital City which have different levels of 
development, is another indication that family planning pro-
grams can be relatively effective under different levels of 
modernization. At the same time, the limited success of the 
program, in the absence of modernization, can be seen, for 
example, in the higher average ideal family size of the 
administrative rural area compared to the Capital City. 
A comparison of the four areas with different levels 
of development provides a convenient set up for a natural 
experiment of the relationship between modernization and 
family planning performance. The results presented in this 
chapter substantiate the analysis at the individual level 
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presented in Chapter V. Hodernization and family planning 
seem to be complementary, yet independent at the aggregate 
level also. The specific combination of these two dimen-
sions evident in the four subsamples lends credence to the 
notion of individual demographic transitions suggested by 
Teitelbaum and others. 
CHAPTER VII 
MODERNIZATION AND FAMILY PLANNING: AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN REDUCING FERTILITY 
Both the fertility literature and the preliminary 
analysis, particularly at the aggregate level, presented in 
the preceding chapters suggest the complementary, yet sepa-
rate influences of modernization and family planning on fer-
tility. A more stringent test of the nature of the comple-
mentary relationship between modernization and family 
planning in their effects on fertility behavior and their 
relative independent contributions to fertility reductions 
is possible through the use of path analysis. Following the 
procedures outlined in Asher (1976) and Kerlinger and 
Pedhauzur (1973), a path analysis of the fertility model 
detailed in Chapter III was carried out. The model includes 
four structural variables-- rural urban area of residence, 
religion, caste status, and age of the respondent--which are 
hypothesized as influencing the two indices of primary mod-
ernization, the respondent's and her family's socioeconomic 
status. These status characteristics, in turn, would deter-
mine the extent of secondary modernization in a family, 
measured by the respondent's age at marriage, the extent of 
infant mortality experienced by the couple, and the social 
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psychological manifestation of modernization indexed as the 
nature of the role relationships. These modern characteris-
tics are further conceptualized as influencing the respon-
dents' norms regarding family size and family planning and 
consequently their family planning behavior. Ultimately, 
modernization and family planning are expected to determine 
the number of children each couple has. 
Results from the path analysis suggest that family 
planning behavior and indicators of secondary modernization, 
such as age at marriage and infant mortality, which have a 
quantitative impact on family size are some of the most 
direct determinants of fertility behavior. As might be 
expected, family planning which involves a deliberate con-
trol of fertility has a stronger influence on family size 
than modernization. Further, the indirect effect of modern-
ization through family planning is as strong (if not 
stronger) as its direct influence on actual fertility. 
Thus, even though the practice of family planning presup-
poses modern traits and values, the role of modernization as 
a tool in reducing fertility is strengthened when it is 
accompanied by the appropriate family planning behavior. 
Family planning programs aimed at popularizing the concept 
and use of family planning methods among all social and eco-
nomic classes will speed up the fertility declines. 
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A Methodological Note 
As a first step in delineating the path model, each of 
the endogenous variables were regressed on the causally pre-
ceding independent variables. Two criteria were used in 
trimming the model: (1) paths were dropped if their values 
were smaller than .05, the magnitude often recommended as a 
criteria for deleting paths (Kerlinger and Pedhauzur, 1973: 
~18); (2) paths were also deleted at each step using the .05 
level of significance for the path coefficients. Path coef-
ficients above the value of .05 were omitted only when they 
were insignificant at the .05 level. Once the non-signifi-
cant paths were deleted, the regressions were rerun until 
the final path model was ascertained. 
In the course of the regression analysis, family plan-
ning effectiveness (see Appendix B for description of this 
variable), the last of the family planning variables in the 
causal order, was dropped from the model for several rea-
sons. When actual family size was regressed on all the 
independent variables in the model, the coefficient for the 
direct path from family planning effectiveness to actual 
family size was not only insignificant at the .05 level of 
significance but was only .04 in magnitude. Secondly, the 
correlation between the parity at which use of family plan-
ning was initiated and family planning effectiveness was a 
high -.62. Hence, all the influence of family planning 
effectiveness on fertility behavior (r=-.46) is because of 
the influence of the antecedent variable, parity of family 
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1 planning initiation, on effectiveness. Measurement of fam-
ily planning effectiveness also required the respondent to 
recollect the contraceptive circumstances preceding every 
pregnancy, rendering reliability of recall problematic. In 
the case of parity of family planning initiation, however, 
only one point in time in their pregnancy history needed to 
be remembered. The chances of accurately recalling one such 
event rather than several are much higher. Parity of family 
planning initiation was, therefore, chosen over family plan-
ning effectiveness, as a more reliable index of family plan-
ning behavior. 
Once the path model was determined, the next methode-
logical step was to test its adequacy. Correlations between 
all the independent and the dependent variables at each 
stage in the causal order were recalculated and are pre-
sented in Appendix D along with the original correlations. 
With two exceptions, all the reproduced correlations were 
either identical with or very close to the original suggest-
ing that the model presented in Figure 2 is a tenable one. 
Sizeable discrepancies between the actual and implied corre-
1
rncidentally, the correlations of family planning effec-
tiveness with age of wife (r= -.07), age at marriage (r= 
.26), infant mortality (r= -.06), ideal family size (r= 
-.18), and sterilization status (r= -.14) are small. Hence, 
it is possible to attribute the original relationship 
between family planning effectiveness and fertility to the 
effect of parity of family planning initiation on planning 
effectiveness. The indirect causal role of family planning 
effectiveness in family size determination will be analyzed 
further at a later time. 
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conjugal ~ole ~elationships with actual family size (diffe~­
ence of .07). Even in these two instances, the deviations 
we~e not too la~ge to wa~~ant thei~ inclusion in the model 
2 
at this stage. 
Mode~nization-Family Planning Inte~actions In Dete~mining 
Family Size 
The Backg~ound Va~iables 
The fou~ background variables, ~ural-urban a~ea of 
residence, ~eligion (R),3 caste (C), and age of the respon-
dent (A), constitute the exogenous indices of mode~nization 
in the model. A~ea of ~esidence consists of fou~ a~eas 
necessitating the c~eation of th~ee dummy variables, Capital 
City (Dl), Commercial City (D2), and Administ~ative Rural 
A~ea (D3). The fourth a~ea, Comme~cial Ru~al area became 
the "othe~' catego~y. 
No causal order can be delineated among the exogenous 
va~iables. Their inte~~elationships will, the~efo~e, be 
rep~esented by simple cor~elations in the model. Two types 
2
rn testing the validity of the model, a diffe~ence of 
less than .05 between the actual and implied co~~elations is 
conside~ed acceptable. 
~ The lette~s in pa~antheses are the symbols used to ~ep-
~esent the variables in tracing the paths. 
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of correlations among the background variables need to be 
distinguished. The correlations among the three dummy vari-
ables are completely spurious or non-causal as defined by 
Nie, et. al (1975: 389-390). These non-causal correlations 
will form part of the spurious effects in a correlation. In 
other words, although they are mathematically a part of the 
equations, these correlations cannot be interpreted substan-
tively. On the other hand, the relationships of the three 
dummy variables representing area of residence with reli-
gion, caste, and age of the respondent and the covariations 
among the last three represent 'unanalyzed correlations' 
(Nie, et. al, 1975: 389) with no direction of causation 
specified. Such analyzed correlations introduce ambiguities 
into the model because one-way causations are not implied in 
the relationships among the exogenous variables. 
Since no unidirectional causality is implied among the 
background variables, these covariations provide a basic 
description of the sample. Capital City does not differ 
from the other areas in its religious composition, but does 
have a higher proportion of upper castes4 and older women. 
On the contrary, Commercial City has more Hindus compared to 
the other areas, but there are no significant caste and age 
differences between the Commercial City and the other areas. 
The differences in caste composition among the two cities 
4 The correlation between Capital City and caste is nega-
tive because caste status is ranked in such a way that a 
lower value (for example, 1) indicates higher caste status. 
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may be a reflection of their economic structure. Since a 
higher proportion of upper castes reside in Capital City, 
the administrative capital of Kerala, perpetuation of the 
traditional situation where upper castes were privy to 
higher education and non-commercial white collar occupations 
can be expected. Such caste polarization is not evident in 
the Commercial City, the more cosmopolitan of the two cit-
ies. Further, the commercial and industrial base of the 
Commercial City's economy does not preclude the participa-
tion of any caste group. Caste distinctions (implying the 
preponderance of some castes over others in comparison with 
the other areas) are also absent in the Administrative Rural 
Area although it has a larger proportion of Christians and 
younger women. Differences in the age composition of the 
Capital City and its rural area might be a consequence of 
the higher and lower fertility of the rural and urban areas 
respectively. 
Upper castes in the Hindu tradition occupy a higher 
status in the ritual hierarchy than the Christian upper 
castes. This is evident in the relatively higher caste sta-
tus of the Hindus compared to the Christians (r= -.10). 
Further, while there are no significant religious distinc-
tions between older and younger respondents, caste distinc-
tions do exist. A larger proportion of older women belong 
to the upper castes with the lower caste respondents being 
vounger. This younger age structure of the lower castes may 
be attributed to their traditionally higher fertility. 
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Aside from providing background information on the 
sample, these covariations present conditions that may 
either dampen or enhance the effect of modernization on fer-
tility. For example, a large number of residents in Capital 
City belong to the upper castes. It can be hypothesized 
that both these traits will reinforce each other in reducing 
fertility. At the same time, although modern fertility 
behavior can be associated with upper castes, their older 
age composition will diminish the effects of the higher 
social status associated with upper castes. Such correla-
tions will play an important role in determining the nature 
of the influence that modernization and family planning 
exercize on fertility. 
Primary Modernization 
Family's Socioeconomic Status 
Educational accomplishments of the head of the house-
hold (H), the index of a family's socioeonomic status, is 
the first endogenous modernization variable in the model. 
As might be expected, families in the Capital City enjoy a 
higher status than families in other areas, even after con-
trolling for the effect of the higher caste status of Capi-
tal City's families (path HDl = .46). Commercial City is 
also characterized by higher social status (path HD2=.14), 
although it is not as distinctly different as Capital City 
is from the rural areas. These results, thus, validate the 
findings presented in Chapter VI where Capital City was 
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characterized as the most modern of the two cities. 
Further, despite public policies designed to mitigate the 
discrimination against the lower castes, lower caste status 
is still associated with lower social status (path HC=-.24). 
As noted in the earlier discussion of the exogenous 
variables, the relationships among them also present certain 
indirect links in the effect of the background factors on 
husband's education. For example, families in the Capital 
City or upper castes generally have a higher status (meas-
ured as husband's education) partly because many upper 
castes tend to reside in Capital City (path HDl.rDlC= -.o85 
or path HC.rCDl=.04). In short, urban families and upper 
caste groups still occupy the higher rungs of the socioeco-
nomic order in Kerala. 
Educational Status Of The Wife 
While the family is the unit of procreation, the wife 
is the most directly involved in the childbearing process. 
As such her socioeconomic characteristics have an additional 
significance in determining family size. 
Wife's education (H) is the first index of her socioe-
conomic status in the model. A causal link cannot be estab-
lished between husband and wife's education because the man 
and the woman enter the marriage market with their educa-
~Path HDl.rDlC= -.08 refers to the product of the unana-
lyzed correlation (r) between caste status (C) and residence 
in the Capital City (Dl) and the path from Capital City to 
Husband's education (H). 
260 
tion. No doubt, in contracting a marriage, parity in the 
educational qualifications of the husband and wife is 
stressed and the man's decision or choice generally pre-
vails. Yet, it is not possible to stipulate that husband's 
education causally determines the wife's educational status. 
It was, therefore, decided to exclude husband's education 
from the analysis of the determinants of wife's education 
and to allow the residuals in the two be correlated. 6 
There is no difference in the causal structures of the 
respondent's and her husband's education. Like their hus-
bands, women residing in the two cities and upper caste 
women have higher education in comparison with rural and 
lower caste women respectively. Similarities also exist in 
the sizes of the path coefficients for husband and wife's 
education. Despite differences in the levels of education 
among men and women (see Chapter V), traditional structural 
biases (such as caste status and area of residence) are 
equally strong in creating disparities in the educational 
accomplishments of both men and women in Kerala. This rela-
tive absence of sex bias in educational advancement can, to 
a large extent, be attributed to the programs of free educa-
tion in Kerala to which 39% of Kerala's budget is devoted 
(Visaria and Visaria, 1981: 9). Consequently, Kerala also 
6 The residuals were allowed to be correlated only to 
facilitate the recalculation of the implied correlation 
between husband and wife's education. Hence, it does not 
affect the original estimation of the path coefficients. 
See Sewell, et.al, 1970 for a similar approach. 
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has the highest literacy rate among all the states in India 
both for men and women: 74% of Kerala's men as opposed to 
the national average of 47% and 65% of its women compared to 
25% of the women in the nation are literate (Visaria and 
Visaria, 1981: 9). There are still differences in the edu-
cational achievements of men and women. But the patterns in 
their education, i.e., factors accounting for disparities in 
educational accomplishments, are the same for both sexes. 
Age of the respondent is the fourth determinant of her 
educational status. Many younger women, irrespective of 
their area of residence and their caste status, have higher 
education compared to their older counterparts (path 
WA=-.08). Such improvements in th~ status of women over 
time is another important aspect of the modernizing trends 
in Kerala today. 
In the preliminary analysis of the data, however, the 
insignificant simple correlations between age of wife and 
her education (r=.05) suggested there had not been any sig-
nificant improvements in women's social status over time. 
Two factors were responsible for this misleading conclusion. 
Many older women live in the Capital City where women have a 
higher educational status (path WDl.rDlA=.09). Some older 
women also belong to the upper castes and upper caste women 
generally have higher education (path WC.rCA =.04). 7 Two 
7
since there are no significant age distinctions among 
women in the Commercial City, the path from Commercial City 
is minor. 
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traditional factors, urban residence and upper caste status, 
thus, obfuscate the real improvements gained by women over 
time in the field of education. 
Correlations among the determinants of wife's educa-
tion also provide additional insights into the coexisting 
traditional and modernizing elements in Kerala. For exam-
ole, continuing the traditional pattern found in the case of 
men, upper caste status women who reside in the Capital City 
also have higher education. Many women in the Capital City 
belong to the upper castes who are privy to higher education 
(path WC.rcD1=.04). Alternately, many upper caste women 
reside in the Capital City where residents generally have 
higher education compared to the Commercial City and rural 
women (path WDl.rDlC=-.07). Age composition of upper caste 
women and those residing in Capital City, on the other hand, 
slightly weakens the traditional monopoly of Capital City 
and upper caste status on higher education. For example, 
Capital City has many older women who, in turn, have lower 
education, leading to the lower educational status of some 
residents in the Capital City (path WA.rADl = -.02). Such 
contradictory patterns where the traditional and the modern 
intermingle is, again, a characteristic of a modernizing 
society. 
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Women's Occupational Status 
Employment of women (0), like education, exposes women 
to a wider range of ideas, opinions, and behavior patterns. 
It limits the time women can devote to their families while 
providing an effective alternative to large families and 
even to childbearing. Hence, women's occupational status 
will have a significant influence on their family size deci-
sions. 
Analysis of the factors determining women's occupa-
tional status reveals trends that undercut the improvements 
achieved in the field of education. For example, women in 
both the Capital and Commercial cities and upper caste women 
8 tend not to be employed. It is still neither customary nor 
socially desirable for urban women and those of the upper 
castes to seek outside employment. The low rate of employ-
ment of these women is also due to the limited job opportu-
nities, particularly in the white collar sector, of an 
industrializing society. Within an agrarian economic struc-
ture, rural and lower caste women can be expected to seek 
8since very few women in the sample work (23% are 
employed), a negative association will be more a reflection 
of not being employed than being in lower status occupa-
tions. As noted in Chapter V, women's occupational status 
ranges from unemployed (coded as 0) to professionals (coded 
as 12). A drawback of this measure lies in considering 
unemployed women as the lowest ca~egory in the occupational 
structure. A majority of these women belong to the upper 
social and economic strata. They do not work because it is 
socially undesirable to do so or because of the difficult 
job situation, particularly for the educated. It would have 
been more appropriate to use a dummy variable involving 
employed and unemployed women. 
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employment to supplement the family income. They also have 
definite functions in the agricultural process which 
explains why rural women tend to be employed more than their 
city counterparts. In the case of lower caste women, their 
higher occupational status also suggests increased opportu-
nities to overcome discrimination and to participate in the 
economic progress. 
Another aspect of women's employment and a possible 
consequence of the traditional nature of the economy is the 
importance of seniority as opposed to merit in determining 
movement up the occupational ladder. Not only are more 
older women employed but they are employed in higher status 
occupations compared to the younger women, inspite of the 
latter's higher education. In general, the structural fac-
tors (or characteristics of the groups to which these 
respondents belong)--area of residence, caste, and age 
cohort--have a traditional influence on women's occupational 
patterns. 
Individual achievements, such as education, have, on 
the contrary, an opposite impact on women's occupational 
status. Once the traditional influence of the background 
factors is controlled, women with higher education tend to 
be employed in higher status occupations. What is even more 
significant is that education, an individual characteristic, 
is a more dominating influence on women's occupational sta-
tus compared to their group traits. The significance of 
individual initiative in determining women's participation 
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in the occupational structure represents another important 
aspect of modernization in Kerala. 
Aside from these direct effects, several indirect 
paths further specify the conditions that encourage or 
hinder women's employment and their employment in higher 
status jobs. Higher education of urban residents and of 
upper caste women, is a very strong facilitator of women's 
employment. For instance, women in Capital City have a 
higher education in comparison with women in other areas and 
consequently tend to be employed in higher status jobs (path 
OW.WD1=.20). This may be due partly to the increased avail-
ability of higher status jobs in the Capital City. Simi-
larly, higher education also enables women in the Commercial 
City and upper caste women to be employed and to be employed 
in higher status occupations. In fact, the intervening 
influences of education in facilitating women's employment 
more than offsets the direct traditional effect of urban 
residence and upper caste status on women's employment.9 
Yet, when urban and upper caste women do overcome the social 
restrictions in the field of employment (a modern pattern), 
it is under circumstances that perpetuate caste and urban 
monopoly over development. This is evident in the case of 
upper caste women who live in the Capital City, where women 
have higher education and, therefore, are employed in higher 
9The direct path coefficient ODl is equal to -.12 in con-
trast to the indirect path OW.WD1=.20). 
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status jobs (path OlV.WDl.r-DlC=-.04). In shor-t, higher-
education does incr-ease the chances of women being employed; 
but such oppor-tunities ar-e still limited to ur-ban and upper-
caste women who tr-aditionally have had special access to 
higher- socioeconomic status. 
Age distinctions in women's employment status pr-ovides 
another- instance of the coexistence of the tr-aditional and 
the moder-n in Ker-ala. Aside fr-om benefitting directly from 
the principle of seniority (path OA=.lO), older women have 
higher status jobs because they reside in the Capital City 
where women generally have higher education (path 
OW.WDl.rDlA=.05). On the other hand, when younger women are 
in higher status jobs, it is because of their individual 
. 
achievements (higher education). There have been improve-
ments in the educational and, therefore, occupational oppor-
tunities available to younger women over time (path 
OW.WA=-.04). Yet, the limited nature of this progress over 
time is evident in the small size of these paths compared to 
the direct effect of seniority (path OA=.lO). Further, many 
of these women work in a predominantly agrarian occupational 
structure which would limit their access to upper white col-
lar and professional jobs. Though these women are employed, 
such employment may not constitute a major break from their 
traditional roles of mother and housewife. 
Analysis of the interrelationships among the indices 
of primary modernization trends in Kerala thus far presents 
a mixed picture. On the one hand, substantial advancements 
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have been achieved by women in improving their socioeconomic 
status. A fair correspondence also exists between urbaniza-
tion and socioeconomic modernization. Nonetheless, tradi-
tionally restrictive forces, such as caste status, still 
play a sizeable role in excluding the lower castes from par-
ticipating in the general economic and social progress that 
has been achieved. 
Secondary Modernization 
~ At Harriage 
While primary modernization is a pre-requisite for 
changes in fertility values and behavior, its effect is 
mediated through various channels, one of which is secondary 
modernization. Secondary modernization refers to the conse-
quences of urbanization, industrialization, and the concom-
mitant improvements in the socioeconomic status of individu-
als and families. The first set of indices of secondary 
modernization are basically demographic variables--age at 
marriage and infant mortality. Age at which a woman marries 
(M) can be hypothesized to have a quantitative influence on 
fertility by determining the number of reproductive years. 
At the same time, age at marriage also has a socioeconomic 
connotation. It denotes a set of values and beliefs associ-
ated with social and economic modernization as it influences 
age at marriage. 
As hypothesized, the most significant aspect of pri-
mary modernization that determines the age at which a woman 
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marries is her socioeconomic status. Women with higher 
education tend to postpone marriage at least until after 
completing their education (path MW=.35). Employment is 
another factor contributing to late marriages (path M0=.22), 
although its effect is not as strong as that of education. 
Women's employment is still not very widespread in Kerala, a 
factor limiting the impact of occupation on age at marriage. 
Further, families wait until after a girl completes her edu-
cation before they get her married. Her employment, on the 
other hand, is not that strong a deterrent to her marriage, 
reflecting the stronger significance attached to women's 
education over her occupation. Yet, working women tend to 
marry later than the non-working women for several reasons. 
They may wait until they are settled in their jobs before 
getting married because it increases their bargaining power 
in the marriage market. Still more important is that a per-
manent job places restrictions on the geographical area 
within which their search for a suitable partner will have 
to be confined. Such restrictions will tend to postpone 
their marriages even further. 
It is also true that women with higher education tend 
to postpone their marriage because such women also have 
higher status jobs (path MO.OW=.l2). In other words, the 
problem of finding a suitable partner, both in terms of 
their educational and occupational statuses becomes com-
pounded in such instances. Higher education and employment 
also modernize the values and ideas of these women and their 
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families concerning themselves and their role in their mar-
riages and in the society. Such changed concepts may per-
suade them to break away from the traditional customs of 
early marriage, motherhood, and housekeeping as their sole 
purpose in life. Improving the socioeconomic status of the 
women, therefore, modifies marriage practices that have a 
direct bearing on fertility. 
Infant Mortalit¥ 
What are the implications of the mixed patterns of 
primary modernization discussed earlier for rates of infant 
mortality (I), the second index of secondary modernization? 
Like age at marriage, inrant mortality is a demographic 
variable with quantitative and motivational effects on rer-
tility. The number of inrant deaths will numerically deter-
mine the size or the family. At the same time, under condi-
tions or high rates or infant mortality, couples may be 
motivated to have a large ramily as an insurance for the 
survival of at least a few. Hence, inrant mortality is a 
crucial factor in fertility analysis. 
Inrant mortality, in turn, is both a biological and 
social class phenomenon. The survival rate of infants is 
partly determined by the health of the mother and physical 
conditions, such as sanitation and availability of medical 
care, in which inrants grow. For instance, age of the 
respondents is a significant predictor of her rate or infant 
mortality. Older women tend to have experienced a higher 
proportion of infant deaths in their pregnancy histories 
than the younger cohorts (path IA=.lO). Several explana-
tions can be provided for this pattern, not the least of 
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which is the cohort effect. Prior to Independence in 1947 
and even in the post-independence era, when the majority of 
older women had their children, health and living conditions 
were poor and medical services meager. Health care and san-
itation facilities have since been improved considerably for 
all segments of society. Such improved health conditions 
may contribute to the lower infant mortality rates experi-
enced by the younger women. Older women also have longer 
childbearing histories, compared to the younger women. As a 
result, the likelihood of older women experiencing more 
pregnancies, and consequently more infant deaths are 
greater. 10 
Despite the significant advances in health care and 
living conditions in Kerala, social class still influences 
access to and effective utilization of these services. Even 
after the effect of age of wife is controlled, her family's 
socioeconomic status influences the rate of infant mortality 
in the family (path IH=-.11). Specifically, upper class 
families experienced fewer infant deaths, probably because 
they have easier access to modern and improved health care. 
10However, at this stage of the analysis only the recur-
sive link from infant mortality to actual fertility was 
included. The non-recursive relationship between infant 
mortality and actual fertility will be analyzed at a later 
time. 
r 
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Higher education may also involve a change in the percep-
tions about health and disease and a shift in the emphasis 
from curative to preventive health. 
In short, younger women experienced fewer child losses 
in their pregnancy histories reflecting either the improve-
ments in living and health conditions or fewer pregnancies 
among younger women. Yet, class distinctions in infant mor-
tality experienced by these women still persist. Narrowing 
such class disparities have to be an integral part of mod-
ernization and indirectly of the population control program 
in Kerala. 
Conjugal Role Relationships 
Conjugal role relationships (L), the ~hird index of 
secondary modernization, is another means of specifying the 
possible influence of socioeconomic factors on fertility. 
Unlike age at marriage and infant mortality which are prima-
rily demographic factors with quantitative influences on 
fertility, conjugal role relationships is a social psycho-
logical phenomenon. Conjugal role relationships refer to a 
system of values and attitudes about marriage and family 
that govern the nature of the relationships between the hus-
band and the wife and their familial roles. Modernization 
expressed in terms of conjugal role relationships can be 
conceptualized as a family situation, in which the husband 
and the wife share equal, yet interchangeable responsibili-
ties in family affairs. Such shared participation is prima-
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rily a reflection of the equality in the status of the man 
and the woman. In a traditional society, where women play a 
subordinate role, having a large family becomes an important 
source of prestige for them. Hence, improving women's sta-
tus will also have to be a critical goal of the population 
program. 
What are the conditions under which modern conjugal 
role relationships and improved status of women occur to 
enable joint participation of women with their husbands in 
carrying out familial activities? The most significant cor-
relate of jointness in role relationships is higher educa-
tion of the wife (path LW=.48). Higher education exposes 
women to ideas, roles, and functions that are effective 
alternatives to the subordinate familial roles traditionally 
prescribed for them. Such women also seem to translate 
these notions into practice within their family as expressed 
in their joint role relationships. Another factor that 
determines the nature of role relationships between the hus-
band and the wife is residence in the Capital City (path 
LD1=.13). Couples who live in the Capital City participate 
jointly in decision making and familial responsibilities to 
a larger extent than non-residents. Capital City offers its 
residents greater and varied exposure to modern ideas and 
' 
behavior patterns through mass media of communication, such 
as radio, the press, and the cinema. Limited housing condi-
tions in the city largely precludes the maintenance of an 
extended family. Family pressures from the older generation 
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to preserve the traditional division of labor will, there-
fore, be relatively absent in an urban setting. 
But the opportunities for individual advancements that 
exist in the Capital City have a stronger effect in modern-
izing role relationships than the direct effect of mere res-
idence in Capital City. Capital City's respondents enjoy a 
higher educational status and consequently have joint rela-
tionships (path LW.WD1=.18). 
A third factor that differentiates couples in their 
role relationships is their religious background. Christian 
respondents, possibly due to the Western component in Chris-
tianity, tend to be more joint in their relationships than 
the Hindus (path LR=-.08). Unlike Hinduism, Christianity is 
a highly organized religion stressing group participation in 
religious activities, an emphasis obviously carried into the 
secular life of its adherents. 
Improving the educational standards of women, in gen-
eral, is an effective tool in raising their status within 
the family. It is highly probable that the opportunities 
for equal participation in family affairs that higher educa-
tion provides women will play a major role in modernizing 
their fertility values and behavior. 
Another aspect of the patterns in primary and secon-
dary modernization that requires special mention is the sig-
nificant disparity in the extent of development in the rural 
and urban areas in Kerala. As noted in Chapter VI, Capital 
City is the most advanced of the four areas with Commercial 
274 
City occupying an intermediate position. In contrast, the 
two rural areas are traditional and very similar in their 
social and economic structures. Thus, involving the rural 
areas in the modernization trends is one of the major chal-
lenges that faces Kerala. 
Family Size Norms 
Ideal Family Size 
In the fertility model presented in Chapter III, mod-
ernization was hypothesized as influencing family size 
through the intervening set of family planning indicators. 
Researchers such as Davis (1975) and Schutzer (1978) have 
emphasized the need for evaluating the relationship of norms 
regarding family size (N) to fertility behavior. From a 
policy perspective, the argument is that couples have many 
children because they desire large families. Until there is 
a shift in desires or norms from large to smaller families 
no major change in fertility behavior can be expected. 
It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the correlates 
of ideal family size to determine how women with low ideals 
differ from those with high ideals. Women who marry late 
tend to idealize smaller families compared to those who 
marry young(path NM=-.09). When these women conceptualize 
the family size that would be ideal for them, they take into 
account the length of their reproductive span. Since women 
who marry when they are older also have a higher socioeco-
nomic status, they probably are aware of the dangers to 
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their health and the health of their children posed by 
pregnancies in the later years of the reproductive period. 
such women, because of their educational and occupational 
backgrounds can be expected to have similar aspirations for 
their children, aspirations which can be effectively ful-
filled only if they have a small family. 
It is this emphasis on upward mobility that is 
reflected more strongly in the influence of the family's 
social status on ideal family size (path NH=-.19). Smaller 
families tend to be idealized more by women with a higher 
social status than by women from the lower strata. Apart 
from the mobility aspirations upper class women may have for 
their children, their upper class status does not require 
them to be dependent on their children in their old age. 
There has also been a general shift toward smaller 
family size norms in more recent years, possibly due to the 
influence of the family planning program. Irrespective of 
their class backgrounds, younger women have smaller family 
size ideals than older women (path NA=.l7). 
Religion, the final correlate of ideal family size, 
presents an anomaly. Earlier, it was noted that the Chris-
tian respondents tend to be more modern in their relation-
ships than their Hindu counterparts. Yet, Christian women 
idealize larger families (path NR=-.09). The upper caste 
Christian families in Kerala (35% of the 31 Christian 
respondents are upper castes) are predominantly a land own-
ing class for whom large families are almost an economic 
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necessity. On the other hand, more than half the Christian 
respondents (65%) belong to the lowest castes in the hier-
archy, a position compounded by their lower class status. 
Thus, while the joint role relationships among the Chris-
tians is a consequence of the organized nature of Christian-
ity, their traditional family size norms is a more socioeco-
nomic phenomenon. This discrepancy explains the 
contradictions in their role structure and ideal family 
size. 
Family Planning Norms 
Attitude To Use Of Family Planning 
While improvements in the standards of living, raising 
the status of women, and modern family size norms provide a 
conducive framework for limiting the size of the family, 
such reductions can be achieved only through deliberate con-
trol of reproduction. The variety of family planning meth-
ods available enables couples to effectively control their 
pregnancies. Nonetheless, efficient use of family planning 
presupposes a favorable disposition towards the methods (D). 
One determinant of family planning attitudes of women 
in Kerala is their family size norms. As might be expected, 
women with modern (smaller) family size ideals also tend to 
be favorable to using family planning to achieve those small 
ideals effectively (path DN =.08). 11 Correspondence between 
11Family planning attitudes is scored in such a fashion 
that a lower score implies favorable dispositions. 
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family size norms and favorable dispositions to the means of 
actualizing those norms suggest a crystallization of modern 
family planning concepts. 
Women with higher education also appear to favor use 
of some method(s) of family planning to control pregnancies 
in contrast to the less educated women. Limiting their fam-
ily size can be expected to be more imperative to higher 
educated women (path DW=-.19). Women with higher education 
would have similar aspirations for their children, a goal 
which can be accomplished more effectively if they have 
fewer children. Besides, these women would be more capable 
of evaluating objectively the usefulness and side effects of 
different methods rather than form hasty judgements based on 
hearsay. Contrary to the expected pattern, however, resi-
dents of Commercial City tend to be less favorable to the 
use of family planning compared to women from other areas 
(path DD2=.15). It was in the Commercial City that the 
first mass sterilization camps and other propaganda cam-
paigns were conducted. Some of the adverse reaction of its 
residents may be a backlash against imaginary and real prob-
lems, such as harmful side effects, that accompany the ini-
tiation of such massive programs. Education allays some of 
these fears, even in the Commercial City. In other words, 
when respondents in the Commercial City have higher educa-
tion themselves, they are more favorable to the practice of 
family planning (path DW.WD2=-.03). Such differentials in 
perception of family planning methods exemplify the modern 
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values that accompany educational developments in the course 
of modernization. 
Practic·e Of Famil:z Planning 
Parit:z Of Famil:z Planning Initiation 
Whether couples practice family planning or how effec-
tively they use the method(s) of their choice would provide 
the proof of the intensity of the favorable disposition to 
family planning and consequently their modern status. Use 
of family planning early in the reproductive history (P) 
reflects the couple's desire to have control over their 
pregnancies and not to leave them to chance. As hypoth-
esized, women who view family planning favorably initiated 
birth control much earlier than women who are opposed to it 
(path PD=.ll). Similarly, women with smaller family size 
ideals also started family planning early in their pregnancy 
histories (path PN=.07). These women not only desire small 
families but attempt to actualize their norms. Early initi-
ation of family planning is an effective tool in realizing 
their desires. Such congruity between attitudes and prac-
tice, although not widespread, once again, denotes the crys-
tallization of modern fertility values and behavior. 
Another, and even stronger precondition for early use 
of birth control is joint participation in familial roles by 
the couple (path PL=-.25). In contrast, when there exists a 
traditional division of labor between the couple in terms of 
the duties of the man and the wife, birth control is post-
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noned. Joint participation by the couple essentially 
implies equality of the husband and wife's position in the 
family. It is not surprising that women who play an equal 
role tend to use family planning early. Women have more at 
stake in a pregnancy and their chances of using birth con-
trol to limit the size of the family to the size they desire 
are greater if they have an equal voice in the matter. 
Thus, the influence of role relationships on the timing of 
birth control is a consequence of the status of women in the 
family. 
Age at marriage, like conjugal role relationships, is 
another significant correlate of family planning behavior 
(path PM=-.27). Just as with joint role relationships, late 
marriages are a consequence of the improved social and eco-
nomic status of the women. This improved status influences 
their fertility behavior too. In other words, the higher 
status of women who marry at a later age predisposes them to 
control their births early in order to minimize accidental 
pregnancies. 
A fifth factor that determines how early a couple ini-
tiates use of family planning is the extent of infant mor-
tality the couple has experienced. Specifically, women who 
have lost children tend to postpone deliberate control of 
pregnancies in order to replace the child deaths. Or they 
may desire to have a large number of children to insure 
against further losses. If early and effective use of fam-
ily planning is to become more widespread, living standards 
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will have to improve so as to minimize child losses. 
Yet another index of the timing of family planning 
initiation is the status of the respondent's family. Cou-
ples with an upper class background started controlling 
their pregnancies earlier than the poorer respondents (path 
PH=-.20). Higher social status and early use of family 
planning are interrelated aspects of modern predispositions 
and behavior. Even more significant is the implication of 
the relative weakness of the impact of the husband's social 
status on family planning in comparison to the other indices 
of women's social status (particularly age at marriage and 
role relationships). It is surprising that in a male domi-
nated society, the indices of women's social status are 
stronger correlates of family planning behavior. 
The patterns delineated thus far suggest a definite 
class bias in the practice of family planning. However, 
changes in family planning behavior that surmount the class 
distinctions have occurred over time. It is evident in the 
strong impact of age of wife on the practice of birth con-
trol (path PA=.35). It is to the credit of the family plan-
ning program initiated in the late sixties and early seven-
ties that younger cohorts have departed from the traditional 
pattern and initiated birth control much earlier than their 
older counterparts •. 
One of the most unexpected findings in the study is 
the effect of residence in the Administrative Rural Area on 
family planning practice. These rural residents generally 
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initiated family planning earlier than the residents of the 
cities. Like age of the respondents, this pattern reflects 
the relative independence of family planning from moderniza-
tion. Specifically, it is the family planning program in 
this area that is responsible for the widespread early adop-
tion of birth control. Further, since women in the Adminis-
trative Rural Area tend to be younger, they have also ben-
efitted from the more recent trend toward early use of 
family planning (path PA.rAD3=-.05). 
Aside from these indirect links provided by the back-
ground variables, those traceable through the indices of 
primary and secondary modernization are very insignificant. 
Had the rural area been more developed, these modernization 
oaths would have been significantly stronger, indicating 
once again, the complementarity of family planning and mod-
ernization. 
In general, the differentials in the timing (parity) 
of the initiation of family planning signify the role of 
both modernization and the family planning program in mod-
ernizing family planning behavior. Moreover, in the realm 
of modernization, improving the status of women is an impor-
tant precondition of early and efficient use of family plan-
ning. 
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Sterilization Status 
Sterilization (S), aside from being a method of family 
planning, is of interest because it is a terminal method 
and, therefore, presents one of the most effective means of 
shortening the reproductive span. It is also significant 
because the poorer segments of the population most fre-
quently resort to it. As such, sterilization is different 
from the other reversible methods of birth control. While 
the timing and the use of temporary methods are indices of 
modernization, the use of sterilization presents an opposite 
pattern. 
Couples who initiate family planning later in their 
reproductive span tend to resort to sterilization to a 
larger extent than those who started birth control earlier 
(path SP=.l2). Sterilization, thus, becomes the final 
resort of couples who virtually had an uncontrolled preg-
nancy history and who in all probability have much larger 
families than they desired or could even sustain. 
A more compelling argument for the attractiveness of 
sterilization to the lower class is evident in the effect of 
the family's social status on sterilization. It is the 
poorer segments of society that have resorted to the termi-
nal method (path SH=-.14). In the absence of systematic and 
early control of reproduction, a permanent method that 
involves a single application seems most convenient for the 
lower class. In other words, couples who are poorer tend to 
postpone deliberate family planning until late in the preg-
nancy history when they decide to resort to sterilization 
(path SP.PH=-.02). 
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Sterilization has become more widespread only in 
recent years which is evident in the age of the respondents 
who have adopted it. As might be expected, the younger 
cohorts appear to favor sterilization more than the older 
women (path SA=-.24). But, when higher status involves mod-
ern fertility behavior, such as early initiation of family 
planning, younger women tend to accept the temporary methods 
(path SP.PA=.04). 
One basic theme that exists among these contradictory 
patterns is that sterilization is the poor person's contra-
ceptive, adopted as a last resort in the face of uncont-
rolled childbearing. Eventhough it is an almost perfect 
contraceptive, its role in reducing the family size is 
undercut by the fact that most couples who accept it, do so 
very late in their childbearing history. Further, despite 
its popularity in recent years, women with modern family 
planning behavior patterns utilize methods other than steri-
lization. 
Actual Family Size 
Actual fertility, the central concept in this study, 
is the most important element of the population problem in 
India. In the final analysis, it is the number of children 
each couple has that will determine whether India's popula-
tion will continue to grow or remain stable. It is, there-
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fore, imperative to identify the social, economic, 
demographic, and family planning factors that fertility 
behavior is responsive to. To pose the issue differently, 
given the nature and degree of development and family plan-
ning practice in Kerala, what kind of family size patterns 
can be delineated? From a policy perspective, identifying 
the characteristics of the couples with small families will 
provide guidelines as to the directions the population pro-
gram should adopt. 
To begin with an aspect closest to fertility behavior, 
the influence of sterilization status on family size con-
firms its appeal to the less modernized segments of society. 
In other words, couples who have accepted sterilization are 
not only poorer and traditional in their family planning 
behavior, they also tend to have large families (path 
FS=.06). On the contrary, early initiation of family plan-
ning is a very strong predictor of small family size (path 
FP=.64). In fact, a couple which initiated family planning 
after their second child would have one child more than a 
couple who started family planning before the first preg-
nancy. Thus, a convincing case exists for the effective 
role of family planning in checking actual fertility. Early 
use of birth control also implies consistent and efficient 
planning throughout the pregnancy history. (The correlation 
between parity of family planning initiation and overall 
family planning effectiveness is -.62). The strength of the 
direct influence of family planning practice on actual fer-
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tility, after the effect of modernization has been cont-
rolled suggests the significant role of family planning in 
the noteworthy reduction in Kerala's population growth rate 
between 1961 and 1981. 
Norms regarding family size is another deciding factor 
in the size of a couple's family. Women who idealize small 
families tend to conform to those norms and have smaller 
families (path FN=.08). In other words, subscribing to a 
small family norm generally provides the motivation to actu-
alize those desires. Women with small family norms also 
tend to have initiated family planning earlier and have 
lower actual fertility (path FP.PN=.05). Early initiation 
of family planning is a more concrete proof of the intensity 
of motivation of the couples who desire small families. 
Whatever the reason, these patterns support the theoretical 
argument presented in Chapter II that actual fertility can 
be reduced if couples desire smaller families. Yet, small 
family size norms are not sufficient conditions for reducing 
the family size. Under the influence of the family planning 
propaganda, there is a general consensus on the desirability 
of the small family, a factor contributing to the small size 
of the path from fertility values to fertility behavior. 
Additional factors, from the realm of modernization are nec-
essary to explain the differences in achieved family size. 
It would, therefore, be simplistic to assign exclusive 
credit to family planning in slowing the population growth 
rate in Kerala. In the first place, modernization was found 
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to be a significant correlate of family planning practice in 
the discussion of family planning presented earlier. Sec-
ondly, and perhaps of greater significance, modernization, 
even if it is at the secondary level, does directly affect 
the number of children a couple has. As noted at the begin-
ning of this chapter, three indices of modernization, age of 
the respondent, age at marriage, and infant mortality, that 
directly determine actual fertility have quantitative influ-
ences on fertility. Aside from their socioeconomic implica-
tions, the respondents' age and her age at marriage repre-
sent the number of years of the reproductive span available 
to the woman. The extent of infant mortality, similarly, 
quantitatively determines the number of surviving children. 
In short, the motivational aspects of modernization affect 
fertility by determining the amount of time a woman spends 
in reproduction or the number of surviving children. 
A better understanding of the dynamics of family size 
can be achieved through a detailed analysis of the influence 
of the three indices of modernization on fertility behavior. 
Among the three factors, infant mortality, an index of eco-
nomic development and health conditions, presents a unique 
case. According to the insurance and replacement hypoth-
eses, couples who have experienced larger numbers of infant 
deaths can be expected to replace these losses or have many 
children to ensure the survival of a desirable number. Nei-
ther of these patterns is directly evident in Kerala. On 
the contrary, in the short run, infant mortality can be 
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expected to have a negative impact on effective fertility by 
reducing the number of surviving children. It is this short 
run influence that is evident in the negative direct rela-
tionship between infant mortality and family size (path 
FI=-.27). 
When couples experience child deaths, they do not seem 
to replace all of their lost children. Part of the explana-
tion for the short term effects or the absence of influence 
of infant mortality could be found in the low level of 
infant mortality in Kerala coupled with the recency of the 
major decline in infant mortality since the 1960s. During 
1974-76 Kerala had an infant mortality rate of 55 per 1000 
live births compared to the national average of 132 per 1000 
for the same period (Visaria and Visaria, 1981). At the 
same time, it is also probable that couples do have many 
insurance births and consequently experience more infant 
deaths. They, however, do not replace all the deaths 
because they may be fairly satisfied with the surviving num-
ber of children. Some concrete evidence of this motiva-
tional impact of infant mortality is also available. Cou-
ples who have experienced higher infant mortality postpone 
using birth control so as to either replace their lost chil-
dren or to have insurance births. Consequently, such cou-
ples do have higher fertility (path FP.PI=.07). Such con-
trasting and coexisting patterns (viz. quantitative and 
motivational) in the impact of infant mortality on fertility 
may be a reflection of the modernizing status of the soci-
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ety. 
Age at ma~~iage and age of the ~espondent, the ~emain-
ing two indices of mode~nization p~esent a clea~e~ pictu~e 
of the ~amifications of mode~nization fo~ fe~tility. Women 
who ma~~Y late have smalle~ families compa~ed to those who 
ma~~Y ea~ly (path FM=-.20). The~e has also been a g~adual 
~eduction in family size ove~ the yea~s as evidenced by the 
lowe~ fe~tility of younge~ women (path FA=.l9). Younge~ 
coho~ts, i~~espective of thei~ backg~ounds, have pa~tici-
-pated in the development, especially in the field of educa-
tion that has occu~~ed in Ke~ala since Independence. Such 
achievements help the younge~ women b~eak away f~om the t~a-
ditional patte~n of high fe~tility cha~acteristic of olde~ 
women. 
Anothe~ implication of the inte~edia~y status of 
India's mode~nization lies in the indi~ect link p~ovided by 
infant mo~tality. Younge~ women, because of the ~ecent 
imp~ovements in health and nut~itional conditions, have 
expe~ienced lowe~ infant mo~tality. Yet, the ve~y recency 
of these improvements ensuring the survival of more chil-
dren, results in the higher fertility of the younge~ cohorts 
(path FI.IA=-.03). Conversely, some older women have 
smaller families because they expe~ienced mo~e infant 
deaths. In a word, while mode~nization does lead to fe~til-
ity ~eduction, its effect is ~estricted, in the sho~t ~un, 
by the limited degree and ~ecency of mode~nization. 
The role of modernization in curtailing fe~tility can 
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be st~engthened considerably if such progress is accompanied 
by modern family planning practices. Even though younger 
women have smaller family sizes than the older respondents 
(path FA= .19), the fertility differences among the cohorts 
is even wider when the younger women initiated birth control 
earlier (path FP.PA=.24). In other words, younger women 
have experienced much lower fertility because they started 
planning their families early. Similarly, age at marriage 
has strong indirect effects on fertility through family 
planning behavior (path FP.PM=-.18) that equals its direct 
effect (-.20). Women who marry late, because of their 
higher socioeconomic status and modern values are modern in 
their fertility behavior (smalle~ family size) too. They, 
however, also use family planning ea~ly and hence have lower 
fe~tility. These patte~ns exemplify the inte~actions 
between modernization and family planning in ~educing family 
size. 
Conclusion 
Rega~dless of whether individual o~ agg~egate level 
data is used, the data suggests one predominant patte~n-­
-Ke~ala appea~s to be in an intermediate stage of mode~niza­
tion whe~e both t~aditional and mode~n elements coexist. 
For instance, at the individual level there has been an 
improvement in the educational achievements of women ove~ 
time, ir~espective of their familial and caste backgrounds. 
Yet, these women gene~ally are not employed, eithe~ because 
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of subtle social sanctions against women's employment o~ the 
dea~th of employment oppo~tunities in a developing society. 
Use of agg~egate level data p~ovides a simila~ pictu~e. As 
noted in Chapte~ I, while Ke~ala can boast of the highe~ 
social status of its wonen compa~ed to the othe~ states in 
India, it is still one of the economically poo~est states. 
Simila~ patte~ns can be delineated in the family plan-
ning p~actices in Ke~ala. Family planning se~vices a~e 
widely available th~oughout the state and it has one of the 
highest ~ates of cont~aceptive acceptance in India (Visa~ia 
and Visa~ia, 1981: 24-25). Data p~esented in this study, 
howeve~, ~eveal socioeconomic diffe~entials in the p~actice 
of bi~th cont~ol. In the t~ansitional stages of development 
of a society, ea~ly and effective p~actice of family plan-
ning can be expected to be mo~e typical of the uppe~ class 
than the poo~e~ segments of the society. At the same time, 
it is to the c~edit of the family planning p~og~am that 
women in the Administ~ative Ru~al A~ea and younge~ women a~e 
mo~e effective cont~acepto~s in compa~ison to the city ~esi­
dents and olde~ women ~espectively. 
What a~e the implications of these mixed patte~ns fo~ 
fe~tility? Mode~n status, exemplified by young women and 
women who ma~~Y late, and ea~ly and effective use of family 
planning a~e both significant cha~acte~istics of couples 
with small families. Family planning, howeve~, has a 
st~onge~ influence in ~educing fe~tility than mode~nization. 
Specifically, those who initiated family planning ea~ly have 
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significantly lower fertility than those who enjoy a modern 
status. Consider two women with similar social statuses. 
If one of these women initiated family planning earlier than 
the other, the former, according to the data has a signifi-
cantly smaller family size than the latter. Differences in 
fertility between two women who initiated birth control at 
the same time, but have different social and economic sta-
tus, on the contrary, are not as pronounced. 
Nonetheless, those women who adopted birth control 
early are generally more modern than the late init~ators. 
But the relative weakness of the impact of modernization on 
family planning initiation and on actual family size (com-
pared to that of family planning on fertility) suggests that 
there are women from less modern backgrounds who initiated 
birth control early and consequently have lower fertility. 
It is also probable that some higher status women 'initiated 
family planning later in their pregnancy histories and had 
large families. Thus, contrary to the predictions of the 
modernization and family planning perspectives, both modern 
family planning behavior and modern social and economic sta-
tus have contributed to lower fertility in Kerala. 
One of the principal contributors to the effective 
family planning status of the less modern women is the wide-
spread availability of contraceptives made feasible by the 
family planning program. It is also possible to attribute 
the major credit for the reductions in fertility and in the 
rate of population growth in the 1970s in Kerala to the fam-
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ily planning program which played an effective role in mod-
ernizing family planning behavior. 
Despite its comparative weakness, modernization in 
itself has also been an important factor in controlling fer-
tility. It has been equally effective in reducing family 
size by modifying birth control practices as is evident, for 
example, in the similarities of the strength of the direct 
effect of age at marriage on fertility (-.20) and its indi-
rect effect through family planning initiation (-.18). As 
Kerala develops further, modernization can be expected to 
play a stronger role in curtailing fertility. A good case 
in point is infant mortality. The short term effects of 
lower infant mortality rates in increasing the family size 
by increasing the survival rates are predominant at present. 
At the same time, lower rates of infant mortality, even if 
to a lesser extent, does motivate couples to initiate family 
planning early in order to have smaller families. As docu-
mented by the Demographic transition theory, with the prog-
ress of modernization, such motivational influences of 
infant mortality in reducing the size of the family will 
become stronger. 
Finally, there is a general and increasing consensus 
among the younger age groups, irrespective of their class 
and caste status, on the small family as the ideal for fami-
lies for Kerala. Status differences still pervail in the 
family size norms; yet, they are not too prominent. Conse-
quently, the impact of the family size ideals on the prac-
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tice of family planning and actual fertility is not that 
strong. In other words, even though many couples idealize 
small families they not only do not practice family planning 
early in order to conform to those ideals but their actual 
fertility exceeds their ideals. Again, as the society 
develops and early adoption of birth control becomes more 
widespread the gap between the low ideals and actual fertil-
ity will be narrowed. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Acco~ding to the p~elimina~y ~epo~ts of the 1981 cen-
sus, Ke~ala is one of the th~ee states whose population has 
g~own at an ave~age annual g~owth ~ate of 1.9% du~ing the 
1971-81 decade despite a 2.6% ave~age annual inc~ease du~ing 
1961-1971. If the ~esults of this study a~e any indication, 
both the p~actice of family planning and mode~nization have 
played significant ~oles in cu~tailing fe~tility in Ke~ala, 
and consequently in slowing down its ~ate of population 
g~owth. The data, thus, lends exclusive c~edence to neithe~ 
of the two competing app~oaches to population cont~ol. To 
~ecapitulate, acco~ding to the the exponents of the mode~n­
ization pe~spective, unless a society develops economically 
and socially, p~og~ams to cu~tail population will not be 
effective. On the cont~a~y, the family planning pe~spective 
best exemplified by the wo~k of Tsui and Bogue (1978, 1979) 
contends that family planning p~og~ams have succeeded in 
cont~olling fe~tility even in societies with low levels of 
mode~nization. Hence, they a~gue it is not necessa~y fo~ 
nations to postpone int~oducing family planning until they 
a~e mode~nized. 
294 
The Modernization And Family Planning Perspectives: A 
Reassessment 
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Research in the modernization and family planning tra-
ditions are generally conducted with the Demographic trans-
ition theory as either an explicit or an implicit organizing 
framework. Transition theorists~ however, support only the 
broad thesis that societies experience demographic trans-
itions from high mortality and fertility levels to low vital 
rates in the process of modernization. Aside from these 
broad patterns, not much uniformity exists in the actual 
process of the transitions of the developed and developing 
societies. 
In the context of these broad processes, Coale (1974: 
65) specified three conditions that will facilitate the 
decline in fertility. According to Coale, conscious fertil-
ity decisions must be an acceptable behavior pattern in a 
society; small families must be perceived as economically 
and socially advantageous; and birth control information and 
methods must be readily and easily available to the moti-
vated couples. How can these conditions be achieved in a 
given society? The modernization and family planning per-
spectives are competing interpretations of the task of ere-
ating the motivation for small families and the desire to 
use family planning to limit family size. According to 
exponents of the modernization approach~ improvements in the 
economic and social status of families will create the moti-
vation to limit family size. In contrast, the family plan-
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ning theorists postulate that family planning programs can 
create the required 'cognitive preparation' (Tsui and Bogue, 
1979: 104) for accepting the small family norm and can also 
provide the birth control methods and services. In fact, 
family planning programs, they argue, can be successful even 
in societies with low levels of modernization. 
Critical analysis of previous research cited by the 
family planning camp and the findings of the present study 
suggest the complementarity of modernization and family 
planning in reducing fertility. The uniqueness of individ-
ual or regional transitions will arise from the specific 
combinations of the extent of modernization and the effec-
tiveness of the family planning programs. While developed 
nations completed their transitions during their moderniza-
tion, trends in today's developing countries indicate possi-
bilities for variations. Teitelbaum (1975: 177) points out 
one such important feature, among others: the role of gov-
ernments in the national family planning programs of devel-
oping countries which can provide the methods of family 
planning and also legitimize the small family norm. Kerala, 
thus, presents a unique situation. It is highly developed 
in the fields of education and health care even though its 
per capita income and gross national product are considera-
bly below the national average. At the same time, it also 
has a state wide family planning program providing services 
in both the rural and urban areas. With these patterns as a 
backdrop, this study provides evidence as to the specific 
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process through which Kerala has succeeded in reducing its 
fertility in an attempt to complete its transition. 
Comparisons of the four areas representing different 
levels of modernization suggested that an effectively organ-
ized and implemented family planning program can be success-
ful in modernizing family planning attitudes and behavior 
even in a rural area, such as the Administrative Rural Area. 
In contrast, respondents from Commercial City, where the 
regular family planning organization lacked leadership and 
dynamism, were comparatively traditional in their family 
planning norms and practices. Development in itself is, 
thus, insufficient to induce modern family planning behav-
ior. However, the results also indicate the importance of 
modernization to the overall family planning histories of 
women in Kerala. As the data from Capital City suggest, a 
family planning program will be most successful if it is 
introduced in a relatively modern context in which couples 
can be assumed to be motivated to adopt family planning to 
limit their family size. Yet, as the experience of the 
Administrative Rural Area indicates it is not necessary to 
postpone introducing a family planning program until a soci-
ety is well advanced in its modernization. To sum up, con-
trary to the expectations of the modernization perspective, 
even the modern couples will not adopt family planning 
unless the methods and services are readily available. On 
the contrary, family planning programs, however effective, 
are not sufficient to sustain the motivation and desires for 
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small families. 
What roles do modern status and family planning behav-
ior play in determining the fertility patterns among couples 
in Kerala? The data presented in this study indicate that 
family planning practices and modern status are synergistic 
in explaining differentials in fertility behavior. Initia-
tion of family planning, particularly in the early stages of 
the pregnancy history, explains to a major extent why many 
women in Kerala have smaller families than others. Even the 
residents of the Administrative Rural Area--the least mod-
ernized of the four areas--started using family planning 
much earlier than residents of the cities and the Commercial 
Rural Area. Such patterns appear to support the family 
planning perspective. 
But, modernization--operationalized as higher socioe-
conomic status of the family, higher age at marriage of the 
wife, fewer child losses, and joint role relationships 
between the husband and the wife--has been an important 
prerequisite for the early initiation of family planning. 
Women with modern characteristics, such as those younger 
women with a higher education (compared to the older women) 
and women who married when they were older, generally have 
fewer children. These modern women have lower fertility 
because they had also started family planning early in their 
childbearing process. Thus, fertility reductions in Kerala 
can be attributed to the interplay of modernization and fam-
ily planning. Stated differently, the 'cognitive prepara-
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tion' for accepting the small family norm and the means with 
which to actualize these norms have been created by both 
modernization and family planning programs in Kerala. 
How can existing fertility patterns in Kerala be char-
acterized? According to Schutzer's theory of demographic 
development (1978), Kerala's fertility levels are in the 
second stage of demographic development when achieved family 
size exceeds family size desires. It presents an opportune 
situation for the vigorous implementation of a family plan-
ning program at the grass roots level which would provide 
birth control information and methods and would continue to 
legitimize the small family norm. It is to the credit of 
the existing program that many younger women, irrespective 
of their socioeconomic backgrounds, idealize smaller fami-
lies in contrast to older women. Social class differen-
tials, however, exist in the family size norms of women in 
Kerala. Such class distinctions in ideal family size cou-
pled with the class differences in family planning and fer-
tility behavior suggest fertility in Kerala is in the pro-
cess of changing from a predominantly biological to a 
socioeconomic phenomenon. That the transformation is, how-
ever, not complete is evident in the influence of infant 
mortality on actual fertility. Lower infant mortality 
results in the survival of a larger number of children 
implying that the actual family size is, to a limited 
extent, determined by biological factors outside the control 
of the couple. But, lower infant mortality motivates cou-
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nles to have fewer children by initiating family planning 
early. As modernization progresses and as infant mortality 
is reduced further, the motivational influences of infant 
mortality in reducing family size will become stronger. 
Improvements in the educational and occupational sta-
tus of women are another aspect of modernization relevant to 
fertility. Although the socioeconomic status of women does 
not directly influence their fertility behavior, it is indi-
rectly relevant. The more modern woman marries when she is 
older and consequently reduces her reproductive span and 
family size. Many such women who marry late are also more 
modern in their family planning behavior and, therefore, 
have fewer children. Another medium through which higher 
educational status of women affects family planning behavior 
and ultimately fertility (as suggested also by van den Walle 
and Knodel, 1980) is conjugal role relationships. Women 
with higher education tend to participate jointly with their 
husbands in family matters. They also tend to view family 
planning more favorably. Many such couples initiate family 
planning early in their childbearing history resulting in 
lower fertility. Improvements in the opportunities for 
women to participate in non-familial and familial sectors, 
could, therefore, be a significant method of achieving 
smaller families. 
Easier access to sterilization, a permanent method of 
birth control, is yet another factor that will curtail fer-
tility. Sterilization in Kerala, however, has been the poor 
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person's contraceptive. It is also more popular among the 
younger cohorts of women. Resumption of the mass vasectomy 
camps and the provision of the opportunities for post partum 
sterilization in the hospitals of Kerala, along with mone-
tary and other incentives, will further reduce the rate of 
population growth. 
Another interesting pattern, which is perhaps a 
reflection of modernization achieved in Kerala thus far, is 
the limited role of background factors in explaining fertil-
ity differentials. Area of residence of the respondents and 
their caste and religious backgrounds do not affect their 
fertility behavior directly. But membership in these groups, 
still, to a large extent, determines access to the progress 
achieved in the state. For example, city respondents, upper 
caste women, and urban Christians have a higher socioeco-
nomic status than the rural, lower caste, and rural Chris-
tian women respectively. And it is these individual mani-
festations of modernization and family planning that 
influence actual fertility. In traditional Kerala, and for 
that matter in India with its strong collectivistic orienta-
tion, the social groups an individual belongs to determined 
many aspects of his life. The relative importance of indi-
vidual traits over group attributes, is an indication of the 
modernization of the society and the concommittant attenua-
tion of the influence of the group over the individual. 
Variations in modernization, family planning, and fer-
tility among the different age groups also exemplify the 
302 
declining importance of the influence of groups on individ-
ual behavior. Many younger women, despite their rural resi-
dence and lower caste status, have a higher socioeconomic 
status than the older women. Again, compared to the older 
cohorts, many younger respondents are more modern in their 
family size norms, family planning behavior, and actual fer-
tility. These cohort differences suggest the progress in 
modernization that has been achieved over time, the success 
of the family planning program in the past decade, and the 
declining significance of social groups in determining par-
ticipation in that progress. 
In short, the results of this study support the revi-
sionist version of the Demographic transition theory which 
upholds the concept of individual or regional transitions. 
Modernization, particularly improvements in the status of 
women and in health conditions, have contributed to Kerala's 
fertility declines. Family planning programs have rein-
forced the motivation for small families induced by modern-
ization and have also provided the methods to actualize the 
desires for small families. 
Major Policy Implications 
On the basis of these results, several ways of improv-
ing programs designed to curtail fertility in Kerala can be 
suggested. 
1 • Rural areas should be involved in the moderniza-
tion trends in Kerala to a greater extent. 
2. More opportunities need to be provided for the 
lower castes to participate in the general social 
and economic progress. 
,. Further improvements in the status of women are 
necessary to encourage modern family planning 
practices and lower fertility. 
a) Higher education of women is a significant fac-
tor in improving the status of women. 
b) Increased job opportunities that constitute a 
break from the traditional roles of housewife 
and mother, particularly for the educated 
women, are another means to improve their sta-
tus in the family and in the society. 
i) Education and employment of women will 
modify marriage practices, such as age at 
marriage, which reduce the reproductive 
span and family size. 
ii) Improving the socioeconomic status of 
women will also facilitate their equal 
participation in family affairs leading 
to modern family planning practices and 
lower fertility. 
4. Further reductions in infant mortality need to be 
achieved so that couples are motivated to have 
small families. 
5. The mass vasectomy camps and hospital facilities 
for post partum sterilization should be revital-
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ized, along with monetary and other incentives for 
acceptors. 
6. Concurrently, continued and effective administra-
tion of the existing family planning programs are 
also required. 
a) Such programs will include regular field visits 
by the family planning workers to maintain con-
tinuous and intensive contacts with individual 
couples, particularly the poor. These periodic 
visits will sustain their interest in family 
planning and will motivate them to persevere in 
using birth control to curtail their family 
size. 
b) The family planning health centers will also 
make the information regarding temporary birth 
control methods and services readily and easily 
available. 
i04 
Both modernization and family planning policies, thus, 
will be necessary to speed up the rate of fertility decline 
in Kerala. But, modernization cannot be achieved overnight. 
In the short run, therefore, it is necessary to coordinate 
the family planning programs efficiently so that the methods 
and services are available to all segments of the society. 
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Limitations Of The Study 
Although these patterns shed some light on the decline 
in the rate of population growth in the past decade, some 
caution needs to be exercized. This study uses cross-sec-
tional data to evaluate the impact of modernization and fam-
ily planning on fertility in Kerala. Time series data cov-
ering a span of at least two or three decades would have 
been more appropriate in assessing fertility trends. But 
such data, particularly at the individual level, is not 
available. Further, eventhough some trend data at the 
aggregate level is available, it is limited to the indices 
of socioeconomic modernization, such as education and infant 
mortality. Data on social psychological modernization (role 
relationships) can be attained only at the individual level 
of analysis. 
Another limitation of the study can be found in the 
use of only women as respondents. The problem is particu-
larly relevant to the social psychological variables, such 
as role relationships, and the attitudinal indices, ideal 
family size and family planning attitudes. Since women were 
the subjects of the interview, responses to these issues are 
basically the wives' family planning attitudes, their family 
size norms, and their perception of the kind of role rela-
tionships that they experience. Despite the validity of 
their perceptions, their husbands' opinions will also have 
an important bearing on their fertility. But interviewing 
men on private issues such as family planning use is nearly 
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impossible for a female researcher while financial limita-
tions precluded the hiring of a male interviewer. Hence, 
the decision was made to limit the study to the wives, who 
are directly involved in the process of childbearing. 
Some Directions For Future Research 
With these reservations in mind, it can be concluded 
that the practice of family planning has indeed considerably 
enhanced the effect of modernization. It would be interest-
ing to examine the extent to which these relationships hold 
in the other states of India. In the absence of survey data 
for the other states, another possibility would be to use 
aggregate indices of fertility, of socioeconomic develop-
ment, and of family planping programs and practices to 
determine the role of modernization and family planning 
among the states in India. A major advantage of using 
aggregate data is the availability of time series data. 
Three groups of states can be identified in terms of their 
population growth patterns. The first group consists of 
states similar to Kerala in that their populations grew by 
less than 2% per year during the 1971-1981 decade despite 
growing at the average rate of over 2% during 1961-71. 
Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Kerala are the three states which 
have succeeded in reducing their population growth rates 
over the last twenty years. At the other extreme are states 
such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh which while 
having experienced average growth rates of lower than 2% 
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during 1961-71, grew by more than 2% during 1971-81. A 
third group consists of Karnataka, West Bengal, Maharashtra, 
and Gujerat, which have maintained above 2% average annual 
growth rates both during the 1961-71 and 1971-81 decades. 1 
Relevant data can be collected for the states and the admin-
istrative districts within each state. Such analyses will 
aid in the identification of the elements that have hindered 
some states and aided others in controlling their growth 
rates. Family planning indicators can be expected to exert 
a more direct influence on fertility at the aggregate level 
also, with modernization being an important yet indirect 
influence on fertility. 
Another interesting finding of this study that needs 
to be further researched is the nature of family planning 
organization and its administration in Kerala. Every dis-
trict has its own family planning board which oversees the 
implementation of the program. An earlier study by Valsan 
(1977) on two districts, Ernakulam (which is included in the 
present research) and Malappuram, documented a major differ-
ence between the two. Despite the low level of socioeco-
nomic development of the Malappuram district, the leadership 
qualities of its medical personnel and the interest of its 
health staff were considered significant contributors to the 
practice of family planning among a large section of the 
1The data on population growth rates for India were 
obtained from Pravin Visaria and Leela Visaria, 1981. 
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eligible couples. In Ernakulam district, in contrast, the 
lack of dynamic leadership was often cited as a problem in 
the implementation of the family planning policies. Some 
indication of the poor performance in Ernakulam district is 
available in this study too. The respondents from the 
Administrative Rural Area, despite their lower socioeconomic 
status, were more modern in their family planning practices 
when compared with the sample from the urban and rural areas 
of Ernakulam district. Informal discussions and observa-
tions of the researcher during the fieldwork, in which the 
family planning health workers provided much assistance, 
revealed the enthusiasm of the medical leadership and the 
health staff in the urban and rural areas of Trivandrum dis-
trict. Thus, further research into the administrative 
aspects of the family planning program in all the districts 
of Kerala will aid in improving the implementation of the 
program in districts that lag behind. Detailed analyses of 
the districts with effective family planning programs will 
suggest specific incentives and means of popularizing family 
planning. For, while modernization is an important indirect 
catalyst of lower fertility, the short run and immediate 
approach to the population problem lies in the effective 
organization and implementation of the family planning pro-
gram. 
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CONJUGAL ROLE RELATIONSHIPS AND ITS INDICES 
Conjugal ~ole ~elationships include seven indices 
dealing with seven aspects of family life. The fi~st 
index--decision making--~efe~s to who makes decisions in the 
following eleven matte~s: management of financial affai~s, 
pu~chasing things fo~ daily needs, buying and selling p~op­
e~ty and othe~ expensive items, wife o~ husband taking up a 
job, education of child~en, t~aining and disciplining chil-
d~en, ma~~iage of child~en, size of the family, use of fam-
ily planning methods, going fo~ films and othe~ fo~s of 
~ec~eation, and allowing ~elatives to stay at home. This 
index is measu~ed as (0) a membe~ (mothe~, b~othe~) outside 
the conjugal pair, (1) husband always, (2) wife always, (3) 
husband more than wife, (4) wife mo~e than husband, and (5) 
husband and wife togethe~. Apa~t f~om being a measure of 
jointness, these indices also include elements of wife's 
cont~ol. In a male dominated society, a woman who has some 
cont~ol in family affai~s will be mo~e effective in planning 
he~ family. Therefo~e, ~esponse 2 was placed afte~ ~esponse 
1 and ~esponse 4 afte~ 3. 
The extent of sha~ing index deals with the extent to 
which husband and wife sha~e the following eleven activi-
ties--discussing wo~k P~.oblems, daily cho~es, looking afte~ 
child~en, teaching child~en at home, settling qua~~els and 
training child~en, ~eligious t~aining of child~en, taking 
meals, spending f~ee time, going for films o~ festivals, 
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playing with children, and discussing family planning prob-
lems. The responses are measured as (1) never, (2) rarely, 
(3) occasionally, (4) frequently, and (5) always. 
Dealing with outsiders index refers to the roles the 
husband and the wife play in visiting in-laws and relatives, 
visiting friends, entertaining friends, keeping contact with 
children's school authorities, and employment of servants. 
The responses are ranked as follows: (1) husband always, 
(2) wife always, (3) husband visits and entertains his 
friends and relatives and contacts son's school authorities 
while the wife visits and entertains her relatives and 
friends and contacts the daughter's school authorities, (4) 
husband more than wife, (5) wife more than husband, and (6) 
husband and wife together. 
The fourth index--participation in religious activi-
ties--covers family prayer, going to church or temple, and 
offering special prayers or poojas. On the religious par-
ticipation index, the responses are ranked as (0) no belief 
in religion, (l)husband alone/husband and children, (2) wife 
alone/wife and children, (3) husband alone/wife alone, (4) 
husband more than wife, (5) wife more than husband, (6) hus-
band and wife together/whole family. 
The extent of disagreement index includes disagreement 
between husband and wife on matters such as financial 
affairs, leisure time activities, jobs to be done by the man 
in the home, dealing with in-laws, bringing up children, and 
household matters in general. The responses range from (1) 
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always (least joint), (2) to a very large extent, (3) to a 
large extent, (4) somewhat, (5) to a small extent, (6)to a 
very small extent, and (7) never (most joint). 
'11he outcome of disagreements index is defined as what 
happens when there are disagreements between the husband and 
the wife. The responses to this index are ranked as (1) 
wife gives in and acts according to husband's wish, (2) hus-
band gives in and comes around to wife's way, (3) sometimes 
the husband gives in while sometimes the wife gives in, and 
(4) discussion and compromise. 
The final index, the pattern of solving disagreements 
is operationalized as how contained within the conjugal unit 
is the disagreement solving network. The responses are (1) 
mediation by friends, relatives, and children (most open), 
(2) mediation by children and relatives, (3) mediation by 
friends, (4) mediation by relatives, (5) mediation by chil-
dren, (6) solve between themselves and mediation by chil-
dren, and (7) solve between themselves. Containment 
includes two criteria: (1) how close to the conjugal pair 
is the problem solving network; and (2) how many different 
roles (both conjugal and non-conjugal) are involved in the 
mediation. According to the first criterion, mediation by 
children is closer to the conjugal pair than is mediation by 
relatives. On the basis of the second criterion, response 
number 2 implies more openness than mediation by relatives 
alone (response 4) or by children alone (response 5). How-
ever, response 6 was ranked before the last (and most closed 
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item) because it, unlike others, partially included problem 
solving between the couples too. 
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FAMILY PLANNING EFFECTIVENESS 
Family planning effectiveness refers to the extent to 
which couples have succeeded in preventing unplanned or 
unwanted conceptions (Stokes, 1973: 300). Following 
Stokes, family planning effectiveness can be measured by 
classifying as planned or unplanned each pregnancy. The 
pregnancy is planned if use of family planning devices is 
not initiated so as to have a child or deliberately stopped 
to have a child(A). The rest of the pregnancy categories 
denote lack of planning in different ways. It is unplanned 
if the pregnancy occurred eventhough some method(s) was 
beintf- use<1 regularly, in which case it is termed an acciden-
tal pregnancy (B). A pregnancy is defined as unintended (C) 
if it occurred while use of some method had to be stopped 
for reasons such as health, side effects, running out of 
supplies, religious considerations, etc. If the pregnancy 
occurred before a method was used, but the child was not 
wanted immediately, it is called an unintended 'D' preg-
nancy. Finally, the 'never-thought-of-it' pregnancies are 
those which just happened in the course of the marriage 
without any of the above considerations. 
APPENDIX C 
FAMILY SIZE DECISIONS IN KERALA, INDIA 
Schedule No. 
Tvm.Rural ( ) 
Tvm. Urban ( ) 
Ekm.Rural ( ) 
Ekm.Urban ( 
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION 
Al. Name of the Head of the Household: 
A2. Name of the Respondent: 
A3. Address: 
A4. Religion: 
A5. Caste: 
A6. Do you possess the following items? 
l.A.C. ( ); 2. Car ( ); 3. Telephone ( ); 
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4. Refrigerator ( ); 5. Motor Cycle ( ); 6. Radio ( ); 
7. Flush Latrine ( ) ; 8. Shower Bath ( ) ; 9. Geyser ( ) ; 
10. Cooking Range ( ); 11. Bicycle ( ); 12. Clock ( ); 
13. Steel Utensils ( ); 14. Settee ( ); 
15. Transistor ( ). 
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B. Household Composition: Form I. 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
! ! 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
Relation Sex Age Educ- Occu- Monthly 
to H.H. ation pation Income 
------------------------------------------------------
! ! 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
B2. How old were you when you got married? 
B3. Have you or your husband undergone sterilization? 
Husband: Yes ( ) No ( ); Wife Yes ( ) No ( ) . 
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C. Pregnancy Record: Form II. 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
Sl. Date of Type of If alive, Age, if If dead, 
No. termin- termin- sex living Age at 
ation at ion* death 
------------------------------------------------------ ! 
! ! 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
* Type of Termination: (l)Live birth; (2) Still Birth; (3) 
Induced abortion; (4) Spontaneous abortion. 
(Go over the Pregnancy Record. Ask Cl to C2 if there is an 
interval of two years or more between two pregnancies or 
since the last pregnancy. Ask Cl and C2 for each such rela-
tively long pregnancy interval.) 
Cl. After the ---th delivery, ----years seem to have lapsed 
before you got pregnant the ---th time. Did we miss 
any pregnancies that occurred in this period? 
Yes ( ); No ( ). (If yes, mark in Form B.) 
C2. If no, was there any special reason why you did not 
become pregnant for such a long time? 
1. Husband away ( ); 2. Used birth control ( ); 
~. Had some difficulty in having children ( ); 
4. Any other (specify) ( ). 
C3. Are you pregnant now? Yes ( ); No ( ); 
Do not know ( ). 
C4. If yes, when is the baby due? 
Year ( ); Month ( ). 
D. Family Size 
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Inspect the pregnancy record and count the number of living 
sons and daughters. 
No. of Sons ( ) 
No. of Daughters ( ). 
Ask Dl to D3 to the non-sterilized respondents: 
Dl. How many (more) children do you want to have? 
D2. Among these, how many boys and how many girls 
do you want to have? 
---boys; ---girls; ---either sex O.K. 
D3. Why do you want ---more children and not 
more or less? 
For both sterilized and non-sterilized respondents: 
D4. If your married life were to start all over again, 
you have as much money as you possibly need, 
and you could have just the number of 
children you want, how many would you want to have? 
D5. Among these, how many boys and how many girls 
would you want to have? 
---boys; ---girls; ---either sex O.K. 
D6. Why do you want ---children and not more or less? 
D7. How many children would your husband want 
to have? 
DB. Among these, how many boys and how many girls 
would he want to have? 
---boys; ---girls; ---either sex O.K. 
D9. Why does he want ---children and not more or less? 
(Refer to the beginning of Section D and 
fill ~ the following) 
Actual family Size ( ); Ideal Family Size ( ). 
If actual is equal to ideal: 
ask sterilized respondents Dl3 to Dl5 (b) 
ask non-sterilized respondents DlO (a) to DlO(e). 
DlO (a) After the birth of the last child, have you 
been doing or will you be doing anything to 
avoid having any more children? 
Yes ( ) Specify; No ( ). 
DlO (b) If not, why not? 
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DlO (c) Are you satisfied with the sex combination 
of the number of children you have? 
Yes ( ); No ( ). 
DlO (d) If yes, is it because you are satisfied 
with the sex combination that your ideal has 
corresponded with your actual family size? 
Yes ( ) ; No ( ) • 
DlO (e) If no, what are the other reasons? 
(If actual is greater than ideal, ask both 
sterilized and non-sterilized respondents) 
Dll (a) After the birth of any child, did you feel 
you had enough children and that you did not 
any more? 
Yes ( ) ; No ( ) • 
Dll (b) If yes, after the birth of which child 
did you feel you wanted no more children? 
---th child. 
Dll (c) After the birth of that child, did you do 
anything to avoid having more children? 
Yes ( ) Specify; No ( ) • 
Dll (d) If no, why did'nt you? 
Dll (e) Did the difference in sex combination 
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affect your decision concerning the actual 
number of children you have? 
Yes ( ); No ( ). 
(For sterilized respondents~ to Dl3 to Dl5 (b)). 
(If actual is less than ideal, ask non-sterilized 
respondents only) 
Dl2 (a) Do you intend to complete the ideal number 
you would like to have? Yes ( ); No ( ). 
Dl2 (b) If yes, why? 
Dl2 (c) If not, why not? 
(If actual is less than ideal, ask sterilized 
respondents only). 
Dl3. Why did you decide not to have any more 
children and go in for sterilization? 
1. biological difficulty ( ); 2. satisfied 
with the number of children( ); 3. Satisfied 
with sex combination ( ); 4. Any other ( ) 
Dl4 Who took the final decision regarding 
sterilization? 
1. Husband ( ); 2. Wife ( ); 3. Together( ); 
4. Others (specify). 
Dl5 (a) Have you ever regretted your decision 
regarding sterilization? Yes ( ); No ( ). 
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Dl5 (b) If yes, give ~easons. 
Ask both ste~ilized and non-ste~ilized ~espondents. 
Dl6 (a) How many child~en, do you think would be 
on the whole ideal fo~ an ave~age family in 
ou~ place? ----child~en. 
Dl6 (b) Among them, hm'l many should be boys and 
how many gi~ls? 
---boys; ---gi~ls; ---eithe~ sex O.K. 
Dl7 Why do you conside~ ---child~en as ideal 
fo~ an ave~age family in ou~ place? 
Dl8 (a) How many child~en do you think would be 
on the whole ideal fo~ a family like 
you~s? ----child~en. 
Dl8 (b) Among them, how many boys and how many gi~ls? 
---boys; gi~ls; ---eithe~ sex O.K. 
Dl9 Why do you think ---child~en is ideal fo~ a 
family such as you~s? 
D20 (a) Do you think it is allright fo~ ma~~ied 
couples who a~e physically able to p~oduce 
child~en, to choose to have none at all? 
1. all~ight ( ); 2. Not ~ight ( ) 
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~.Any othe~ (specify). 
020 (b) Why do you think so? 
021 How many yea~s/months afte~ ma~~iage, 
should come the fi~st baby? 
022 What is the inte~val you would p~efe~ 
between child bi~ths? 
D23 How many child~en would you like you~ 
son o~ daughte~ to have? 
E. Family Planning Effectiveness 
El How would you desc~ibe each of you~ p~egnancies? 
Select one of the following ~esponses. 
A) Planned--Use of family planning devices 
eithe~ not initiated o~ delibe~ately stopped 
to have a child. 
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B) Accidental--With use of family planning method. 
C) Unintended--Use of family planning methods 
stopped fo~ ~easons such as health 
conside~ations, side effects, ~unning out 
of supplies, ~eligious conside~ations. 
D) Unintended--Without use of family 
planning methods. 
E) Neve~-thought-of-it. 
FORM III. 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
! ! 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
Serial No. Description of pregnancy 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
E2. What is your attitude and your husband's 
attitude towards the use of family planning 
methods to prevent pregnancy? 
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+----------------------------------------------------------+ ! ! 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
Attitude Wife Husband 
Indispensable 
Favorable 
Indifferent 
Unfavorable 
Totally Opposed 
Conditional ! 
! ! 
+----------------------------------------------------------+ 
E3 If conditional, explain: 
E4 (a) Is there anyone in this household who 
disapproves of your using family planning 
methods to prevent or postpone pregnancy? 
Yes ( ); No ();Do not know ( ). 
E4 (b) If yes, what is the reason for disapproval? 
E5 What is your total monthly expenditure? 
E6 Do you have (a) savings? (b )debts? 
E7 Interviewer's Assessment of the respondent's status: 
1. Upper class ( ) ; 2. Upper middle ( ) ; 
1. Lower middle ( ); 4. Lower ( ) 
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E8 Housing condition: 
(a) Roof-----l.Thatched( ) 2.Tiled( ) 3.Terraced ( 
(b) Wall-----l.Mud ( ) 2.Brick( ) 3.Plastered( 
( c ) Flooring-l.Cowdung( ) 2.Cement( ) 3.Mosaic ( 
(d)Latrine---l.Open ( ) 2.Pit ( ) 3.Flush ( 
F How are decisions on the following matters taken in 
your family? Choose from one of the following: 
(l).Husband always; (2). Husband more than wife; 
(3). Husband and wife together; (4). Wife more 
than husband; (5) Wife always; (6) Any other 
(specify) 
1 .Management of financial affairs. i.e., who decides about 
spending money for various family needs: 
2.Choice of things/shopping for day to day needs such as 
provisions, clothes, etc.: 
~.Buying and selling property, building a house 
and purchase of other costly items: 
4.Wife or husband taking up a job: 
5.Education of children, i.e., matters such as the school 
or college to which they go, choice of subjects: 
6.Training and disciplining children: 
7.Marriage of children, i.e., choice of partner, marriage 
marriage expenses, etc.: 
8.Number of children (Family Size): 
9.Use of family planning methods: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
lO.Going for films and other forms of recreation: 
ll.Allowing relatives to stay at horne: 
G. To what extent do you and your husband share 
the following activities? Would you say: 
(l)Never; (2)Rarely; (3)0ccasionally; 
(4)Frequently; (5)Always. 
l.Discussing work problems: 
2.Daily chores in the horne, such as preparing food, 
cleaning up, minor repairs, shopping for 
provisions: 
~.Looking after children: 
4.Teaching children at horne: 
s.settling quarrels and training children: 
6.Religious training of children: 
7.Taking meals: 
8.Spending free time, such as chatting together, 
listening to the radio, going to the park, etc.: 
9.Going for films or festivals: 
lO.Playing with children: 
ll.Discussing family planning problems (family size, 
use of family planning methods: 
H. In dealing with outsiders, what part do you play 
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along with your husband? Would you say: 
(l)Husband always; (2)Husband more than wife: 
(3). Husband and wife together; (4)Wife more 
than husband; (5)Wife always. 
l.Visiting in-laws and relatives: 
2.Visiting friends: 
3.Entertaining visitors: 
4.Keeping contact with children's school 
authorities: 
S.Employment of servants: 
I. How does your family participate in the 
following activities? Would you say: 
(l)Husband alone; (2)Husband more than wife; 
(3)Both together; (4)Wife more than husband; 
(5)Wife alone; (6)Wife and children; 
(7)Husband and children; (8)Whole family 
l.Family prayer: 
2.Going to church or temple: 
i.Offering of special prayers or poojas: 
J. To what extent do you have disagreements with 
your husband on the following matters? Would you 
say: (l)Always; (2)To a very large extent; 
(3)To a large extent; (4)Somewhat; (5)To a small 
extent; (6)To a very small extent; (7)Never. 
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!.Financial matters: 
2.Leisure-Time activities: 
i.Jobs to be done by the man in the house: 
4.Dealing with in-laws: 
5.Bringing up children: 
6.Household matters: 
K. When there are disagreements between you 
and your husband, what usually happens? 
l.You give in and act according to his wish 
2.He gives in and comes around to your way 
1.Sometimes one way and sometimes the other 
4.Discussion and come to a compromise 
L. How do you solve your disagreements? 
1. Mediation by friends ( 
2. Mediation by relatives ( 
3. Mediation by children ( 
4 • Solve between yourselves 
Date: 
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( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
APPENDIX D 
ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED CORRElATIONS IN 'lliE FERTILITY IDDEL l, 2 • 3 
Dl n2 D3 R c A H w 0 
~ 1.0 -.4232 -.3341 .0239 -.1790 .2492 .4444 .3211 .0929 
n2 ... 1.0 -.3121 .1000 .0505 .0403 -.0639 -.0109 -.0405 
D3 ... . .. 1.0 -.2689 -.0619 -.1345 -.2169 -.1783 -.0854 
R . . . ... . .. 1.0 -.1038 -.0221 .0242 .0483 -.0324 
c ... . .. . . . . .. 1.0 -.1625 -.3194 -.2645 -.0424 
A ... . .. . . . . . . . .. 1.0 .1941 .0509 .0759 
H ... . .. -.1738 .0507 . .. .1604 1.0 .7508 .2939 
w ... . .. -.1408 .0496 . .. . .. . .. 1.0 .4664 
0 . . . . .. -.0245 .0014 . . . ... . 3309 . .. 1.0 
10rigi.nal correlations are above the diagonal; reproduced correlations are belc:M the diagonal . 
w 
t; 
ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED OORREI.ATIONS (Continued) l 
M I L l\{ D p s F 
M 1.0 -.0019 .2674 -.1468 -.0499 -.3959 -.1509 -.4643 
I -.0340 1.0 -.0702 .0325 .0497 .1822 -.0891 -.1449 
L .2317 -.0407 1.0 -.1439 -.1417 -.4233 ~.1294 -.3524 
N -.1510 .0357 -.0842 1.0 .1300 .2402 .1031 .2870 
D -.0983 .0195 -.1144 .1180 1.0 .2250 .1119 .1372 
p 
-.3993 .1834 -.3833 .2297 .2095 1.0 .0734 .7519 
s -.0991 -.0894 -.1136 .0196 .0446 .0763 1.0 .1269 
F -.4556 -.1368 -.2809 .2764 .1613 .7501 .1121 1.0 
10rigina.l correlations are above the diagonal; Reproduced correlations are below. 
~ 
ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED CORRELATIONS (Continued) 2 
M I L N D p s F 
Dl .1358 -.0529 .2852 -.0964 -.1316 -.1106 .00 -.0720 
n2 -.0326 .0479 -.0467 .0553 .1577 .1148 .00 .0846 
D3 -.0561 .0114 -.1225 .0384 -.0828 -.0670 .00 -.0169 
R -.0049 -.0441 -.0505 -.0928 .0527 .0479 .0558 -.0304 
c -.1189 .0427 -.1643 .0739 .1242 .1105 .1403 .0891 
Dl .1319 -.0243 .2852 -.0552 -.1285 -.0920 -.1281 -.0426 
n2 -.0125 .0114 -.0691 .0111 .1541 .0974 .0101 .0705 
D3 -.0543 .0057 -.0913 .0378 -.0703 -.0831 .0446 -.0634 
R .0176 -.0080 .0505 -.0997 -.0025 .0098 .0003 -.0076 
c -.1012 .0192 -.1428 .0503 .0612 .0875 .0906 .0490 
2. Top panel contains the original correlations ; Bottom panel contains the reproduced correlations. 
~ 
ORIGINAL AND REPRODUCED CORRElATIONS (Continued) 2 
M I L N D p s F 
A .0383 .0816 .0136 .1273 .0537 .3313 -.2289 .3689 
H .3239 -.0927 .4540 -.1847 -.1683 -.3466 -.2156 -.2741 
w .4488 -.0887 .5192 -.2048 -.2055 -.4277 -.1654 -.3632 
0 .3781 -.0076 .2386 -.0929 -.0366 -.2141 -.0841 -.1854 
A .0341 .0854 .0592 .1339 .0078 .3240 -.2255 .3649 
H .3328 -.0962 .4156 -.1933 -.1660 -.3564 -.2085 -.2643 
w ... -.0794 .5191 -.1762 -.2030 -.4063 -.1565 -.3401 
0 ... -.0295 .2362 -.0840 -.1002 -.2159 -.0866 -.2021 
2. Top panel--original correlations; Bottom panel--reproduced correlations 
* 
3. DJ. ---Capital City 
n2---Ca:rmarcial City 
D3---Achninistrative Rural Area 
R---Religion 
C---Caste 
A---Age of Wife 
H---HUsband's Education 
W---Wife's Education 
a---Occupation of Wife 
M---Age at M3.rriage 
I---Infant MOrtality 
L---Conjugal Role Relationships 
N---Ideal Family Size 
D---Family Planning Attitudes 
P---Parity of Family Planning Initiation 
S---Sterilization Status 
F---Actual Family Size 
347 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The dissertation submitted by Marilyn Fernandez has been read 
and approved by the following ccmnittee: 
Dr. Kirsten A. Gr~j erg, Director 
Associate Professor' Sociology, wyola 
Dr. Kenneth M. Johnson 
Assistant Professor, Sociology, wyola 
Dr. Robert W. Hodge 
Professor, Sociology, University of Southem Califomia 
Dr. Kathleen M. McCourt 
Assistant Professor, S<?ciology, wyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies 
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated 
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the 
Comnittee with reference to content and fo~"'Il. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Ibctor of Philosophy. 
348 
